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ABSTRACT 
 
As a quantitative auditing tool for Physical Protection Systems (PPS) the Estimated 
Adversary Sequence Interruption (EASI) model has been available for many years. 
Nevertheless, once a systems macro-state measure has been commissioned (Pi) against 
its defined threat using EASI, there must be a means of articulating its continued 
efficacy (steady state) or its degradation over time. The purpose of this multi-phase 
study was to develop the concept and define the term entropic security decay.  Phase 
one presented documentary benchmarks for security decay. This phase was broken into 
three stages; stage one presented General Systems Theory (GST) as a systems 
benchmark for the study. Stage two applied the writings from stage one to physical 
security, and stage three presented a benchmark for considering physical system decay. 
Phase two incorporated the pilot study towards validating the feasibility of undertaking 
the main study and refining interview instrumentation. Phase three executed the main 
study, extracting and presenting security experts (N=6) thoughts, feelings and 
experiences with the phenomenon of security decay. Phase four provided the 
interpretative analysis, responding to the study’s research question.  
 
The study found that within a systems approach to physical security there is a complex 
interrelationship between the built environment, physical controls, technology, people 
and management processes as they achieve the elements of Defence in Depth. Within 
this complex interrelationship the study indicated that decay occurs at the constituent 
level, and if left undetected expands to affect the sub-system in which it is located. 
Furthermore, based on the interrelationary aspects of Physical Protection Systems (PPS) 
the decay expands from its point of entry into the remainder of the system, propagating 
throughout the Defence in Depth system. The study suggested that security decay theory 
is primarily concerned with managing the natural entropic processes/pressures occurring 
against commissioned levels of effectiveness within PPS. In addition, the study 
indicated that in order to maintain PPS at their commissioned levels of effectiveness 
during their life cycle, they need to be managed in accordance with their commissioned 
designed specifications. The most effective method to manage decay in order to 
maintain the designed specifications within PPS is through the utilization of a 
performance indicator frame work, which facilitates full management of the system. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses the effects decay has within the systems approach utilised when 
implementing security strategies, specifically the theory of defence in depth. Defence in 
depth is implemented within a risk management framework to reduce an organisation’s 
identified risks which could lead to undesirable and unacceptable consequences. This 
theory aims to link layered security elements into a system to ensure a holistic and 
functional security system, underpinned by the functions of: deter, detect, delay and 
response. For such a system to be commissioned, and maintain its commissioning 
effectiveness these functions must be performed in their sequential order and within a 
period of time, which is less than an adversary’s task time. This paper argues that such a 
relationship between the defence in depth elements, and each elements constituents 
requires an orderly relationship, and that factors which impede this orderliness directly 
affects the security system as a whole. This paper applies the concept of entropy, 
referred to as the steady degradation of a system, underpinned by the characteristics of 
disorganisation and decay to argue that a security system can become degraded through 
the reduction in effectiveness of its individual components. Such degradation decays the 
effectiveness of the whole system. Within the risk management frame work this paper 
argues that as decay increases, risk reduction decreases, therefore risk exposure 
increases.    
 
Key words: security, decay, entropic, defence-in-depth, risk management. 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The concept of risk management is well established in academic and organisational 
literature and to some degree, so is security risk management; however, the 
effectiveness of security risk management has been questioned (Brooks, 2009, p. 1). 
Therefore, this study discusses how security risk management may be implemented in a 
systems approach, using the theory of Defence in Depth whilst being cognizant of the 
concept of entropy. It has been proposed that defence in depth strategies can be impeded 
by the characteristics of disorganization and decay underpinning entropy. For an 
organisation to maintain a sound security profile, all Defence in Depth elements and 
their constituents must be maintained at their optimum level of performance. It is 
argued that organisational security should draw on the concept of entropy to establish 
the concept of security decay, which results in a reduction in overall system 
performance and avoidance through the active monitoring and reviewing of treatment 
strategies. 
1.2 Background of the Study  
In contemporary business, risk management is considered a significant management 
activity. Borgsdorf and Pliszka (1999, p. 6) define risk management as “the planning, 
organising, leading and controlling of an organisation’s resources” to minimise the 
potential of negative effects on the business activity. This approach is a formal 
systematic process that includes identifying exposure to risk, evaluating methods to 
manage risk, implementing treatment strategies, ongoing performance monitoring of 
implemented strategies and implementing necessary adjustments to such strategies, 
referred to as a systems approach (Hatfield & Hipel, 2002, p. 1054). Such an approach 
is supported through Australian Standards in risk management (AS/NZS ISO 31000: 
2009) and security risk management (Standards Australia, 2006). Security management 
has embraced the risk management concept for planning how organisational resources 
can be efficiently and effectively managed to reduce the chances of negative outcomes 
from breaches of security programs.  
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1.2.1 Physical security 
For contemporary security professionals, risk arises from a combination of a threat 
exploiting some vulnerability such that it could cause some harm to an asset, where an 
asset is considered anything with value and need in protection, normally including 
people, information, property and reputation (Burns-Howell, Cordier & Erikson,  2003, 
p. 11). The risk management process includes the implementation of acceptable 
practices; procedures and principles which when organised into a cohesive whole have 
the desired effect of significantly reducing the statistical chances of undesirable events 
against such assets from occurring. Therefore the aim of security controls (design) is to 
decrease the ratio of unfavourable events to total events (Broder, 2006, p. 25). Such a 
planning process in security management is in general referred to as security risk 
management. 
 
In addressing security risk concerns, Standards Australia HB167 security risk 
management  (2006, p. 63) states “the key elements of organisational, community or 
individual security controls are those components which contribute to the management 
of risks through their ability to deter, detect, delay, respond and recover from adversary 
attacks”, such a view is supported by Somerson (2009, p. 13) who states, “a security 
programs objectives in controlling for security related risks are to deter, detect, 
delay/deny, respond and where necessary recover from reasonably foreseeable attacks”. 
According to Burns-Howell, Cordier and Erikson (2003, p. 11) acceptable risks can be 
defined as “a judgement on the unique elements of each risk, with the decision based 
either on the costs of protecting an asset, balanced with the costs if it is damaged or lost, 
or on the organisation’s appetite for accepting risks. Therefore, a security risk 
management plan determines the level of treatment controls required based on a 
facility’s risk rating and are implemented in accordance with the theory of defence in 
depth (Garcia, 2001).  
 
The theory of defence in depth aims to link layered security elements into a system 
incorporating people, technology, barriers and procedures to ensure a holistic and 
functional security system (Smith, 2003, p. 8). This system delivers effective risk based 
decisions, enhanced operational effectiveness, and a reduction in overall risks and costs 
(Trusted Information Sharing Network, 2008, p. 2). However, it has been argued that 
security controls can degrade over time reducing the level of risk treatment. This 
argument was first considered by Underwood (1984) who referred to decaying security, 
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stating, “security decay is the most serious threat to a security system” and that 
“security decay must be expected”, “avoided”, and “countered” (Underwood, 1984, p. 
xi). Underwood (1984, pp. 249-250) postulated that:  
“the provision of effective security is paradoxically the first step towards 
decay, as an effective system will not only repel successful attacks, but also 
prevent the attacks being made: arguing an illusion is then created that the 
established security is unnecessary suggesting decay will follow until the 
degree of security falls to the point where an attack will succeed”.  
 
Underwood’s (1984) writings were reviewed by McClure’s (1997) thesis “Security 
Decay: the erosion of effective security”, where he viewed the theory of security decay 
as being primarily concerned with the influence apathy has on security. McClure (1997, 
p. 4) defined security decay as “a concept and phenomenon when effective security 
indirectly causes an attitude of apathy towards the provision of security, resulting in 
ineffectiveness’. McClure (1997, p. 4) states:  
“apathy leads to poor compliance with security policy and procedures 
causing a decay of security effectiveness”.  
However, it could be argued that a lack of education and awareness leads to security 
decay or that the two arguments are interlinked. Nevertheless, such arguments only 
consider minimal causal factors and do not consider holistic factors, nor describe where 
security decay lies within the Defence in Depth system.     
 
Consistent with the writings of Underwood (1984) and McClure (1997) it can 
reasonably be argued that the concept of security decay is a significant risk to any 
security program. However, to date very little dedicated research has been conducted 
into the area. Furthermore, what has been discussed provides very limited insight. For 
example, according to Garcia (2001, p. 6) the theory of Defence in Depth should be 
implemented in security management using a systems approach. Garcia’s (2001) views 
are supported by many published security authors (Underwood, 1984; Fennelly, 1997; 
Fisher & Green, 2003). In addition, Underwood (1984, p. xi) states “It is important that 
security is seen as a whole, and both designed and operated as a system”. Such views 
indicate that security should be designed, implemented and managed as a system. In 
considering Underwood’s (1984, p. xi) writings, Bittel (1978, p. 652) explains that the 
practice of management also requires a system approach. Underwood (1984, p. xi) 
points out that the normal processes of management by objectives should be applied to 
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the establishment of the security system. In considering the systems approach to both 
security and management, it can be argued that nobody would deny the importance of 
applying systems thinking and analysis to security management.  
 
The systems approach to both security and management is a well supported theme. As 
such, it is reasonable to argue that any discussion in relation to a holistic approach to 
security decay must consider a systems approach. This approach must include 
designing, implementing, and managing the security system. That is, a holistic approach 
to security decay must encompass both the processes in establishing the system and the 
ongoing management processes which aim to ensure the system reliably delivers, over 
time, the output for which it was commissioned. In light of such literature, the study 
supports the concept of security decay; however, argues that the concept of security 
decay must be considered, defined and applied congruous with the systems approach 
utilized to employ the theory of Defence in Depth.  
 
However, to date there is a dearth of dedicated published research pertaining to security 
decay. This study argues previous approaches by both Underwood (1984) and McClure 
(1997) were viewed through a narrowly focused lens and are therefore limited in that 
they did not consider the systems approach to security. The systems approach to 
Defence in Depth interrelates the functions of detect, delay and response into an 
effective security system, referred to as a Physical Protection System (PPS) (Garcia, 
2001, p. 5). As such, this research argues that any theory of security decay must be 
considered within this approach. The study postulates that decay within a security 
system lies within both the elements and their constituents of detect, delay and response 
and in their interrelationships towards achieving the desired protection goal. Whereby 
factors such as apathy are only contributors towards decay and do not represent the 
salient contributor or actual decay within the system.  
 
In considering the concept of security decay from a systems approach, according to 
Hamlyn (1969, p. 16) explanations in science may be divided into two kinds. First, 
explanations made by reference to laws; second, explanations made by reference to 
theories. According to Hamlyn (1969, pp. 16-17) in making reference to laws we seek 
to account for deviations from expectations by reference to the law. In contrast, theories 
are invoked to account for laws and in doing so, seek to provide a model of some sort 
into which the laws may be incorporated. It is therefore argued that any consideration of 
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security decay within a systems approach must be discussed by either drawing on those 
scientific laws and/or theories which apply to systems in general.  
1.3 Significance of the Study 
The security industry, both government and commercial, rely on the application of 
security risk management. Risk management is becoming a well established discipline, 
with its own body of knowledge and domain practitioners. States worldwide have their 
own risk management standards and in many of these states, it is the company director’s 
responsibility to ensure that appropriate risk management meets internal and external 
compliance requirements. Nevertheless, many of these standards and compliance 
requirements only consider risk management, not security risk management. However, 
security risk management is unique from other forms of risk management and many of 
the more generic risk models lack key concepts necessary for effective design, 
application and risk mitigation (Brooks, 2009, p. 1). 
 
It is expected that characteristics that may make an organisation prone to entropic decay 
can be identified and measured. Once these characteristics are understood, this will 
allow the use of considered funding to stimulate and maintain the effectiveness of 
various security risk mitigation strategies. Therefore, this research aims to expand 
Underwood’s (1984) and McClure’s (1997) theory of security decay towards 
establishing the theory of entropic security decay. This theory is based on the argument 
that security is achieved through a systems approach and that all systems if left will 
degrade due to the effects of natural entropy. 
1.4 Purpose of the study 
The concept of entropy inevitably leads to security systems decaying over time, 
reducing their commissioning levels of efficiency and effectiveness. To purpose of this 
study is to articulate the concept and define the term entropic security decay.  
 
1.4.1 Objectives 
 
1. To determine if the theory of entropic security decay is supported by security 
experts. 
2. To identify a framework for evaluating entropic security decay. 
3. To formulate a definition for security decay. 
4. To stimulate academic discourse into the concept of security decay. 
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1.4.2 Research Question 
Do security experts support the theoretical validity of entropic decay theory, which 
argues that security decay is represented by “the gradual degradation of the microscopic 
quantities (constituents), and, or, the gradual degradation in the relationship between the 
microscopic and macroscopic quantities within a security system”? 
 
This research question was considered by responding to the following sub-questions: 
 
1. Do security experts support the systems approach to implementing effective 
security controls?  
 
2. Do security experts support the argument that security systems can and do suffer 
from decay? 
 
3. Do security experts support that security decay lies within the systems elements, 
constituents and their interrelationship? 
1.5 Study Overview 
According to Lin (1976, p. 5) “social research follows a sequence of phases”, as such, 
the study adopted a multiple phase approach incorporating a number of sequential 
phases to achieve the research outcomes. Figure 1.1 presents the phased sequencing, 
designed to facilitate a logical step by step approach towards responding to the study’s 
research question.  
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 Figure 1.1 Study Phases (Adjusted from Lin, 1976, p. 6). 
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The study was designed to explore, define and develop deeper understandings towards 
the concept of security decay. Hamlyn (1969, p. 16) stated “explanations in science 
are/can be divided into two kinds, those which make reference to laws, and those which 
make reference to theories”. In exploring the phenomenon of security decay from a 
systems approach, consistent with Hamlyn’s (1969, p. 16) writings stage one of phase 
one of the study made reference to theories, developing a literature based benchmark for 
considering measured security by drawing on the theory of Defence in Depth and 
General Systems Theory (GST) (Chapters 2 and 3). At the completion of a security 
system benchmark; the study then made reference of laws towards developing a 
literature based benchmark for considering degradation or decay within an open systems 
approach to physical security (Chapter 4).  
 
Phase two of the study aimed to consider security experts thoughts, feelings and 
understanding of security decay within a systems approach to implementing effective 
physical security through the use of a semi-structured interview questionnaire, starting 
with a pilot study (Chapter 6). At the completion of the pilot study, the semi-structured 
interview questionnaire was adjusted to increase its usability and draw out deeper data. 
Phase three incorporated the main study interviews using the Delphi methodology 
(Chapters 7-8). Phase four (Chapter 9) of the study sought to interpret the interview data 
in relation to the three research sub-questions and the study’s research question. This 
phase aimed to validate the theoretical assumptions underpinning the theory of entropic 
security decay. The final phase, phase five (Chapter 10) presented the study’s findings, 
limitations, its recommendations and conclusion.  
1.6 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the study’s background and the current limitations within the 
area of security decay. The study was designed to reduce the current knowledge gaps 
through developing deeper understanding of security decay from a systems approach. In 
developing a deeper understanding the study sought to define the term entropic security 
decay. The study produced a number of beneficial outcomes. (1), a system based 
understanding of security decay. (2), expert validation of the theoretical underpinnings 
of entropic decay theory. (3), a systems framework for managing Physical Protection 
Systems (PPS) in a manner to maintain their commissioned effectiveness over their life 
cycle and (4) initial deductive definition of Security Decay.  
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CHAPTER 2 
A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO SECURITY 
 
2.0 Introduction 
Phase one of the study requires the establishment of a systems framed security decay 
benchmark. This benchmark was established through a conceptual review of literature. 
The choice of such a literature review stems the writings of Stake (2010, pp. 109-111) 
who explains that some literature reviews aspire to maximise the broad and complex 
conceptual standing of the research question/s, encompassing a vast number of citations 
working across multiple disciplines, extending the understanding of a specific 
phenomenon related to different fields. Such literature reviews bring together writings 
on diverse matters towards providing an existing framework for deductively exploring 
phenomenon (Patton, 2002, p. 453). The conceptual review was achieved via a 
documentary analysis of published materials including books, journal papers, 
conference materials and internet web sites. Stake (2010, pp. 109-111) advocates the 
benefits of such a conceptual review, stating “it significantly contributes to highlighting 
the complexity of a professional problem”.   
 
This chapter presents the first stage of phase one of the study; establishing a systems 
approach to security benchmark. The chapter presents the common thread within 
published security literature leading to the study’s theoretical foundation (underlying 
theory); being General Systems Theory (GST). This chapter is broken into a number of 
sequential sections. Section 2.1 discusses the difficulties associated with academic 
security research and provides an operational definition of security for the study. 
Section 2.2 presents the systems literature towards providing an open systems frame for 
considering physical security within a systems approach. Section 2.3 concludes the 
chapter.  
2.1 Security 
Security management in contemporary times concerns a wide spectrum of activities and 
skills. According to McCrie (2004, p. 11) conceptually, and in actuality, no 
contemporary organisation can survive or thrive without adequate security. However, 
security is a multi-disciplinary profession (Brooks, 2007, p. 1), where the concept of 
security can have different meanings depending on context. As a result of its diversity, 
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security as a profession lacks consensus in definition (Borodzicz & Gibson, 2006, 
p.182; Manunta, 1999, p. 58). Such definitional diversity has implications for security 
research. For example, in establishing an academic security frame for considering 
security decay, Lorenz (1963; 1968) stated “once the initial state of a system is known, 
then any changes in this state can be considered as its measure of error”. Such a view 
was also presented by Pitzer (1995, p. 26) who considered that when measuring a 
quantity, a standard must be chosen, then find a means of comparing the measurement 
of an object of interest with this standard”. McClure (1997, p. 59) referred to this as 
“benchmarking”, drawing on the works of O’Leary (1995 cited in McClure 1997, p. 59) 
who defined benchmarking as “the process of constantly measuring and assessing 
products, services and practices against recognised standards”. However, as McClure 
(1997, p. 59) wrote “the problem faced in benchmarking a security function, is 
recognising a standard on which to compare”.  
2.1.1 Security as a construct 
Security as a construct, is one of ancient need (Underwood, 1984, p. x), which 
according to Maslow (1970, p. 39) for humans has its basis in psychological necessity. 
In discussing the concept of security Maslow (1970, pp. 35-46) states “the concept of 
security relates to humans having a hierarchy of five universal needs”. These needs 
include: 
1. Survival needs- food and shelter; 
2. Safety needs- protection and security; 
3. Love, affection, and a sense of belonging-the need for humans to feel part of 
social groups, such as families, religious groups, fraternal societies; 
4. Esteem needs- the need for self satisfaction with work and group activities and 
social recognition from others; 
5. Self-actualization-which Maslow defined as the simultaneous fulfilling of the 
first four (4) needs.  
Within Maslow’s (1970) hierarchy of needs the concept of security is one of the more 
basic needs and encompasses; stability, dependency, protection, freedom from fear, 
from anxiety and chaos, need for structure, order, law, limits and strength in the 
protector, which collectively are defined as “security”. Based on the hierarchy of needs 
Maslow (1970, p. 39) considers that if security needs are not fulfilled an individuals’ 
ability to achieve those higher order needs are impeded. In considering security within 
the context of social organisation, security has been connected with the notion of law 
and order (Manunta, 1999, p. 60), where according to Maslow (1970, p. 43) whenever a 
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threat to law, order, or to the authority of society occurs a regression from those other 
lower level needs rapidly occurs towards the safety/protection/security needs. 
 
In discussing the diversity within the contemporary security profession Somerson 
(2009, p. 51) considers that the connection between safety, protection and security is 
drawn from humans early functional pursuit of self protection against the felonious acts 
of others. However, in considering the notion of safety within the concept of security 
Somerson (2009, p. 51) suggests this originated from mans commissioning of barriers to 
guard himself from “the duncery of his own negligence”, where the sum of these guards 
provides the function of safety.  
 
In contemporary times this diversity has lead to the concept of security being defined in 
many ways, for example, Craighead (2003, p. 21) defines security as “free from danger” 
or “safe”. However, Fisher and Green (2004, p. 21) defines security as “a stable 
relatively predictable environment in which an individual or group may pursue its ends 
without disruption or harm and without fear or disturbance or injury”. Such a definition 
is supported by O’Block, Donnermeyer and Doeren (1991, p. 7) who define security as 
“freedom from fear of crime and the actual danger of being the victim of crime”.  
 
In considering the various definitions of security put forward by Fisher and Green 
(2004) and others (O’Block, Donnermeyer and Doeren, 1991; Craighead, 2003, p. 21) it 
is argued that whilst they share common themes they are descriptive in nature, therefore 
more representative of dictionary definitions, which Runyon, Coleman and Pittenger 
(2000, p. 11) suggest lack observable and measurable variables. In the context of 
operational security such criticisms and viewpoint are supported by Manunta (1999, p. 
58) who argues all encompassing descriptive definitions are inadequate, purporting 
security must be considered by a more functional, clearer definition. It is argued that 
Manunta’s (1999) approach would be more congruous with Maslow’s (1970) discourse 
on security.  
 
In considering Manunta’s (1999) standpoint, the Concise Dictionary (p. 497) defines 
functional as (1) involving, or containing a function or functions, regarded as the 
“intended purpose” (2) “practical” rather than decorative (3) capable of “working”, 
meaning Manunta (1999) takes on a purposeful “functionalism” approach to security. 
For example, Manunta (1999, p. 58) defines security as “a function of the presence and 
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interaction of Asset (A) requiring protection from either a person, organisation or 
community referred to as Protector (P), a Threat (T) to the asset requiring protection in a 
given Situation (Si)” defining security by the formula S=  ƒ(A, P, T) Si.  Manunta 
(1999, p. 58) argues the absence of one of the core elements (A, P, or T) voids the 
concept of security of its significance, as without an Asset there is nothing to protect, 
without a Threat there is no reason to protect, and without a Protector there is no 
striving for or pursuit of security.  
 
Manunta’s (1999, p. 58) functional approach towards security is supported by Cohen 
and Felson’s (1979) Routine Activity Theory. This theory, within the context of law and 
order, postulates that for a crime to occur there must come together a likely offender, a 
suitable target and the absence of capable guardians. Such an approach towards 
definition is congruous with Underwood’s (1984, p. x) definition of security, defining 
security as “confidence in the retention of belongings”, “confidence in personal safety”. 
In considering various sentiments towards defining security Manunta (1999, p. 58) 
argues that functional definitions have advantages over descriptive views. According to 
Manunta (1999, p. 58) they separate beliefs and chance approaches from managed 
security, distinguishing security from other attached concepts such as safety, yet being 
general enough to embrace all types and levels of Assets, Protectors and Threats in all 
possible Situations.  
 
The separation of security from safety at the functional level is supported by Somerson 
(2009, p. 51) and Garcia (2001, p. 2). Somerson (2009, p. 51) highlights the sentiment 
that, whilst both domains address themselves directly towards augmenting overall 
organisational objectives, their emphasised functions remain separate. For example, 
security as a function has received its greatest emphasis in economic loss prevention 
and defence industries. A focus supported by Garcia (2001, p. 2) who refers to security 
as systems used to prevent or detect an attack by a malevolent human adversary. Whilst 
Garcia (2001) accepts there are some overlaps with safety, as a function security’s 
salient focus is on preventing attacks by malevolent human adversaries. In contrast, 
according to Somerson (2009, p. 51) safety’s emphasis is based in losses arising from 
workers compensation claims.  
 
Such a functional approach towards security is considered both a process of activity and 
a condition resulting from that activity (O’Block, et al, 1991, p. 15). For example, as a 
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process, it can be considered that security can be regarded as the utilization of people, 
equipment, and procedures to reduce or eliminate risk of loss of assets, tangible and 
intangible, from causes and events not considered to be within the boundaries of 
conventional speculative or profit/loss activities. As a function, security can be 
considered the use of “measures designed to safeguard people, to prevent unauthorised 
access to equipment, facilities, materials and documents (information) (O’Block, et al, 
1991, p. 7).  
 
It is argued by Post, Kingsbury and Schachtsiek, (1991, pp. 97-99) that to achieve a 
holistic security program for any organisation it is a requirement that physical, 
personnel and information security components be interrelated into a comprehensive 
barrier system. Whilst the level of focus each organisation places on these components 
will vary depending on business environment and risk exposures, from a functional 
approach, all three systems (Figure 2.1) must be present within every organisation to 
provide a comprehensive security function.    
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Holistic organisational security program (Adjusted from Post, Kingsbury & 
Schachtsiek, 1991, pp. 97-99).  
 
2.1.2 Defence in Depth 
From a functional perspective, security as a domain discipline, collectively embraces a 
historically consistent strategy towards preventing theft, destruction of facilities, the 
protection of personnel and information, referred to as Defence in Depth (Smith, 2003, 
p. 8). The theory of Defence in Depth is underpinned by the functions of deter, detect, 
delay, response and recovery (Standards Australia HB 167:2006, p. 3). According to 
Smith (2003, p. 8) this strategy (Defence in Depth) has been applied to the protection of 
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assets for centuries, based on the argument that a protected asset should be enclosed by 
a succession of barriers, to restrict penetration of unauthorised access, towards proving 
time for an appropriate response and recovery (Standards Australia HB 167:2006, p. 3). 
 
In applying the theory of Defence in Depth Francis (1992, p. 2) explains that this 
strategy (Figure 2.2) results in further layers of protection being encountered as deeper 
progression occurs into a facility. Whenever a breakdown in one barrier occurs, whether 
by accident or deliberate breach, one or more barriers remain to maintain reliable and 
effective access control. The functions of Defence in Depth elements are:  
 Deterrence - psychological measures or cues implemented to deter opportunistic 
offenders from perpetrating deviant acts; 
 Detection - means to alert organisations that an attack or breach is underway; 
 Delay - physical means for retarding the progress of anyone who has gained an un-
authorized level of access; 
 Response - an organisations’ means of interrupting persons who have breached the 
security perimeter of a facility; 
 Recovery – is a planned and prepared approach to reactivating to a realised event. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Theory of Defence in Depth (MIL-HDBK-1013/1, 1993, p. 28).  
 
In discussing the theory of Defence in Depth further, Smith (2003, p. 8) highlights that 
this strategy aims to link layered security elements into a “system” incorporating; 
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people, technology, barriers and procedures to ensure a holistic and functional security 
system. For example, Figure 2.2 shows how defence in depth layers are linked into a 
barrier “system” incorporating discrete sequential tasks which must be successfully 
overcome by an adversary, before they are interrupted by a response force, to achieve 
their objective.  
2.1.3 Security defined 
In their discussion of the security industry Borodzicz and Gibson (2006, pp. 181-182) 
highlight that in contemporary times’ security is a key aspect in organisational 
management, yet a universal definition remains problematic. Brooks (2008, p. 5) argued 
that security can only achieve definition through applied context and concept definition, 
where according to Brooks (2008, p. 5) concept definition may be achievable through a 
consensual body of knowledge. In considering such definitional barriers Borodzicz and 
Gibson (2006, pp. 181-182) explain that the common thread is a desire on the part of all 
practitioners to protect those assets, which they hold to be valuable, from deliberate 
malicious human intervention in the form of perceived risks and perpetrated 
consequences using a variety of countermeasures.  
 
Despite a common cause within the security domain, a fundamental issue remains, to 
scientifically study a topic requires a definition which enables researchers to describe 
processes and variables by which an object, event or construct can be observed and 
objectively measured. Such a definition is termed an “operational definition”. To 
facilitate objective measurement it is therefore necessary to utilize or formulate such a 
definition (Runyon, Coleman & Pittenger, 2000, p. 11). Given security as a profession 
lacks consensus in definition (Borodzicz and Gibson, 2006, p.182; Manunta, 1999, p. 
58) this study engaged in thematic analysis (Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2006, p. 259) 
extracting common themes (factors) and key words (processes) from the available 
literature (see; Maslow, 1970; Felson, 1979; O’Block, Donnermeyer & Doeren, 1991; 
Post, Kingsbury & Schachtsiek, 1991; Manunta, 1999; Garcia, 2001; Craighead, 2003; 
Fisher & Green, 2004; Borodzicz & Gibson, 2006; Standards Australia HB 167; 
Brooks, 2007; Somerson, 2009) to establish an operational definition, operationally 
defining security as: 
A stable condition stemming from a systematic process which effectively 
combines people, equipment and procedures, within a security context, 
to restrict unauthorised access to either people, information or physical 
assets through their ability to deter, detect, delay and respond to attacks 
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which may lead to loss of, or, harm to protected assets manifested by a 
malevolent human adversary/s who seek/s to gain a level of 
unauthorised access. 
 
This study argues that such a definition enables a security context to be established, 
enables direct observation of measures combined to deter, detect, delay and respond to 
adversary attacks therefore facilitating objective measurement of the protection systems 
effectiveness, which is essential in any endeavour to objectively study a phenomenon 
under investigation.  
2.2 Underlying theory 
The theory of Defence in Depth is implemented in security management using a 
systems approach (Garcia, 2001, p. 6), an approach supported by many published 
security professional (Underwood, 1984, p. xi; Fennelly, 1997; Garcia, 2001, p. 6; 
Fisher & Green, 2003, p. 164). As Fennelly (1997, p. 59) states “maximum security is a 
concept, whereas alarm systems, physical barriers, guard forces and other components 
of a security system do not individually (in isolation) achieve this”. Fisher and Green 
(2003, p. 147) support Fennelly’s (1997) viewpoint, adding, every security program 
must be an integrated “whole”. As such, the underlying theory for this study was 
General Systems Theory (GST). 
2.2.1 Systems theory, history and science 
The systems approach towards operational security stems from the science of systems 
thinking. Systems approach originated in biology in the 1920s, through the works of 
Kohler to elaborate the most general properties of inorganic compared to organic 
systems (Bertalanffy, 1969, p. 11); however, as an area of scientific generalization, the 
idea of a General Systems Theory (GST) was first introduced by Bertalanffy (1950). 
Bertalanffy (1950, p. 142) believed a general theory of systems should be an important 
regulative device in science to guard against superficial analogies which he regarded as 
having no basis in science.  
 
At the same time that Bertalanffy was developing GST, Wiener (1948) was developing 
cybernetics as a result of developments in computer technology, self-regulating 
machines and information theory (Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 15). Cybernetics is a theory of 
control systems based on communication transfer (transfer of information) between 
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systems, the environment and within the system, and control (feedback) of the systems’ 
function in regards to the environment (Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 22).  
 
These developments in systems thinking occurred simultaneously with Shannon and 
Weaver’s (1949) information theory, and Von Neuman and Morgenstern’s (1947) Game 
Theory (Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 15). Information theory is based on the concept of 
information identified by an expression isomorphic to negative entropy of 
thermodynamics, where the information may be used as a measure of organisation. 
Game Theory is a “system” of antagonistic “forces” with specifications, concerned with 
the behaviour of seemingly “rational” players to obtain maximal gains and minimal 
losses by appropriate strategies against other players (or nature) (Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 
22). However, the focus for this study is the application of Bertalanffy’s (1950) General 
Systems Theory (GST) to the security literature.    
 
According to Bertalanffy (1950, p. 139) General Systems Theory (GST) is a logico-
mathematical field, with the subject matter being the formulation and deduction of those 
principles which are valid for ‘systems’ in general. Bertalanffy (1950, p. 139) stated 
“there are principles which apply to systems in general, whatever the nature of their 
component elements, or of the relations or forces between them. Bertalanffy (1950, p. 
142) considered that GST should be methodologically; an important means of 
controlling and investigating the transfer of principles from one field to another, where 
it should no longer be necessary to duplicate or triplicate the discovery of the same 
principles in different fields, isolated from each other. 
 
Systems Theory according to Checkland (1981, p.5) is a meta-discipline, that is, in 
contrast to other disciplines, which are concerned with particular sets of phenomena 
such as chemistry or physics. GST’s focus is towards subject matter which can be 
applied within virtually any other discipline. The underlying premises supporting the 
systems approach to science stems from the argument that, general aspects and 
viewpoints in different fields of science are alike, and that we find formally identical or 
isomorphic laws in completely different fields of science (Bertalanffy, 1950, pp. 136-
138). That is, the isomorphism of natural laws are characterised by the fact that they, in 
general, hold for certain classes of complexes or systems, irrespective of the special 
kinds of entities involved.  
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As such, general systems laws exist which apply to any system of a certain type, 
irrespective of the particular properties of the system or elements involved. In 
discussing the premises of systems theory Checkland (1981, p.6) explains that science 
provides man with the phrase “a scientific approach”, just as systems provides “a 
systems approach”. Both approaches are meta-disciplines, and both embody a particular 
way of regarding the world.  
 
Bertalanffy (1968, p. 6) further explains that the systems approach according to the 
basic propositions of science; as systems are part of the scientific tradition; assumes the 
world contains structural wholes, which can maintain their identity under a range of 
conditions and exhibit certain general principles of “wholeness”. Bertalanffy (1968, pp. 
36-37) considered that prior to systems theory, science attempted to explain observable 
phenomena by reducing it into its elementary units, independently of each other. A 
process Bertalanffy (1968) refers to as reductionism. However, according to Bertalanffy 
(1968, p. 18) conceptions in science appeared which were concerned with “wholeness”, 
where wholeness relates to problems of organisation, phenomena not observable by 
respective parts in isolation.  
 
Bertalanffy (1968, p. 18) considered “the system problem as essentially, a problem of 
such limited analytical procedures in science (reductionism)”. According to Bertalanffy 
(1968, p. 18) the success of reductionism principles are highly applicable depending on 
two conditions. First, the interrelations between “parts” must be non-existent or weak 
enough to be neglected for certain research purposes. Second, the relations describing 
the parts be linear, only then is the condition of sumativity given i.e., an equation 
describing the behaviour of the total is the same form as the equations describing the 
behaviour of the parts. 
 
Expanding on Bertalanffy’s (1968) discussion, Checkland (1981, p. 105)  explains that 
General Systems Theory is the skeleton of science, in that, it aims to provide a 
framework or structure of systems on which to hang the flesh and blood of particular 
disciplines and particular subject matters in an orderly and coherent corps of 
knowledge. 
2.2.2 Defining systems 
The systems approach, and more specifically its framing literature, has lead to systems 
being defined in many ways (Churchman, 1968, p. 29), embodying many meanings 
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(Midgley, 2003, p. 178). In considering a single definition of a system Aslaksen (2004, 
p. 271) explains that systems are defined in terms of their boundaries and interactions. 
A view supported by Midgley (2003, p. xxiii) who suggests GST proposes that systems 
of all kinds share specific common characteristics which can be described through the 
use of both mathematics and ordinary language.  
 
Through the use of mathematics Bertalanffy (1968, p. 56) defines a system as a 
complex of interacting elements, for example, P1, p2….pn. Interaction means that 
elements, p, stand in relations, R, so that the behaviour of an element p in R is different 
from its behaviour in another relation, R’. According to Bertalanffy (1968, p. 56) if the 
behaviour in R and R’ are not different, there is no interaction, and the elements behave 
independently with respect to the relations R and R’. Bertalanffy (1950, p. 143; 1968, p. 
56) explains his approach utilizing a system of simultaneous differential equations. 
Denoting some measures of elements, pi (i = 1, 2, ….n), by Qi, these for a finite number 
of elements and in the simplest of cases, will be in the form of:  
                       
                                      (1) 
 
According to Bertalanffy (1950, p. 143; 1968, p. 56) change of any measure Qi 
therefore is a function of all Q’s from Q1 to Qn; conversely, change of any Qi entails 
change of all other measures and of the system as a whole.  
 
Bertalanffy (1950, p. 144; 1968, p. 57) argues that this equation can be used to a) show 
the structural isomorphism in different fields and levels of reality, that is, to demonstrate 
the possibility of a General Systems Theory whose fields of application are to be found 
in various sciences. Although the parameters and variables will have very different 
meaning in each case of application, b) discuss several general systems properties. 
Although nothing is said about the nature of the measures Qi or the functions fi-i.e., 
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about the relations or interactions within the system certain general principles can be 
deduced.   
 
In explaining systems through the use of language Bertalanffy (1968, p. 19) defined a 
system as “sets of elements standing in interaction”. Bittel (1978, p. 1130) further 
defined a system as ‘a set of interrelated components that function together within 
constraints towards a common purpose”, whilst Waldman (2007, p. 271) considers a 
system to be an assemblage or combination of things or parts forming a complex or 
unitary whole. However, Morales-Matamoros, Tejeida-Padilla and Badillo-Pina (2010, 
p. 88) state that a system is defined as “a group of components that keep some 
identifiable set of relationships with the sum of their components (subsystems), in 
addition to relationships (systems themselves) to other entities”.  
 
Faithful to Bertalanffy’s (1968) works, Midgley (2003, p. xxii) defines a system as a 
unity of organised elements, where according to Midgley (2003, p. xxii) a system’s 
organisation is crucial as it provides rise to properties of the system which cannot be 
found in a disorganised collection of the same elements. For example, Midgley (2003, 
pp. xxii-xxiii) states “a person can only remain alive as long as their parts are organised 
in a set of particular relationships with one another. A random collection of organs is 
not a living person”. Hall and Fagen (cited in Midgley, 2003, p. xxv) consider a system 
to be a set of objects together with relationships between the objects and between their 
attributes (Hall & Fagen, cited in Midgley, 2003, p. xxv).  
 
In considering the different approaches (semantics) towards defining systems, according 
to Bittel (1978, p. 29) all definers’ agree that a system is a set of parts coordinated to 
accomplish a set of goals, where according to Midgley (2003, p. 64) it is the 
relationships that “tie the system together”. That is, such relationships create the notion 
of “system” useful. Midgley’s (2003, p. 64) view is supported by Ackoff (1981 cited in 
Skyttner, 1996, p. 35) who states “a system is two or more elements which satisfy the 
following conditions: 
 The behaviour of each element has an effect on the behaviour as a whole, 
 The behaviour of the elements and their effects on the whole are interdependent, 
 However, subgroups of the elements are formed, all have an effect on the 
behaviour of the whole, but none has independent effect on it. 
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Uniform to Ackoff (1981 cited in Skyttner, 1996, p. 35), Midgley (2003, p. 68) 
considers that from the various systems definitions, any given system can be further 
divided into sub-systems. That is, “in every system it is possible to identify one sort of 
unit, each of which carries out a distinct and separate process, and another sort of unit, 
each of which is a discrete, separate structure. According to Midgley (2003, p. 201) the 
totality of all the structures in a system which carry out a particular process is a 
subsystem”.  Tejeida-Padilla, Badillo-Pina, and Morales-Matamoros (2010, p.88) 
explain that a subsystem is “a greater systems component”, that is, when a greater 
system is constructed of two or more interacting and interdependent components, where 
the subsystems interact in order to obtain their own purpose(s) and the purpose(s) of the 
system in which they are embedded.  
 
In considering the lack of a single definition, yet common themes, this research suggests 
a system can therefore be summarised as “an organised collection of constituents, which 
are combined into various subsystems (elements), which are highly interrelated towards 
the accomplishment of an overall, predetermined design goal”. That is, a system 
comprises of various smaller constituent parts which provide various inputs, which, to 
achieve desired outputs go through specific predefined processes. 
2.2.3 The systems approach 
Systems theory has a strong history and in contemporary times this approach is 
supported by Waldman (2007, p. 1) who states, “now” most outcomes or outputs are 
derived from interactions within systems composed of machines, computers and people. 
These systems represent thinking systems and thinking systems require system thinking.  
Waldman (2007, p. 1) defines thinking as “having a conscious (self-aware) mind, to 
some extent of reasoning, remembering experiences, making rational decision”, 
thinking involves “volition” (Waldman, 2007, p. 272).  
 
According to Waldman (2007, p. 278) systems thinking embodies an approach towards 
understanding how things work. Bertalanffy (1968, pp. 4-14) explains that systems 
thinking was driven by technological advances after the 2nd World War, which saw the 
combining of components originating in heterogeneous technologies including 
mechanical, electrical and chemical. In addition, within these heterogeneous 
technologies relations between man and machine became interrelated. These component 
22 
 
interrelations required a systems approach, as though systems had been studied for 
centuries it became a requirement to study the interactions within.  
 
The systems approach is concerned with a holistic view of interacting components that 
function together towards achieving a common purpose (Bittel, 1978, p. 1130). This 
approach involves a rational plan of the constituent components of a system and their 
operational function. That is, it is about thinking about the systems purpose “what it is 
for”. The ultimate aim of such component thinking is to discover those components 
whose measures of performance are truly related to the measures of performance of the 
whole system (Churchman, 1968, p. 43). For example, according to Waldman (2007, p. 
272) if a part of the system is changed, the nature of the overall system is often changed 
as well. Waldman (2007, p. 272) bases this premise on the argument that by definition, 
a system is systemic, meaning relating to or affecting the entire system. Waldman 
(2007, p. 272) refers this to co-evolution, where interactive changes between system 
components leads to what was eventually termed “the butterfly effect”.  
 
2.2.4 The butterfly effect 
Consistent with Waldman’s (2007, p. 272) view that as part of the system changes the 
nature of the overall system changes, the butterfly effect is a phenomenon which relates 
to this underlying premise of systems theory (Peirce, 2000, p. 5). Systems theory 
considers that as small changes occur in the various systems’ sub-systems, or their 
constituents, these small changes perturb or reverberate through the system in a manner 
which produces significant change. Evidence supporting this premise stems from 
research conducted by meteorologist Edward Lorenz (1963; 1968). Lorenz (1963) was 
using non-linear equations to plot weather patterns across time. As part of Lorenz’s 
(1963) simulation process, the initial conditions of a program he was utilizing had used 
the numerical input 0.506127 correct to six (6) decimal places. However, when Lorenz 
(1963) repeated the simulation to save time, the numerical input was rounded down to 
three (3) decimal places, inputting 0.506. According to Peirce (2000, p. 5) Lorenz 
assumed that the difference, one input in a thousand, would be inconsequential. 
However, Lorenz (1963) found small changes as an input were not inconsequential. 
 
Lorenz (1963) found a small difference can, over a long period of time, build to produce 
a large effect. Moreover, the way the difference affects the outcome is very sensitive to 
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small changes, finding that small perturbation of weather elements can have a large 
effect later on (Peirce, 2000, p. 5). Technically this is termed “sensitivity to initial 
conditions”, which means that any difference in input into a system, no matter how 
small, will eventually produce enormous differences in output. More graphically 
“sensitivity to initial conditions” is referred to as the “Butterfly Effect” (Warren, 
Franklin & Streeter, 1998, p. 363).  
 
The butterfly metaphor stems from Lorenz’s (1968, p. 306) original metaphor for 
describing sensitivity to initial conditions where Lorenz (1968) stated “if the theory of 
atmospheric instability were correct, one flap of a sea gull’s wings would forever 
change the future course of the weather”. According to Lorenz (1968, p. 306) a 
disturbance created by a single flap of a sea gull’s wings is a point disturbance, 
supposing that after some small time interval the smaller-scale errors resulting from an 
initial point disturbance have grown to become large in amplitude as the smaller-scale 
motions on which they were superimposed within a region near the initial disturbance, 
but the errors are still undetectable over most of the globe (at the macro level). The error 
energy is still then very small compared to the global kinetic energy in the same scale. 
However, in actuality, the error will already have entered their non-linear phase of 
growth, since they are large in those locations where they exist at all, and they should 
no longer be amplifying except near the boundary of the region in which they occupy.  
 
This effect error propagation has come to be known as the “Butterfly Effect”, based on 
several sea gull analogies such as “the flap of a butterfly’s wings in Brazil can set off a 
tornado in Texas (Hilborn, 2003, p. 425), or a single butterfly flapping its wings in 
China might, weeks later, cause a hurricane in New York (Peirce, 2000, p. 5).  Lorenz’s 
(1963; 1968) works are considered in many variations of systems theory, where the 
systems approach is based on the premise that as individual measures of performance of 
constituent components increase, so does the holistic measure of performance of the 
total system (Churchman, 1968, pp. 42-43).     
 
As such, Churchman (1968, pp. 42-43) considers that the separation of systems into 
their component parts provides systems analyst with information necessary for 
evaluating whether the system is operating properly and if and what corrective measures 
are required to maintain the system at its commissioning level of effectiveness. Such a 
segmentation process also enables systems managers’ to ensure all monies spent in 
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maintaining the system are spent correctly, contributing to the real objectives of the 
system ensuring fiscal restraint of limited financial resources.    
2.2.5 Different types of systems 
According to Midgley (2003, p. xix) there are many different system ideas, with 
different systems paradigms embracing various ideas pertaining to what constitutes 
systems thinking. Nevertheless, there are common points, for example, Barton and 
Haslett (2007, p. 44) suggest systems thinking involves the scientific methods of both 
analysis and synthesis, that is, systems thinking lies within the dialectic between the two 
scientific methodologies. Analysis is defined as the procedure by which investigators 
break-down an intellectual or substantial whole into its constituents (component parts). 
In contrast, synthesis involves combining a systems constituents or elements to form a 
coherent whole (Ritchey, 1991, p. 1).  
 
According to Barton and Haslett (2007, p. 145) science has debated the order in which 
analysis and synthesis are applied. However, Holton (cited in Barton & Haslett, 2007, p. 
146) points out that Descartes and Newton agreed with Plato, that for a given initial 
hypothesis, analysis must precede synthesis. This sequence is based on the argument 
that without a previous analysis, attempting synthesis does not lead to truth. A view 
supported by Ritchey (1991, p. 10) who argues that every synthesis is built upon the 
results of a preceding analysis, where every analysis requires a subsequent synthesis in 
order to verify and correct its results. As such, Barton and Haslett (2007, pp. 147-148) 
suggest systems thinking provides a distinctive way of framing this dialectic where 
systems thinkers recognize that individual (analysis) events are part of a pattern 
(synthesis) of events. That is, the analytic process attempts to explain how something 
works, whilst synthesis attempts to establish understanding of its purpose. Therefore 
systems thinking occurs when people use the cognitive construct of thinking to frame 
the scientific process, defined as “a dialectic between analysis and synthesis” (Barton & 
Haslett, 2007, pp. 147-153).  
2.2.6 System typologies 
According to Midgley (2003, p. xix) there are different types of systems, with a number 
of dichotomies each drawing attention to particular aspects of systems thinking (Barton 
& Haslett, 2007, p. 151). These include whole versus parts, soft versus hard, complex 
versus simple and open versus closed systems; however, according to Barton and 
Haslett (2007, p. 151) the most significant development in scientific method towards 
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systems thinking has stemmed from the open versus closed dichotomy. In considering 
the various systems dichotomies this thesis focused on the closed versus open approach 
and briefly discuss these approaches within a complex aspect.  
2.2.6.1 Closed systems 
Bertalanffy (1968, p. 39) defines closed systems as those considered isolated from their 
environment, meaning a concrete system with impermeable boundaries through which 
no materials (energy or information) can enter or leave (Midgley, 2003, p. 182). 
Midgley (2003, p. 182) explains that within a closed system whatever matter-energy 
happens to be within the system is finite and it gradually becomes disordered. Closed 
systems theory therefore emphasises the tendency towards equilibrium (Keren, 1979, p. 
312), where according to the laws of thermodynamics, closed systems attain a time-
independent equilibrium state, with maximum entropy and minimum free energy 
(Bertalanffy, 1950, p. 23). Thermodynamic equilibrium (Figure 2.3) describes a 
condition in a system where the distribution of mass and energy moves towards 
maximum entropy (Pidwirny, 2006).  
 
    
Figure 2.3 The thermodynamic equilibrium of a system over time (Pidwirny, 2006). 
 
Thermodynamic equilibrium (entropy state) is a measure of the amount of heat and 
work that is associated with a system, as left to itself accordant with the laws of 
thermodynamics, a physical system tends to maximise its entropy (Lovey & Manohar, 
2007, p. 99; Styer, 2000, p. 1). 
2.2.6.2 Open systems 
In contrast to closed systems, there are those systems which by their very nature and 
definition are not closed systems. According to Midgley (2003, p. 182) most concrete 
systems have boundaries, which are at least partially permeable, permitting magnitudes 
of at least certain sorts of matter-energy or information transmissions to cross them. 
These systems are defined as open systems. Traditional physics and physical chemistry 
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exclusively focused on closed systems; however, the need to consider organisms and 
other living systems meant that it was necessary to generalise systems theory 
(Bertalanffy, 1950, p. 155).  
 
According to Bertalanffy (1950, p. 155) open systems theory has lead to new and 
revolutionary consequences and principles for the discipline of physics, as it provides 
for important generalization of physical theory, kinetics and thermodynamics. This 
approach has lead to new principles and insight, such as the principle of equifinality, the 
generalization of the second thermodynamics principle (second law of 
thermodynamics), and the possible increase of order in open systems (Bertalanffy, 
1968, p. 102). 
 
Open systems theory considers the interaction with the environment as crucial to the 
adoption and evolution of complex systems. Open systems depend on their environment 
for resources and are constrained by its influences (Bittel, 1978, p. 1130).  For an open 
system, the ability to change in response to environmental pressures ensures the 
systems’ long term viability. Open exchange with the environment implies adjustment, 
both as adaption and innovation (Keren, 1979, p. 316).  
 
In contrast to a closed system which eventually attains a time-independent equilibrium 
state, an open system may attain (certain conditions presumed) a stationary state where 
the system remains constant as a whole and in its phases, through a continuous flow of 
the component materials. Such a state is referred to as a steady state (Bertalanffy, 1950, 
p. 23) defined by Martin (2000, p. 210) as a state encompassing very little change, 
which according to Honkasalo (1998, p. 134) describes a situation where the flow of 
energy is constant and the increase in entropy is at a minimum. According to Martin 
(2000, p. 210) the amount of change in a steady state can be considered as a percentage 
of a preset threshold level, where Bertalanffy (1950, p. 157) explains that a system’s 
steady state condition is maintained through a continuous exchange, between the in-
flow, and out-flow of feed-back materials, where a steady state equilibrium (Figure 2.4) 
shows an average condition of a system where the trajectory (average) remains 
unchanged over time (Pidwirny, 2006).  
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Figure 2.4 A steady state system (average condition) over time (Pidwirny, 2006).  
 
Whilst the final state in a closed system depends on the components given at the 
beginning of the process, steady state systems (open systems) show equifinality 
(Bertalanffy, 1950, p. 158).  If a steady state is reached in an open system, it is 
independent of the initial conditions and determined by the system’s parameters. 
Equifinality in open systems can be characterised by phenomena such as overshoot, 
false start and asymmetry, (Figure 2.5) where the system may initially proceed in one 
direction, which is opposite to, or different from that which eventually leads to its 
steady state condition. For example, in Figure 2.5, path A indicates that a steady state 
can be achieved from an initial condition of overshoot, whereas path B shows an 
asymmetric approach to a steady state, and path C shows a fake start towards achieving 
a steady state condition (Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 143).   
 
Figure 2.5 System Equifinality (Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 143).  
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According to Bertalanffy (1968, pp. 142-143) the steady state in an open system is 
maintained in distance from true equilibrium and therefore is capable of doing work, in 
contrast to closed systems in equilibrium. That is, the system remains constant in its 
composition, regardless of continuous irreversible processes, import and export, and 
building up, and breaking down, taking place.  
 
In discussing the characteristics of open systems Checkland (1981, p. 83) explains that 
the steady state of an open system may be thermodynamically unlikely, creating and/or 
maintaining a high degree of order, whereas closed systems by their isolated nature have 
no path to travel except towards increasing disorder (high entropy). The steady states in 
open systems are not defined by maximum entropy, but by the approach of minimum 
entropy production. Entropy in open systems may decrease where the steady states with 
minimum entropy production are generally stable systems. Therefore, if one of the 
systems variables is altered, the systems manifests changes in the opposite direction 
(Bertalanffy, 1950, p. 26), this property is consistent with Lorenz’s (1963) findings, and 
“Butterfly” metaphor.   
 
In discussing an open systems capacity to maintain their steady state (homeostasis), 
Keren (1979, p. 316) points out that open systems theory emphasises the role of feed-
back in systems survival. Feed-back is the process where energy is imported from the 
environment beyond that which has been expended. As open systems are energy-
processing, they feed on throughputs of energy to sustain order or negative entropy 
(negentropy) and can therefore, through their feed-back processes remain in a 
sustainable condition of disequilibrium (Morales- Matamoros, Tejeida-Padilla & 
Badillo-Pina, 2010, pp. 75-76). In an open system Feed-back means from the output of 
a machine a certain amount is monitored back (Figure 2.6), as information to the input 
towards regulating the output to stabilize as directed the action of the machine 
(Bertalanffy, 1950, p. 160).   
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Figure 2.6 Open system typology with feedback mechanism (Bittel, 1978, p. 1131). 
 
Figure 2.6 demonstrates the processes of an open system, where resources such as 
energy, financial inputs and people, etc., become the systems inputs. These inputs are 
put through a pre-determined process, influenced by the environment in which they 
exists towards producing the desired product as the systems macro-state output. From 
the product output, for an open system, a feed-back loop is maintained to ensure 
appropriate energy inputs sustain the system at a distance away from equilibrium 
(steady state).    
2.2.7 System complexity  
Systems are generally classified as concrete (physical), conceptual, abstract or 
unperceivable, where the most common system being concrete or physical systems. 
Physical systems are those which exist in physical reality of space and time, and are 
defined as those systems consisting of at least two units or objects. Concrete systems 
can be living or non-living, natural or man-made, and can be classified according to 
their level of complexity. Complex behaviour can occur in any system made up of a 
large number of interacting components with non-linear coupling (Morales-Matamoros, 
et al, 2009, p. 72). In an organised-complexity system only a finite but large number of 
components will define the system (Skyttner, 1996, p. 43). According to Smarr (1985 
cited in Corning, 1995, p. 93) complexity is a multi-dimensional, multi-disciplinary 
concept, where there is no single right means to either define or measure it.  
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For example, Smarr (1985 cited in Corning, 1995, p. 93) explains that a mathematician 
might define complexity in terms of the number of degrees of freedom in computational 
operations, whereas a physicist may be more focused with the number and frequency of 
interactions in a system of interacting gas molecules. In contrast, Waldman (2007, p. 
271) considers a bicycle to be a complex system based on the variety of its parts and 
their interrelations.  
In considering a standard definition of a complex system Sheard and Mostashari (2008, 
p. 296) have adopted that previously developed by scientists conducting research 
focusing on complexity theory and its descendants. Sheard and Mostashari (2008, p. 
296) define a complex systems as “systems that do not have a centralizing authority and 
are not designed from a known specification, but instead involve disparate stakeholders 
creating systems that are functional for other purposes and are only brought together in 
the complex system because individual agents of the system see such cooperation as 
being beneficial for them”.  
According to Sheard and Mostashari (2008, p. 296) complex systems have autonomous 
components, where the elements are heterogeneous. In addition, complex systems are 
self-organizing, showing a decrease in entropy due to utilizing energy from the 
environment. They display emergent macro-level behaviour which emerges from the 
actions and interactions of the individual constituents, and their interactions among the 
parts matters dramatically. Finally, complex systems elements change in response to 
imposed “pressures” from neighbouring elements. Such a discourse regarding what 
constitutes a complex system is supported by Midgley (2003, p. 386) who refers to a 
complex system as one constructed of a large number of parts that interact in non simple 
ways. According to Midgley (2003, p. 386) in such systems the whole is more than the 
sum of its parts, not in an ultimate metaphysical sense, but in the important pragmatic 
sense that, given the properties of the parts and the laws which govern their interaction, 
it is not a trivial matter to infer the properties of their whole.   
2.2.8 Benefits of systems thinking 
In considering the literature relating to systems theory Waldman (2007, p. 1) argues that 
such an approach has significant benefits. According to Waldman (2007, p. 1) systems 
thinking results in silo framed thinking styles being avoided. Silo thinking is a 
phenomenon where humans think and react individually and locally rather than 
collectively or globally. Silo thinking aims to simplify or reduce complexity 
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(reductionism) towards a phenomenon being investigated, whereas systems thinking 
aims to analyse and integrate as part of the same thought process (Albrecht, 2010, p. 2).  
 
Silo thinking refers to a metaphor drawn from large grain silo’s and its term suggests 
that just as each silo  stands alone, each aspect of a problem (such as a system) is solved 
in isolation, standing alone. According to Waldman (2007) such thinking often degrades 
net system outcomes, whereas systems thinking forces people to focus on processes, 
interactions and causes of outcomes, rather than the components in isolation. In 
contrast, GST is considered the scientific exploration of “wholes” and “wholeness” 
(Schaefer, Hensel & Brady, 1977, p. 12). For example, giving a drug to a patient to 
improve kidney function without considering its effects on the liver is an example of 
silo thinking (Waldman, 2007, p. 1). In short, the system model considers the whole 
system in action, not just the output of the system (Keren, 1979, p. 314). 
 
In applying GST to the application of physical security the underlying assumptions of 
systems theory can be traced through history; however, Fredrich Hegel (1770-1831) 
formulated four generic and significant statements concerning systems theory which 
hold true in contemporary systems thinking: 
 The whole is more than the sum of its parts, 
 The whole defines the nature of the parts, 
 The parts cannot be understood by studying the whole, 
 The parts are dynamically interrelated and interdependent (Skyttner, 1996, p. 
30). 
2.2.9 The systems approach to physical protection 
Designed physical systems exist as a direct result of an identified specific need in some 
human activity (Checkland, 1981, p. 119). For security systems, Garcia (2001) explains 
that the designed goal is the successful interrupting of an adversary. To achieve their 
goal security systems require resources from their environment. That is, consistent with 
the premises supporting open systems in general, security systems rely on the input of 
finances, people, energy, equipment, information and organisation to achieve their 
service product. This product is the successful interruption of a malevolent human 
adversary.   
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2.3 Conclusion 
The chapter provided stage one of the study’s first phase in the research process. In this 
chapter security’s diversity and lack of definitional consensus among published authors 
was discussed. Nevertheless, the chapter highlighted that despite such diversity a 
common thread was the systems approach utilized to employ the theory of Defence in 
Depth towards protecting organisational assets. These themes set the theoretical frame 
for the study. Consistent with these themes and conforming to the writings of Runyon, 
Coleman and Pittenger (2000, p. 11) this chapter presented a systems based operational 
definition of security, establishing a measureable context for discussing physical 
security decay.  
Congruous with the study’s operational definition of security, the chapter presented and 
discussed General Systems Theory (GST) as the study’s underlying theory. Within the 
context of GST, Section 2.2.1 discussed Systems Theory, history and science. In 
addition, a number of GST concepts and principles were discussed including defining 
systems, the systems approach, the Butterfly effect, different types of systems and 
typologies such as closed and open systems. These combined concepts and principles 
lead to a discussion on the benefits of systems thinking. As a result of this discussion a 
systems approach for considering the concept of physical security consistent with the 
writings of such published security professional (Underwood, 1984, p. xi; Fennelly, 
1997; Garcia, 2001, p. 6; Fisher & Green, 2003, p. 164) was established. This 
discussion provided a detailed theoretical underpinning to be taken forward into 
Chapters 3 and 4 for considering the concept of security decay within an open systems 
approach to physical security.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
AN OPEN SYSTEMS APPROACH TO PHYSICAL SECURITY 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the second stage of phase one of the study; establishing an open 
systems framed physical security benchmark. Consistent with the principles of the 
conceptual review of literature, the chapter brings forward the writings from Chapter 2 
to establish an open systems physical security benchmark. Section 3.1 discusses an open 
systems approach to physical protection. This discussion applies the underpinnings of 
General Systems Theory (GST) highlighting how the systems interrelations achieve the 
systems output goal. Section 3.2 combines the available literature defining Physical 
Protection Systems (PPS) within GST frame. Accordant with the study’s operational 
definition of security, Section 3.3 presents a discussion on measuring a Physical 
Protection System’s effectiveness.  This discussion embeds a quantitative approach to 
physical security for discussing physical security decay. Central to establishing a steady 
state PPS Section 3.4 discusses security and risk management which underpins the 
systems established level of Defence in Depth elements. The chapter concludes with 
Section 3.5. 
3.1 An open systems approach to physical protection 
In applying the systems literature to physical security, the physical components of an 
organisational security program relates to the establishment of barriers including fences, 
locks, gates, vaults, alarm systems, sensory devices, protective lighting and security 
personnel (Post, Kingsbury and Schachtsiek, 1991, pp. 97-99).  Within a systems 
approach these physical components of the holistic security program are defined by 
Garcia (2001, p. 6) as a Physical Protection System (PPS). Concordant with the study’s 
operational definition of security, an effective security system must be able to detect an 
adversary then delay this adversary long enough along their attack path to provide 
sufficient time for a facility’s response force to arrive and neutralize the threat before 
the adversary accomplishes their desired goal (SAND Report, 2002, appendix D). As 
such, congruous with the theory of Defence in Depth the primary functions of such a 
system are the detection and assessment of any adversary’s intrusions, the delaying of 
the adversary’s progress along their attack path exposing them to a prompt response 
(Spencer, 1998, p. 3).  
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Concordant with the writings of Bertalanffy (1950, p. 26; 1968, p. 39; Bittel, 1978, p. 
1130; Keren, 1979, p. 316; Checkland, 1981, p. 83) a Physical Protection System (PPS) 
is defined as a complex, open system. Bittel (1978, p. 1131) explains that for open 
systems, external constraints become important parts of the definition of the system 
boundary. The characteristics of such systems are constitutive, that is, those which are 
dependent on the specific relations within the complex. As such, for understanding such 
characteristics their parts and their interrelations must be known. That is, the system 
must be spelt out (mapped) (Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 55). Conforming to the systems 
philosophy Garcia (2001; 2006) explains that a PPS must achieve its objectives by 
either deterring, or a combination of detection, delay and responding to unauthorised 
security events. Therefore, in order to map the system the various components of deter, 
detect, delay and response, and their systems based interrelations must be spelt out in 
detail. 
3.1.1 Deterrence 
According to the theory of defence in depth the first element is deterrence (Smith, 2003, 
p. 8). All security systems have some level of deterrence which is related to level of 
dedication and sophistication of the threat agent and the relative value and/or criticality 
of the asset requiring a level of security (MIL-HDBK-1013/1, 1993, p. 24). Mosely and 
Coleman (2000, p. 101) consider it is the systems deterrence value which is saliently 
important when protecting a site against low level opportunistic offenders. As such, 
according to Broder (2006, pxiv) true to the first element of Defence in Depth cost 
effective security measures should be designed, refined and evaluated to deter would-be 
offenders, where Broder (2006) considers that to deter an attacker the perimeter must 
have the appearance of being too difficult to defeat and/or being able to inflict injury.  
 
Deterrence can be defined as ‘something which discourages (from acting) or prevents 
(from occurring) usually by instilling fear, doubt or anxiety (Collins Dictionary, p. 342). 
As such, deterrence as a concept is argued to be a perceptual phenomenon (Nagin, 2002, 
p. 5), which according to Walker (1988) stems from the Latin word deterre, meaning ‘to 
frighten’. Walker (1988, p. 11) suggests that experience and research supports the 
argument that offenders are not immune to fear as a deterrent. Therefore, in designing 
security systems the psychological aspects governing offenders are considered towards 
persuading them that it is not worth their while to make an attempt against an asset, or 
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that if they do try, they will fail or be caught in the act (Walker, 1988, p. 11). In 
considering the concept of deterrence Tilley (2005, p. 268) explains that where there are 
predictable systems, risks, rewards, effort needed and the tools required for success can 
all, in principle, be gauged in advance.  
 
The application of GST, that is, a systems philosophy to the deterrence, is related to the 
concept of free choice, where according to Bertalanffy (1986, p. 114) free choice from a 
system perspective is described by formulations of Game Theory and Decision Theory. 
Axiomatically both Game Theory and Decision Theory are concerned with “rational 
choice”. Rational choice refers to a choice which “maximises” an individual’s utility or 
satisfaction, that the individual is free to choose among several possible courses of 
action and decides among them on the basis of their consequences of their actions, what 
stands highest on the list, “they” prefer more of a commodity to less, other things being 
equal. This discussion of “rational choice” includes everything that can be meant as 
“free will”.    
 
The concept of deterrence is considered within the rational choice framework where it is 
argued that an attack will occur if; EUoffence > EUlegal + U taste (Winoto, 2003, p. 2), where 
such expected utility decisions are based on the decision making formula: (1), the 
expected gain from committing the offence symbolised by, EUoffence, an offender acts 
according to their expected utility, represented by: EUoffence = (1-p) U1 + pcU2. Where 
U1 is the return from the offence, Pc is the perceived probability of conviction, and U2 is 
the punishment. (2), Expected gain from not committing the offence, EUlegal. (3), Taste 
(or distaste) and preference for offence, Utaste- a combination of moral values, proclivity 
for violence, and preference for risk. Based on this model an offender will attempt an 
offence/attack if EUoffence > EUlegal + U taste (Winoto, 2003, p. 2).  
 
Based on Winoto’s (2003) formula, it is purported that the sequential strategy of 
Defence in Depth aims to, and for deterrence to be achieved must, communicate to an 
adversary that EUoffence < EUlegal + U taste (adjusted from, Winoto, 2003, p. 2) resulting in a 
rational choice by adversaries to refrain from their desired course of action, deterring 
them from ever attempting a penetration against an organisation (Cornish & Clarke, 
1987, p. 934).  
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Within a linear relationship each function of the theory of defence in depth strategy 
must be achieved in their sequential order, where deterrence is achieved through 
systematic application of detect, delay and respond (D-DDR) (Garcia, 2006, p. 240), in 
this sequential combination (Garcia, 2001). This systematic combination aims to 
communicate to potential adversaries that the risks outweigh the benefits influencing 
their (however rudimentary) cost benefit equation (Cornish & Clarke, 1987, p. 934).  
 
However, according to Cioffi-Revilla (1999, p. 243) deterrence must be supported by an 
efficacious capability for the risks to be perceived at the cost benefit analysis as greater 
than the potential gains. That is, deterrence is not a protection strategy; rather it is the 
anticipated result of implemented security measures at a facility (Garcia, 2006, p. 240). 
This supports deterrence as “a perceptual phenomenon”, where, according to Hamlyn 
(1969, p. 3) contemporary psychological theories of perception have their roots, in one 
way or another, in Gestalt Theory. Gestalt in the German language has two meanings, 
its connotation with shape or form as an attribute of things, and a concrete entity which 
has, or, may have, a shape as one of its characteristics (Kohler, p. 104).  
 
Gestalt principles help explain how people subjectively organize perception, drawing on 
the principles of proximity, closure, similarity, simplicity and continuity (Weiten, 2002, 
p. 109). Gestalt is a product of organization, organization, the process that leads to a 
Gestalt. That is, organization as a category is completely opposed to more side-by-side 
or random distribution. In the process of organization, “what happens to a part of the 
whole, is determined by intrinsic laws inherent within this whole” (Koffka, 1963, pp. 
682-683).  
 
Weiten (2002, p. 109) explains, sometimes “wholes”, as they are perceived, may have 
qualities which do not exist in any of their parts. This “insight” became the basic tenant 
of Gestalt psychology (Weiten, 2002, p. 109), where according to Hamlyn (1969, p. 58) 
the most general thesis of Gestalt theory is that humans not only see whole objects or 
forms rather than parts which are synthesized, but there is a tendency to see such forms, 
“gestalten”, as being as simple or “good” as possible. Hamlyn (1969, p. 3) points out, 
Gestalt psychologists purport that humans generally don’t perceive the gaps between 
things, that is, unless they attend to them specifically with care (Hamlyn, 1969, p. 84).     
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Gestalt in English is used to refer to a concept of wholeness (Collins Concise 
Dictionary, N.D. p. 516), represented by the phrase “the whole is greater than the sum 
of its parts” (Gestalt, Psychology and Psychiatry, 2010), this phrase, drawn from Gestalt 
Theory, is congruous with the first of Fredrich Hegel’s (1770 cited in Skyttner, 1996, p. 
30) four statements concerning systems theory, which still hold true in contemporary 
systems thinking, Hegel (1770 cited in Skyttner, 1996, p. 30) also suggested as part of 
his systems thinking paradigm “the whole is more than the sum of its parts”. It is this 
aspect of perception, “the view of wholeness” which it is argued that lends some 
offenders to view the security program as a “whole”, and determine that the risks 
outweighs the benefits, ultimately “deterring” them. This is consistent with Underwood 
(1984, p. xi) who stated “it is important that security is seen as a whole”, it is argued 
that the perceived ∑ detect, delay and response, as a form of “wholeness” is what drives 
the deterrence value of a PPS, where according to Garcia (2001, p. 2) the deterrent value 
of a true PPS can be very high. 
 
Deterrence can be useful in discouraging attacks from opportunistic offenders’. 
However, the deterrence function of a security system is difficult to measure with no 
substantiated key performance indicators. As such, the reliance on successful deterrence 
can be risky (Garcia, 2001, p. 2). This is a view supported by Cioffi-Revilla (1999, p. 
243) who states “sometimes deterrence works and sometimes it fails”. Therefore, based 
on a two type offender typology (opportunistic/deliberate) (Underwood, 1984, pp. 3-4), 
where an adversary’s internal drive is great enough, including situations stretching 
beyond personal gain towards subversion, systems must be designed for defeating 
attacks which are going ahead regardless of their overt deterrent value (Walker, 1988, 
p.11). Robinson (1999, p.38) supports such a view, stating “all targets can be breached 
given enough time”. Therefore, “the aim of a protection system is to provide initial 
detection, then enough time for a response force to arrive and thwart an attack”.  
3.1.2 The physical protection system 
When deterrence fails conforming with the remaining elements of defence in depth and 
Standards Australia HB 167 Security Risk Management (2006, p. 63) for a PPS to meet 
its objectives there must be an awareness that an attack is underway (detection), the 
slowing of an adversary’s progress to the target (delay) and enough time for the 
response force to interrupt or stop the adversaries (response) before they achieve their 
goal. Physical Protection Systems (PPS) integrate people, procedures and equipment for 
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the protection of assets (Jang, Kwak, Yoo, Kim & Ki Yoon, 2008, p. 747) which makes 
them heterogeneous in nature. For example, Figure 3.1 highlights the functional 
elements of defence in depth and their interrelationship within PPS.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Functional elements and components (constituents) of a physical protection 
system (Garcia, 2006, p. 34). 
3.1.3 System performance 
According to Churchman (1968, p. 43) within a systems thinking approach, the ultimate 
aim is to discover those components whose measures of performance are truly related to 
the measure of performance of the whole system. A systems performance is proven by 
providing objective evidence that the program and/or system are doing what the 
designer states they are doing (Robinson, 1999, p. 58). Accordant with the premises of 
systems theory according to Churchman (1968, p. 30) system objectives must be some 
precise and specific measures of performance of the overall system.  
 
In applying Churchman’s (1968, p. 43) approach it is argued that a salient focus must be 
towards a systems macro-state performance measure and the various sub-system 
measures which combine to produce this macro-state measure. That is, the component 
measure must be analysed where ultimately a synthesis process must occur to achieve a 
macro-state output measure; where according to Dillon (1983, p. 183) mathematics 
provides the means of expressing such functional relations to which operational 
significance (measures of performance) can be attached. According to Dillon (1983, p. 
183) from such mathematical relations logical deductions can be drawn through 
numerical manipulation. A systems performance measure is therefore a score which 
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describes how well the system is actually doing. Such objective evidence of a systems 
performance is also essential for a security system (PPS). For security professionals 
operating at levels from medium to high-risk facilities it is important to be able to 
determine the likelihood (probability) that, if their facility was attacked, the attacker(s) 
would be denied their success. 
 
In considering a total system evaluation Churchman (1968, p. 29) suggests that when 
evaluating a system it is necessary to spell out in detail what the whole system is, the 
environment in which it lives, what its objectives is/are and how this is supported by the 
activities of its parts. Compatible with this study’s definition of security Garcia (2001, 
pp. 242-249) explains that a PPS is a complex configuration of detection, delay and 
response elements, and that system performance measures should include probability of 
detection, delay times, and response times. This literature suggests that the best 
effectiveness measure (macro-state) for a PPS is one which combines these functional 
elements of defence in depth into a functional whole.  
 
The holistic performance measure for a PPS (its macro-state) is the principle of timely 
detection, represented as its probability of interruption (Pi) (Garcia, 2001, p. 246). Pi is 
calculated from the variables of detection, delay and response (Jang, Kwak, Yoo, Kim 
& Ki Yoon, 2008, p. 748) and is the probability of intercepting an adversary before any 
theft or sabotage can occur, defined by Garcia (2001, p. 246) as “the cumulative 
probability of detection where there is enough time remaining for the response force to 
interrupt adversaries”. Overall system performance measures are achieved through the 
combining of component subsystem performance measures (Spencer, 1998, p. 3), where 
consistent with the theory of Defence in Depth; the overall performance measure for a 
PPS is the measure of the sum of the detection, delay, and response function of the PPS 
(Garcia, 2001, p. 246).   
 
Congruous with the study’s definition of security, the scientific principles of analysis 
and synthesis facilitate the calculation of PPS effectiveness in terms of its degree of 
success in producing detection, delay and response functions of Defence in Depth (Jang, 
Kwak, Yoo, Kim & Ki Yoon, 2008, p. 748). According to Jang, Kwak, Yoo, Kim and 
Ki Yoon (2008, p. 748) due to the complexity of PPS its quantitative macro-state 
performance measure (PI) is usually evaluated using computer modelling techniques, 
where Garcia (2001, p. 252) suggests this can be achieved utilizing the Estimate of 
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Adversary Sequence Interruption (EASI) model. This model referred to as EASI was 
developed in the 1970s and models one adversary path at a time, as selected by the 
model user. EASI uses specific quantitative input parameters representing the PPS 
functions of: detection, transmission, assessment, communication, delay and response 
performance values to compute the probability of interrupting an adversary before they 
accomplish their objectives (Spencer, 1998, p. 4). Such quantitative methods are 
systematic, repeatable and based on objective measures and demonstrate high statistical 
validity (SAND Report, 2002, p. 11).  The input parameters for EASI require: 
 Detection and communication inputs as probabilities that the total function will 
be successful; and 
 Delay and response inputs as mean and standard deviation time measurements 
for each element. 
EASI is a simple calculation tool which draws on the basic laws of probability (see 
Howell, 2008, p. 128) to combine through calculation the quantitative performance 
measures of the systems constituent subsystems to determine the macro-state of the PPS 
(Garcia, 2001, p. 252).  
3.1.4 Intrusion detection 
For an adversary to be caught, their penetration must be detected (Walker, 1988, p.19). 
Detection is the second element of defence in depth (Smith, 2003, p. 8) and the first 
required function of a security system (SAND report, 2002, p. 39). In discussing and 
achieving detection Underwood (1984, p. 137) refers to the geometry of detection 
stating an adversary can be detected when they cross a line (linear protection), when 
they enter a space (volumetric protection) and when they contact an object (point 
protection), and that this is employed from the perimeter inwards. In addition, once a 
sensor has activated the detection system must then transmit this signal notification to a 
location where it can be displayed with meaning to generate an appropriate facility 
response (Garcia, 2006, p. 14). As such, detection not only includes sensor activations 
but also alarm assessment, alarm communication and display, and entry control as 
subsystems synthesised together. The detection subsystem of a PPS therefore includes 
exterior and interior intrusion sensors, alarm assessment and alarm communication 
(Garcia, 2006, pp. 13-14).  
 
In evaluating the detection function of a PPS, conforming to systems principles (Barton 
& Haslet, 2007, p. 44; Ritchey, 1991, p.1) the detection constituents are initially broken 
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down for analysis, then the constituents are combined through a process of synthesis to 
form a coherent whole in order to verify it’s operating according to purpose.  
3.1.4.1 Detection 
According to Armstrong and Peile (2005, p. 34) for intruder detection purposes each 
application requires a sensor, irrelevant of its technology, to perform a particular 
function. For the detection system its quantitative performance function is calculated as 
a product, where Garcia (2001, p. 64) explains that for an ideal sensor the probability 
that it would detect an unauthorised intrusion would be 1.0 (100%). For example, 
according to Armstrong and Peile (2005, p. 35) the probability of detection is calculated 
from the result of three trials in a controlled environment.  
In discussing the key performance indicators of the detection subsystem Garcia (2001, 
p. 56) states that the probability that an individual sensor will sense unauthorised 
activity is its probability of sensing (PS). This view is supported by Adams, Snell, Green 
and Pritchard (2005, p. 2) who denote this as P(sensing) which is the product of: 
• PF= the probability that the sensor is functioning at the time of the attack 
(measured between 0.0 and 1.0); 
• PR = the reliability of the sensor itself at the time of the attack (measured 
between 0.0 and 1.0); and 
• PS = probability that the sensor generates an alarm-that is, senses an intrusion 
(measured between 0.0 and 1.0).  
 
Drawing on the multiplicative law of probability (see Howell, 2008, p. 129), this is 
summarized by the equation:  
P(sensing) = PF × PR × PS 
(2) 
This equation argues that the probability of sensing is the accomplishment of many 
phenomena. As such, drawing on the writings of Garcia (2001, pp. 63-64) the 
probability of detection is represented by the equation:  
Pd = P(sensing) coupled with CL 
 (3) 
The PD is measured between 0.0 and 1.0, and CL = a confidence level, where confidence 
levels can vary, generally with the number of trials. Usually CL levels are equal to 
values ranging between .90 or 90%, .95 or 95%, or .99 or 99%. In addition, EASI uses 
the input P(Detection) as its probability of detection inputs for detection element 
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performance indicators along an adversary’s path. EASI also uses location parameters 
of delay for calculating P(Detection) where EASI assigns detection relative to delay along 
an adversary’s path to more accurately model system effectiveness. For example, an 
entry of B in the location column is added where delay occurs before detection, an entry 
of M is added for delay between the before and end of detection (middle) and an E is 
entered where delay falls after detection (Garcia, 2001, pp. 256-260). 
 
In establishing a measure of detection towards obtaining an overall effectiveness 
measure for a PPS Adams, Snell, Green and Pritchard (2005) consider slightly smaller 
factors into some of their component terms than Garcia’s (2001; 2006), however, 
congruous with the basic laws of probability the general construct used in EASI is the 
same. As such, for this study, an individual sensors performance measure will be 
denoted by Pd, where Pd represents the EASI input of P(Detection), through the equation: 
Pd = PS coupled with CL 
(4) 
Where: 
 PS = probability of sensing unauthorised activity (measured between 0.0 and 
1.0); 
 CL = the product confidence level (measured between 0.0 and 1.0) including 
Adams et al, (2005, p. 2) PF (measured between 0.0 and 1.0) × PR (measured 
between 0.0 and 1.0). 
Accordant with the basic laws of probability and the premises of systems theory (see 
Howell, 2008, p. 128 and Churchman, 1968, p. 42) theoretically this is summarised as: 
 Pd = PS coupled with CL for each detection sensor along an adversary’s path. However, 
the EASI performance measure of intrusion detection along an adversary path is 
calculated as the probability of non-detection which is the complement of PD. That is, 
consistent with the additive law of probability (mutually exclusive events) non-
detection is the mathematical complement of Pd. This measure means the systems 
probability of non-detection along an adversary’s path is a combined measure of 
between 0.0 and 1.0 as product of probability. For example, along an adversary’s path 
there may be three (3) intrusion technologies, the theoretical Pd along this path = Pd for 
S1 × PD for S2 × PD for S3, that is, 0.95 × 0.95 × 0.95 = PD = 0.85. However, to account 
for an adversary getting to the next layer along their path EASI draws on the probability 
of non-detection (Garcia, 2001; 2006) with a variation for where the sensor is located 
relative to delay measures (Garcia, 2001, pp. 256-260). Thus, in this example, this 
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would be S1.05 x .S2 .05 x .S3 .05, or .000125, then after multiplying the probabilities of 
non-detection, the final product is subtracted from 1 to give the Pd: 1 - .000125 provides 
a Pd of .99. 
 
In considering the efficacy of detection constituents, Ball (2007, p. 11) considers that 
for detection technologies, their probabilities of detection may vary due to factors 
beyond the control of the systems designer. Therefore, as an alternative for a 
commissioned system, a detection rate can be utilized towards establishing the detection 
systems key performance indicators. This view is based on the work of Armstrong and 
Peile (2005, p. 35) who argue that Pd is not a real probability of detection. As a sensor 
with a PD of .5 (50%) can deliver three successful trials in a row. Therefore, for a 
commissioned system, true probability of detection is a product of an actual detection 
rate (walking, running, crawling, jumping climbing etc), where this product is 
calculated as:  
 	
     × 100 
	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  
(5) 
3.1.5 Alarm communication (transmission) and display 
Alarm communication and display (AC&D) as a subsystem within a PPS transports 
alarm and video information to a human operator for assessment purposes (Garcia, 
2006, p. 17). As such, in line with the systems approach, the EASI performance 
measure for this constituent sub-system is also a calculated as a product, that is, the 
probability that an alarm indication will be successfully transmitted to an evaluation or 
assessment point, referred to as probability of transmission (PT) measured as a product 
between 0.0 and 1.0 (Garcia, 2001, p. 253). 
3.1.6 Intruder assessment 
In discussing an intruder assessment key performance indicators Garcia (2006, p. 15) 
explains that there is no detection without assessment, therefore once an alarm has been 
generated it must be assessed. Therefore the key performance indicator for the 
assessment sub-system must include a consideration of human factors, adversary tactics 
and technology aspects of this sub-system. Alarm assessment requires direct 
observation of an alarm source by people, or immediate capture of an image of a sensor 
detection zone at the precise time of an alarm event (Garcia, 2006, p. 15).  
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Contemporary assessment systems use fixed video cameras focused on a specific field 
of view for designated detection zones to automatically capture images of alarm zone at 
the precise time the alarm was generated and display these images on a screen for 
assessment by a person to determine the alarm cause (Garcia, 2006, p. 16). This 
approach requires effective processing of the sensor detection where the alarm computer 
processes the alarm appropriately, effective display so that the relevant information can 
be understood (clear) by a human operator through an appropriate interface, and an 
operator makes the correct assessment of the alarm source (Adams, et al, 2005, pp. 2-3).  
 
Congruous with systems theory, the assessment subsystems combined process provides 
the performance measure of probability of accurate assessment (PA). This probability is 
the combined effects of video image quality (resolution), speed of capture for images, 
proper installation and integration of detection sensor zones with appropriate camera 
fields of view coverage (Garcia, 2006, p. 16). According to Garcia (2006, p. 149) in 
practice, the probability of assessment (PA) as a quantitative probability is expressed 
using three (3) levels of numerical assessment; 0.25, 0.5 and 0.95.  
3.1.7 Detection sub-system  
Accordant with the premises of systems theory and the requirement of synthesis to 
follow analysis (Barton & Haslet, 2007, p. 44; Ritchey, 1991, p.1), conforming with the 
basic laws of probability the Estimated Adversary Sequential Interruption (EASI) 
model, interrelates sensor detection, alarm transmission and probability of accurate 
assessment to provide a macro detection subsystem key performance measure. This 
subsystems performance measure is the probability of assessed detection (Pd), where 
the relationships are expressed by Garcia (2001, p. 253) in the equation:  
Pd = PS × PT × PA. 
(6) 
However, for this study the detection sensors key performance indicator denoted as PD 
and the EASI detection constituents inputs of P(Detection), this study uses the equation: 
Pd = PD × PT × PA. 
(7) 
The detection systems constituent’s performance measures relationships are represented 
by Figure 3.2, where the detection functions of sensor activation, signal transmission, 
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and alarm assessment are synthesised to achieve the sub-system performance measure 
of Pd. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Detection systems performance measure relationships.  
(Adjusted from Garcia, 2001; 2006). 
 
Figure 3.2 emphasises how analysis of the constituents precedes synthesis, and how 
synthesis of the detection constituents functions in a PPS interrelates the micro-state key 
performance indicators for the whole detection sub-system (Garcia, 2006, p. 36). These 
combined functions aim to initiate the security systems response time line (MIL-
HDBK-1013/1, p. 75). 
3.1.8 Entry control 
Entry control is the provision of security controls whereby personnel, vehicles and 
materials are identified and screened to discriminate authorised from unauthorised 
personnel and vehicles, and to detect contraband or other undesired materials such as 
explosives (MIL-HDBK-1013/1, p. 31). The entry control sub-system must afford 
maximum security while minimising delay in the flow of authorised traffic (MIL-
HDBK-1013/1, p. 71). The entry control subsystem contributes in a total PPS by 
allowing the movement of authorized personnel and material through normal access 
routes, and by detecting and notifying facility personnel of unauthorized movements 
and delaying unauthorised progression through portals. The entry control subsystem 
encompasses all the technologies, procedures, databases, and personnel used to monitor 
the movement of people and materials into and out of a facility (Garcia, 2006, p. 16).  
 
Garcia (2006, p. 154) explains that the entry control sub-system uses probability of 
detection PD as its primary measure of effectiveness. For example, the performance 
measures for entry control components of a PPS include throughput rates and error 
rates. Throughput rates are a measure of the time it takes for an authorised person or 
materials to successfully pass an entry or exit point. A systems error rates relates to 
falsely rejecting authorised access, and falsely accepting the improper acceptance of an 
unauthorized person. In addition, when considering the performance measures of this 
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sub-system a strong consideration of the security objectives is required as systems can 
be set to minimize false rejects or minimize false accepts, however access control 
systems cannot be set to minimize both types of errors simultaneously (Garcia, 2001, 
pp. 178-179).  
 
Garcia (2006, p. 155) states “the false accept rate is the mathematical compliment of PD 
and is equal 1- PD”. According to Garcia (2006, p. 155) this is a key measurement of 
sub-system performance because it represents the probability of defeat of the device. 
For example, facility characterization may require a high probability of detecting metal 
weapons. In this case, entry control technologies (contraband detectors) are incorporated 
as part of the detection sub-systems functions which provide a probability of detecting 
those materials they have been installed to detect. 
 
3.1.9 Alarm communication 
Communications are essential for facilitating an effective facility response, organizing 
responders, directing them to the scene, and successful interruption towards 
neutralization where necessary. This constituent sub-system starts with alarm reporting 
and ends with deployment of guard force and interruption (Garcia, 2006, p. 21). The 
performance measure for this constituent system is the probability of guard 
communication (PC) measured between 0.0 and 1.0, and the time required for 
communication (Garcia, 2006, p. 39) where the time taken to communicate is included 
in the response time (Garcia, 2001, p. 253). According to Garcia (2001, p. 253) most 
effective systems operate with a PC around 0.95 (95%). In addition, where the time to 
establish accurate communications increases the probability of communication also 
increases. For example, Figure 3.3 emphasises the relationship between guard 
communication time and probability of accurate communications. Figure 3.3 Variation 
of probability of communication with time (Garcia, 2006, p. 39). 
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Figure 3.3 Variation of probability of communication with time (Garcia, 2006, p. 39). 
3.1.10 Delay 
Delay is the third element of Defence in Depth (Smith, 2003, p. 8) and the second 
required function of a security system (SAND report, 2002, p. 39). In establishing the 
delay key performance indicator for a PPS, Garcia (2006, p. 19) explains that the aim of 
delay within a PPS is to slow an adversary’s penetration down to gain time for alarm 
assessment and where necessary facility response to unauthorised entry events. 
Ultimately strategies which establish this key performance indicator impede an 
adversary’s progress and are accomplished through the placement of fixed, passive or 
active barriers (SAND report, 2002, p. 40). These barriers form the various delay 
microstates within a PPS, and are defined by O’Block, et al, (1991, p. 349) as “a system 
of devices or characteristics intended to withstand unauthorised penetration for a 
specified period of time”. In addition, for this delay to be meaningful in a system, it 
must occur after detection.  
3.1.10.1 Passive delay 
Passive barriers are defined by Fisher and Green (2003, p. 148) as either natural or 
structural and are the physical elements which define boundaries initially aiming to 
deter unauthorised access. Natural barriers comprise site specific topographical features 
which contribute to impeding or denying access to a protected area. In contrast, 
structural barriers are permanent or temporary devices constructed to impede 
unauthorised penetration for a specified period of time. Garcia (2001, p. 202) considers 
that this category of delay includes structural elements such as doors, walls, locks and 
fences.  
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3.1.10.2 Active delay 
Active barriers are those delay resources which utilize a sensing device to initiate the 
dispersement of liquids, foams and other irritants to impede unauthorised penetration 
(Garcia, 2001, p. 202). According to Garcia (2001, p. 202) whilst passive barriers can 
be weak against some threat agents depending on their capabilities, dispensable barriers 
when implemented properly can maximise delay to an asset, and due to their 
characteristics can be threat independent, maintaining their intended delay regardless of 
adversary tactics.  Within a PPS barriers are placed along a potential adversary’s 
pathway between the attacker and specific assets requiring protection (Moseley & 
Coleman, 2000, p. 100).  
3.1.10.3 Measuring delay 
In discussing the effectiveness of physical barriers Moseley and Coleman (2000, p. 101) 
highlight that no single barrier or series of barriers is impenetrable, as with the 
appropriate means including time and equipment a determined attacker will eventually 
penetrate, or scale any number of physical barriers. The effectiveness of material 
barriers depends upon the amount of time they can withstand physical attack, where the 
longer a barrier remains intact, the greater the chances of prevention and apprehension 
(O’Block, Donnermeyer & Doeren, 1991, p. 349). As such, the key performance 
effectiveness measure for the delay element of defence in depth within a PPS is 
calculated as a sum, and is measured by time (Garcia, 2001, p. 2005; MIL-HDBK-
1013/1, pp. 31-32; Jang, Kwak, Yoo, Kim & Ki Yoon, 2008, p. 748).  
 
To analyse individual delay constituents true to the principles of analysis and synthesis 
individual barrier penetration times are defined as the time interval required for an 
intruder to successfully create a man-passable opening through a barrier, or pass over or 
around a structure, or move cross an open area. Therefore, when evaluating the physical 
barrier the delay time must be assessed against the time it takes an adversary to pass 
through, over, or under the barrier and enter their next task. For penetration evaluations, 
uniform to the Military Handbook of Physical Security (MIL-HDBK-1013/1, p. 32), 
this study defines a man passable opening as an opening of 96 square inches (0.06 sqm), 
which is at least 6 inches (150mm) wide or high.   
 
In establishing barrier penetration times, analysis can be based on working time or 
elapsed time, where working time does not include variables such as intervals for 
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changing tools, changing operators, etc. A working time assessment results in a more 
conservative penetration time (MIL-HDBK-1013/1, pp. 29-32).  
 
In establishing penetration time, Garcia (2001, pp. 203-204) suggests that the 
penetration time starts at a distance two feet in front of a barrier and ends at a point two 
feet beyond the barrier. For vehicle penetrations Garcia (2001, pp. 203-204) suggests 
that a vehicle has successfully penetrated when the ramming vehicle passes through or 
over a barrier and is still functioning, or a second vehicle can be driven through the 
breached barrier. However, this study contends that allowances must be made for a 
vehicle penetration of a barrier to occur and then for the attack to proceed on foot from 
that point. However, the distance to travel is still a remaining barrier and would be 
calculated as the next barrier in the attack. The time it takes to penetrate all barriers 
along an adversary’s path is the adversary task time. Given that all barriers can be 
defeated in time, the most successful barrier would be the one that could increase task 
time (resist a threat) until appropriate action can be taken.  
 
Accordant with the principles of analysis and synthesis, synthesis of the delay 
constituents occurs by calculating the cumulative delay time which is the total time an 
intruder is impeded from gaining unauthorised access to a secured asset. This means 
that an adversary’s task time (ATT) is the cumulative sum of all delay measures along 
an adversary’s path. For example, Table 3.1 shows that the penetration time for each 
delay constituent is measured in seconds and listed as individual tasks which must be 
achieved in their sequential order. Whilst each individual task may only take several 
seconds, Table 3.1 shows that the adversary’s task time is the cumulative sum of all six 
sequential tasks during scenario 1, ingress route. In addition, where an adversary is 
required to remove an asset (scenario 2) then they must retrace their steps back through 
their previous penetration path to leave the facility or take an alternative exit path. 
  
 Table 3.1 Adversary estimated de
Task 
Y1 60 seconds
Y2 90 seconds
Y3 90 seconds
Y4 12 seconds
Y5 40 seco
Y6 15 seconds
Y7 12 seconds
Y8 90 seconds
Y9 15 seconds
Standard total adversary task time is represent
The cumulative adversary task time (ingress and egress) = 424 seconds.
 
However, the EASI performance measure for the delay sub
and standard deviation of adversary task time, in seconds as formula inputs, represen
by the formulas:  
 
The standard deviation of adversary task time is represented by the formula: 
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lay time. 
Estimated Delay Time 
Scenario 1: Ingress 
Mean Time (seconds) Task Description
 Cut through outer fence
 Cross open ground 
 Penetrate building outer door 
 Cross room floor 
nds Breach filing cabinet
 Find and remove required file
Scenario 2: Escape 
 Cross room floor  
 Cross over open ground
 Climb back through outer fence
ed by the sum: 
 

1
 
 
-system requires the mean 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(8) 
ted 
(9) 
 
(10) 
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Congruous with the systems approach, barrier effectiveness relates to the barriers 
integration with other security subsystems (Moseley & Coleman, 2000, p. 101). For 
example, according to Garcia (2001, p. 204) as an adversary encounters a series of 
progressively more difficult barriers, it becomes increasingly difficult as it will require 
more and different equipment, which adds weight or people to the attack scenario, 
which either slows them down or makes them easier to detect. Furthermore, although 
the egress path would be quicker as all forced breaching would have been completed, 
the response force may still arrive and cut off the adversary’s egress path, interrupting 
their escape. 
3.1.11 Response 
Response is the fourth element of defence in depth (Smith, 2003, p. 8) and the third 
required function of a security system (SAND report, 2002, p. 39). Response is a 
facility’s means of interrupting an adversary along their attack path (Garcia, 2001, p. 
223). In considering and establishing the response key performance indicator within a 
system Garcia (2001, p. 21) highlights two interrelated factors associated with 
maintaining an effective response capability, these are the performance measures for the 
desired response to be placed into effect and the effectiveness of that response. As a 
holistic key performance indicator, response is a combination of and an interrelationship 
between interruption and neutralization (SAND report, 2002, p. 40).  
 
The response key performance indicator is initially established by focusing on the 
probability that the organisation’s response personnel will interrupt an adversary along 
an attack path. Interruption is defined as “the response forces arrival at the correct 
location to stop an adversary attempting to gain a level of unauthorised access to an 
asset (SAND report, 2002, p. 40). In achieving successful interruption Adams, et al, 
(2005, p. 3) considers that for successful interruption to occur a response force must 
muster, gather their necessary equipment and travel to the alarm site. As such, in 
considering the key performance measures for response Bitzer and Hoffman (N.D., p. 5) 
highlight that information collected by security equipment (CCTV) must initially be 
reviewed and acted upon by human security personnel. For example, Cummings (1992, 
p. 177) points out, closed circuit television systems are only as effective as the 
personnel viewing them and interpreting their findings. Bitzer and Hoffman (N.D., p. 6) 
explain that ultimately a person viewing a scene on a monitor must interpret incoming 
information and make key decisions about if and what actions to should be taken. Such 
 a salient point is why a differentiation 
Therefore, the measure of effectiveness for interruption is the time from alarm 
notification of a penetration to the response forces arrival at the correct location to 
interrupt the adversary/s (SAND report, 200
3.1.11.1 Measuring response
In establishing the response key performance indicator, response time is calculated as a 
sum, measured in time, where response time is modelled in EASI in seconds (or 
minutes but not both) as the 
device and the confrontation of the adversary by a response force. According to Garcia 
(2001, p. 254) this time consists of the sum of tasks listed in 
Table 3.2 Facility response times 
Input 1 Alarm communication time (A
Input 2 Alarm assessment time (A
Input 3 Guard communication time (G
Input 4 Time required by guard force to prepare and gather 
equipment and start their vehic
Input 5 Guard travel time (G
Input 6 Time to deploy at incident scene (G
 
These response force tasks represent the various micro
response capability, where total response force time is calcul
 
 
 
In addition, as an EASI effectiveness measure input, response time is the mean and 
standard deviation of the sum of the response input values, where the mean is calculated 
through the formula: 
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exists between surveillance and assessment.  
2, p. 40; Garcia, 2006, p. 38).
 
time between the generation of an alarm signal by a sensing 
Table 
inputs. 
Facility Response Time Inputs 
CT)  
AT) 
CT) 
le (preparation time) (G
TT) 
DP) 
-states of the PPS’s 
ated through the sum:  
 
6
1
 
 
 
3.2. 
X1 
X2 
X3 
P) 
X4 
X5 
X6 
 
(11) 
(12) 
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The standard deviation is the square root of the variance in a set of scores, summarised 
as:  
 
(13) 
The variance averages the effects of large and small deviations from the mean and can 
be used to characterise how much the typical score deviates from the mean (Runyon, 
Coleman & Pittenger, 2000, pp. 79-101). This interrelationship between response tasks 
is emphasised in Figure 3.4. 
  
 
 
Figure 3.4 Interrelationship of response functions. Adjusted from Garcia (2006, p. 38). 
 
3.1.12 Total system synthesis 
Once initial constituent analysis has taken place to achieve element synthesis, 
conforming to Bertalanffy (1968, p. 56), the system can be defined mathematically; 
where total system synthesis is calculated through the equation: 
 P(I) = P(D1) × P(C1) × P (R/A1) + ∑  !" (R/Ai) P(Ci) P (Di) ∏ ( %&'!& 1 – P(Di))                    
(14) 
 
In this equation, the first part combines the detection, communication, delay and 
response values to produce an initial macro-state output. For example, in the first part of 
the equation:  P(I) = P(D1) × P(C1) × P(R/A). Where step 1 multiplies the probability of 
detection P(Detection) with the probability of communication P(C). This process produces a 
combined value referred to as probability of alarm P(A), represented by the equation: 
P(A) = P(D) × P(C). 
 
Step 2 of the EASI equation then multiplies this probability of alarm P(A) with the 
probability of the response force arrival prior to the end of an adversary’s action 
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sequence, given an alarm. This probability is summarised as P(R/A), which is a 
combination of time remaining on the path after a sensor activates (TR) and response 
force arrival time (RFT). To achieve an effective interruption TR – RFT > 0, that is, the 
adversary’s task time minus the response forces arrival time must be greater than 0 
seconds. 
 
In calculating this aspect of the EASI equation it is assumed that the variables TR and 
RFT are independent, and normally distributed around the mean. Therefore the random 
variable X = TR – RFT. P(R/A) = *X (Mean) = E (TR) – E (RFT) and + ",  (Variance) 
(TR) + (RFT). Where through statistical assumptions P(R/A) = P (X > 0). 
 
Furthermore, for two or more sensors the conditional probability of response force 
arrival, P (R/A), for each sensor must be calculated as previously described. For 
example, for a path with two detection locations, summarized by the equation:  
P(I) = P(D1) × P(C1) × P(R/A1) + (1 − P(D1)) × P(D2) × P(C2) × P(R/A2). 
(15) 
In addition, Step 3 of EASI considers the impact of previous detection opportunities not 
detecting, incorporating a joint probability of non-detection across multiple points in a 
layered PPS, hence the joint probability of non-detection:  
(Di) ∏ ( %&'!& 1 – P(Di)). 
(16) 
As stated above, the EASI equation for calculating (synthesizing all security elements 
PKI’s) into a whole system is:   
P(I) = P(D1) × P(C1) × P (R/A1) + ∑  !" (R/Ai) P(Ci) P (Di) ∏ ( %&'!& 1 – P(Di)).  
(17) 
3.1.13 System effectiveness 
As previously stated, response is a combination of, and an interrelationship between 
interruption and neutralization (SAND report, 2002, p. 40). Therefore, total systems 
effectiveness P(effectiveness) needs to consider the efficacy of a facilities response. 
Different threats require different levels and capabilities in response force personnel. 
That is, response force capability must be suitable with regards to the anticipated threat. 
This response includes the guard’s presence as a deterrent, or delay, and use of either 
less lethal and lethal force options. Garcia (2001, p. 227) explains that the decision 
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pertaining to the required level of response is a risk management one, based on the 
facilities analysed risk requirements. Whilst the constituents of neutralization are 
beyond the scope of this thesis, this key performance indicator can be added to the 
EASI PPS key performance indicator (Pi) product. According to Adams, et al, (2005, p. 
1) this can be summarized by the equation:  
P(effectiveness) = P(interruption) × P(neutralization) 
(18) 
Neutralization is a product of all neutralization sub-system constituents measured 
between 0.0 and 1.0.  
3.1.14 Relationship of physical protection system functions  
The interrelationships between the functions of the PPS (Figure 3.5) commences with 
the element of detection, which begins on receipt of the first alarm and ends with 
accurate assessment. Nevertheless, as discussed, the delay function must slow down the 
adversary to allow the response force enough time to deploy and interject the adversary. 
This delay time must be more than the response force time, which is the total time 
required for the adversary to accomplish their desired goal. The delay times are the 
adversary task times, and this time must be less than the time it takes to respond to be 
effective. And, it must be after detection. 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Interrelationships of physical protection system functions (Garcia, 2006, p. 
39). 
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Figure 3.5 emphasises the interrelationships of PPS functions. For example, a sensor 
activates at time TO, the time at which the alarm is assessed to be valid is labelled TA. 
At this point in time, the location of the alarm must be communicated to the response 
force. The time at which the response force interrupts the adversary is labelled TI, and 
the adversary task completion time is TC. For a PPS to accomplish its objective of 
interrupting an adversary, TI, must occur before TC. In addition, detection should occur 
as early as possible and TO, TA and TI should be as far to the left on the time axis as 
possible (Garcia, 2006, pp. 37-38). According to Adams, et al, (2005; Jang, Kwak, Yoo, 
Kim and Ki Yoon, 2008, p. 747) the interrelationships between the constituents, their 
elements, and the systems macro-state output depends on a range of complex 
phenomenon to successfully interrupt an adversary.  
 
3.2 Defining a physical protection system 
Accordant with Bertalanffy (1950, p. 26; 1968, p. 39; Bittel, 1978, p. 1130; Keren, 
1979, p. 316; Checkland, 1981, p. 83; Jang, et al, 2008, p. 747) this study argues that a 
Physical Protection System is defined as a complex, open system (Figure 3.6), that is, it 
is not isolated from its environment. For example, uniform with Bittel (1978, p. 1131) a 
PPS relies on its environment for resources such as energy, financial inputs and people, 
etc. These inputs are put through a pre-determined process, influenced by the 
environment in which they exist towards producing the desired product as the systems 
macro-state output. From the product output, for an open system, a feed-back loop is 
established and maintained to ensure appropriate energy inputs sustain the system in a 
steady state at a distance away from equilibrium.  
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Figure 3.6 Open systems approach towards a Physical Protection System (Adjusted 
from Garcia, 2001, p. 4; Bittel, 1978, p. 1131). 
 
3.3 Measuring physical protection  
The application of systems thinking, that is a functional definition of a system, and the 
scientific process of analysis and synthesis enables this thesis’s operational definition of 
security to be measured, where the elements of detect, delay and response combined 
provide a security systems macro-state measure and perceived deterrence value of the 
security system. That is, it is argued that the equation:  
P(I) = P(D1) × P(C1) × P (R/A1) + ∑  !" (R/Ai) P(Ci) P (Di) ∏ ( %&'!& 1 – P(Di)) 
(P(neutralization)). 
(19) 
provides the means of measuring the system’s stable condition. Consistent with the 
study’s operational definition, this condition stems from the systematic process which 
combines people, equipment and procedures to restrict unauthorised access to either 
people, information or physical assets through their ability to deter, detect, delay and 
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respond to attacks by a malevolent human adversary/s who seek/s to gain a level of 
unauthorised access to a facility. In addition, within the security domains body of 
knowledge, anecdotally, the theory of defence in depth is summarized by the formula 
“3DR” to summarily represent the inclusion of all defence in depth elements into a 
“system”. It is argued this summary is facilitated through the mathematical relationships 
established during the analysis and synthesis process required to obtain the systems 
macro-state. As such, this thesis adopts the 3DR formula as a means of representing the 
elements of defence in depth in summary form. 
3.4 Security risk management 
In discussing the implementation of Defence in Depth within a systems approach, all 
the elements of defence in depth are equally important and must be operated in an 
integrated manner. That is, none can be eliminated or compromised if an effective 
security system is to be achieved (MIL-HDBK-1013/1, 1993, p. 24). However, in 
implementing defence in depth economic judgements and pressures are continually 
brought to bear on security measures, where pressure is applied at the immediate field 
level, setting the costs of defence against the loss (Underwood, 1984, p. x). In setting a 
physical security benchmark, that is, determining the required level of key performance 
indicators across the system, the objective is to identify an integrated physical security 
system design that achieves a cost-effective application of security system resources 
(MIL-HDBK-1013/1, 1993, p. 33). Therefore in establishing a Defence in Depth system 
individual security measures must be justified where a protection case has been 
constructed (Manunta, 2007).  
 
In establishing a Defence in Depth protection case Manunta (2007) explains that such a 
justification process requires managers to evaluate security strategies within a costs 
benefit analysis framework. Such an analysis incorporates a combination of potential 
harm, financial impact and relevant political concerns. Manunta’s (2007) view is 
supported by Underwood (1984, p. x; Walker, 1988, p. 18; Cumming’s, 1992, p. 2). For 
example, Walker (1988, p. 18) states “the law of diminishing returns applies to the 
security function”, where according to Cumming’s (1992, p. 2) the amount of time and 
capital spent towards risk control and management depends on the value of the product 
being protected. Walker (1988, pp. 18-22) adds, as the value of the asset increases so 
does the requirements underpinning a security systems design, where components are 
selected based on perceived suitability for the relevant risk environment.  
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In practice, to facilitate the manipulation of risk it is necessary to firstly define the 
sources and nature of an organisation’s risk exposure. For example, for security risk 
management, according to Underwood (1984, p. 1) malevolent attacks against an 
organisation saliently stem from two offender typologies: 
 Opportunists, those who may watch or notice holes in the desired level of 
security and are tempted by their presence; 
 Deliberate criminals, those who plan an attack on a security systems highest 
level of capability (Underwood, 1984, p. 1). 
 
Garcia (2001, p. 245) supports Underwood’s (1984, p. 1) two type offender typology, 
suggesting that the adversary factor is interrelated with the design characteristics of a 
PPS. According to Underwood (1984, p. 3) the opportunist is the most common danger 
and at times difficult to manipulate as opportunist do not consider an attack based on the 
value of gain, but rather in-line with Manunta’s (2007, p. 58) definition of security, that 
is, the coincidence of attacker (themselves) and the absence of suitable protection. 
McCrie (2004, p. 16) supports such a view, arguing that for opportunity based asset loss 
the security controls relationship can be expressed in the formula: 
. 	   /00	12		  
(20) 
In protecting a site against opportunistic offenders Mosely and Coleman (2000, p. 101) 
suggest that true with the first element of Defence in Depth it is the deterrence value 
which is saliently important. However, in contrast to opportunists deliberate offenders 
plan an attack against a security system, and may expend skills, time and effort on 
planning their assault against the normal level of security (Underwood, 1984, p. 3-4).  
 
Underwood’s (1984) view is supported by Robinson (1999, p. 74) who states, “There 
are those people who, through training, extensive experience, firm dedication, and the 
promise of significant reward, attack when they perceive the advantage to be on their 
side”. These individuals take the necessary time to gather intelligence, know how to 
avoid security measures, and when they perceive the risks to be reasonably low and the 
rewards reasonably assured make their approach on the system. For example, according 
to Underwood (1984, p. 4) it has been known that the degree of pre-planning involved 
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for attacks on super-risks such as bullion vaults to take several years in planning and 
execution.  
 
In considering a systems approach to physical security, and ultimately security decay, it 
is argued that the measures of performance for the system, that is the systems output 
goals, must be considered accordant to the systems strategic purpose. For example, 
Underwood’s (1984, p. 4) considerations are supported by Garcia (2001, p. 245) who 
explains that the adversary factor is strongly interrelated with the effectiveness measure 
of the PPS. That is, in applying a systems approach towards developing the objectives 
of Defence in Depth, determining the level of 3DR, the designer must understand the 
facilities operations and threat (Garcia, 2001, p. 3).  
 
Drawing on HB 167 (2006, pp. 55-56) it is argued the PPS objectives can be determined 
based on the traditional security definition of threat, considered as: Threat = Intent X 
capability. Intent as a characteristic is considered the motivational factors which drive 
someone to wish to penetrate the defences of a facility. In contrast, capability considers 
attributes of potential aggressors including their knowledge, skills and resources. In 
defining a threat against a Defence in Depth system, it is argued that the capabilities of 
the threat must be considered based on a population sample, in relation to their 
capability to defeat each element of Defence in Depth within the system.  
 
In determining this threat, HB 167 (2006, pp. 59-60) draws on the Swiss cheese model 
to indicate how many layers of security controls will exist within a Defence in Depth 
system, where under normal circumstances the holes in each slice of cheese will be 
covered up by subsequent layers of controls. The summation of these controls 
represents the effectiveness of the system in managing an attack against the system. For 
example, Figure 3.7 presents the Swiss cheese model from HB 167 (2006, p. 60). As 
such, it is argued that in defining a facilities threat, and therefore developing the 
objectives of the system, each functional element’s resilience must be considered within 
a population sample.  
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Figure 3.7 The Swiss cheese model of a layered security system (HB 167, 2006, p. 60). 
 
3.4.1 Defined threat and the normal curve 
The aim is to implement a system which as a sum can repel a defined threat. For 
example, according to Weiten (2002, p. A-10) virtually all data sets are characterised by 
some variability. Variability relates and refers to how much individual scores tend to 
vary or depart from the mean score of a data set. Weiten (2002, p. A-10) provides the 
example of golf scores, comparing a mediocre, erratic player against a mediocre, 
consistent player. The scores of the consistent player would display less variability than 
those of the erratic golfer, where Weiten (2002, p. A 10) points out, a great many traits 
and qualities are distributed in a manner which closely resembles a bell shaped cure, 
Figure 3.8 which is referred to as The Normal Distribution or Gaussian distribution 
(Runyon, Coleman & Pittenger, 2000, p. 119). The horizontal axis shows how far above 
or below the mean score is and the vertical axis shows number of cases obtaining each 
score. In a normal distribution, most cases fall near the centre of the distribution Figure 
3.8, so that 68.26% of cases fall within plus or minus one (1) standard deviation of the 
mean. In addition, the score placed on The Normal Distribution can be converted to 
percentile scores which indicate the percentage of people who score at or below another 
score (Weiten, 2002, p. A-11).   
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Figure 3.8 The Normal Distribution (ASCD, 2010).  
 
According to Weiten (2002, p. A-10) the Normal Distribution provides a precise means, 
statistically, of measuring how people compare to each other. As such, in determining 
the defined threat, it is assumed that the collective skills, knowledge and resources 
required to defeat a Defence in Depth system (PPS) also need to be considered based on 
a population sample. That is, some threat agents may have the technical knowledge and 
skill to defeat intrusion detection systems, yet lack the skills to defeat barriers in a 
timely manner, or overcome response personnel. However, by population sample, 
others may possess the skills to easily defeat physical barriers and overcome some 
lower levels of response, yet do not possess the knowledge and skills to defeat 
technology or overpower a higher level armed response.  
 
It is therefore argued that in defining the threat and therefore the systems objectives, a 
holistic appreciation is required where a threats collective capabilities are determined 
based on their abilities within a population sample to defeat the collective elements of 
Defence in Depth. For example, Figure 3.9 indicates how an adversary’s capabilities to 
defeat various elements of Defence in Depth layers is considered within a normal 
distribution for each layer, where the sum of the defined threat is the sum of the threat’s 
capabilities across all element distributions.  
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Figure 3.9 the Standard Distribution applied to the Swiss cheese model. (Adjusted from 
HB 167, 2006, p. 60; ASCD, 2010). 
 
3.4.2 Defining risk 
The application of security principles, techniques and hardware therefore requires that 
costs are balanced against the desired effectiveness of the whole system based on an 
organisations risk profile (Post, Kingsbury & Schachtsiek, 1991, pp. 97-99). In 
establishing an organisation’s security risk profile, Garcia (2001, p. 272) provides a 
quantitative definition, defining risk through the formula:  
34  ℎ × 61 × 21  
.  
According to Garcia (2001, p. 272) risk is score defined in mathematical terms through 
the equation:  
R = PA × [1-(PI)] × C 
(21) 
Where; 
• R= Risk 
• PA = Likelihood (threat) of an adversary attack measured between: 0-1.0 
• 1 = Vulnerability: the highest the effectiveness can be. 
•  Pi = Probability of interruption measured between:  0-1.0 
• C = consequences (criticality) value measured between: 0-1.0 
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Garcia’s (2001, p. 272) formula is a measure of PPS performance and does not include 
neutralization. This approach is supported by Standards Australia HB167: 2006, which 
establishes the security risk management context as a combination of threat assessment, 
vulnerability assessment and criticality assessment (Standards Australia, 2006, p. 14). 
Where according to HB 167 (2006, p. 62) vulnerability can be based on an assessment 
of the effectiveness of the controls in managing the threat’s interaction with the critical 
asset.  
 
In discussing the resource requirements and output product of an open system, Olzak 
(2006, p. 1) suggests “which security layers to implement and to what extent is a risk 
management decision”. Therefore, the total cost of the security system is determined 
within the theory of defence in depth by the degree of security control required to 
achieve the amount of time delay judged necessary after detection, to facilitate an 
appropriate response in relation to the risk of the asset being protected (Post, Kingsbury 
& Schachtsiek, 1991, p. 89; Garcia, 2001, p. 272). It is argued that these controls must 
be implemented to achieve a steady state risk reduction capability. For example, 
according to McClure (1997, p. 4) effective security refers to a state where, the need for 
security has been established, its role defined and the appropriate amount of protection 
achieved. McClure (1997, p. 4) explains that an effective security state exists when the 
level of risk exposure is reduced, through various means, to a level that is acceptable to 
the organisation.  
 
In addition, Spencer (1998, p. 2) suggests the costs/benefits associated with the 
implementation of specific measures can be measured against the reduction in 
vulnerability. As the level of vulnerability decreases, a decision may be made where the 
system has reached the point of “acceptable risk” below which decision makers are 
willing to accept the remaining vulnerability as additional system measures are not 
justifiable. The sum of this literature is supported by McCrie (2004, p. 16) who explains 
that either vulnerability or negligence (opportunity) eventually result in a security loss 
event. 
3.4.3 Establishing a steady state physical protection system 
In applying the systems literature to physical security, such an approach includes the 
component resources of people, techniques, procedures, design features, materials and 
65 
 
educational programs integrated to construct a holistic security program (Post, 
Kingsbury & Schachtsiek, 1991, p. 23). Based on the available literature, it is therefore 
argued that in line with the theory of defence in depth and the justification of security 
measures within a cost benefit frame work, the situation can be represented in 
mathematical terms, where from a functional approach to security the relationship can 
be summarized as:  
71   ∑ 89:: ;< =>?@ABC ×DEFA@BG F CH ×I@ C JBF CHK  
(22) 
That is, for an effective state of security to be achieved, a security system must 
demonstrate effectiveness in response to a facilities analysed risk level based on its 
defined threat (Garcia, 2006, p. 30), which must consider Underwood’s (1984, p. 1) two 
offender typology. The defined threat can be more than one level or group. As such, 
system effectiveness varies with a threat’s capability. Therefore a system would perform 
differently against low, medium and high threats agents. 
 
A PPS functions by combining people and equipment into an integrated system of 
subsystems along an adversary path (Garcia, 2001, p. 61). An adversary path is an 
ordered series of activities against a facility which if completed results in successful 
theft, sabotage or other malevolent outcome (Garcia, 2001, p. 242). The objective of a 
PPS is to achieve balanced protection defined by Garcia (2001, p. 60) as, ‘a system 
when, regardless of the adversary path chosen, effective elements will be encountered, 
where, the minimum time to penetrate each of the barriers would be equal, and the 
minimum probability of detecting penetration of each of these barriers should be equal”.  
There are potentially many adversary paths within a facility. The critical path is the one 
with the lowest probability of interruption, therefore the critical path characterises the 
effectiveness of the overall protection system in detecting, delaying and interrupting an 
adversary (Garcia, 2001, p. 247).   
 
In addition, according to Underwood (1984, p. 3) the daily levels of security inevitably 
rise and fall in operation. Based on such real world fluctuations, it is argued that 
consistent with Martin’s (2000, p. 210) percentage of fluctuations in relation to a steady 
state, a zone of tolerance, that is, a preset threshold level to characterise a steady state, 
should be established within the system towards ensuring the sequential strategy 
continually communicates to offenders that EUoffence > EUlegal + U taste.  
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The theory of Defence in Depth, which this study argues needs to be implemented 
within an open systems frame, delivers; effective risk based decisions, enhanced 
operational effectiveness, and a reduction in overall risks and costs (Trusted Information 
Sharing Network, 2008, p. 2). According to Garcia (2001, p. 277) the use of the risk 
equation (Garcia, 2001, p. 272) and Pi (systems performance measure) will enable 
effective cost-benefit decisions to be made towards implementing security controls 
which reduce an organisations risk to an acceptable level. For example, Figure 3.10 
highlights from an open systems frame the level of desired security implemented based 
on the risk equation and PPS system performance measure. Such parameters can be 
achieved whilst being cognizant of maintaining a system’s deterrent value during daily 
fluctuations. Based on this approach, uniform with the objectives of other open systems 
(Honkasalo, 1998, p. 135) the overall aim of a PPS is to reach a steady state where the 
flow of energy is constant and the increase of entropy is at a minimum. This steady state 
condition according to Roos (1997, p. 6) implies an exchange of either matter or energy 
within the environment, such that there is a balance of inputs, outputs and internal 
processes.  
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Figure 3.10: implemented security levels diagram, adopted from the literature of 
Underwood (1984; Martin, 2000, p. 210; Garcia, 2001, 2006; Pidwirny, 2006; Standards 
Australia HB167 Security Risk Management, 2006). 
 
In addition, there are varying states of the facility, which affect the security system 
where accordant with the open systems characteristic of equifinality, for a PPS this 
desired level of security (steady state) can be reached from different conditions 
depending on the changing system parameters. That is, consistent with Figure 2.5 (see 
Section 2.2.6.2) a desired Pi can be reached via a symmetric approach to implementing 
desired security controls, an initial overshoot where the levels of security are initially 
above that which is required for the assessed risk state, or a fake start where the desired 
level of security does not meet the required levels of security and therefore further 
controls are added to the system to achieve the desired level steady state condition of 
the PPS.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
The chapter presented the second stage of phase one of the study; establishing an open 
systems benchmark within a physical security context. This chapter established a 
documentary benchmark for considering an open systems approach to Physical 
Protection Systems (PPS). For example, Bertalanffy (1950, p. 139) states that “General 
Systems Theory is a logico-mathematical discipline, which is in itself formal, but 
applicable to all sciences concerned with systems”, where in-line with the available 
literature, the study purports that a Physical Protection System (PPS) is a complex open 
system, and subjected to the laws and principles of science which govern systems of all 
types.  
 
Central to the establishment of an open systems approach to security risk management 
within a physical security context is the design, implementation and management of 
Physical Protection System (PPS). A PPS aims to provide a level of desired risk 
reduction commensurate to a facility’s defined threat, where measures exist to ascertain 
such a level of efficacy. Within this open systems frame the processes of analysis and 
synthesis within and between the various PPS elements and their constituents’ indicates, 
through mathematics, that all constituents within a PPS have a direct relationship with 
the systems macro-state. This macro-state is based on a desired level of security risk 
reduction, where a desired level of interruption is achieved through incorporating 
various measures of constituents through their ability to add to the systems capability to 
detect, delay and respond to unauthorised access events. In this chapter it was argued 
that through Defence in Depth’s sequential combination the systems “deterrence” set 
would be established. The benefit of such a quantitative approach is the establishment 
of a security benchmark for considering security decay within an open systems frame.  
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CHAPTER 4 
PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM DECAY 
 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the third stage of phase one of the study; establishing an open 
systems framed benchmark for considering physical security decay. This chapter brings 
forward the writings from chapters two and three to establish a benchmark for 
considering physical security system decay. Section 4.1 provides a discussion on 
physical system degradation, including the laws of thermodynamics. Specifically how 
the orderly relationships within Defence in Depth elements and their constituents, 
established utilizing systems thinking to achieve an effective macro-state (Pi), can be 
impeded by the concept of entropy.  
 
Section 4.2 presents a discussion on entropy and its negative effects on physical system 
effectiveness. This discussion highlights how entropy relates to every single physical 
activity that human kind engages in, and specifically how it relates to the degradation of 
Physical Protection Systems (PPS). Section 4.3 presents the theory of entropic security 
decay, the sensitivity within a Physical Protection System (PPS) and the effects of 
entropic security decay. Section 4.4 presents the measurement of security decay. Section 
4.5 provides a discussion on security decay and risk management, and the effects of 
decay on critical path. Section 4.6 presents a discussion on avoiding and countering 
entropic security decay. Section 4.7 concludes the chapter. 
 
4.1 Physical system degradation 
In establishing a benchmark for system degradation/decay, this study draws on the 
writings of Lovey and Manohar (2007, p. 99) and Styer (2000, p. 1) who argue that all 
physical systems, if left to themselves, tend to maximise their entropy, concordant with 
the laws of thermodynamics. Entropy is discussed within the system literature and is a 
concept derived from a metric defined as a measure of disorder in a system and a 
process characterised with: decay, disintegration, running down, becoming disordered 
(Bohm & Peat, 2000, p. 137; Herman, 1999, p. 86; Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 42), and in all 
irreversible processes, entropy must increase (Bertalanffy, 1968, pp. 41-42). For a 
system, as entropy increases (its entropy level) capability decreases, based on the 
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argument that systems rely on order and cohesion. Entropy is the combination of the 
Greek word “tropos”, which means transformation or evolution, and “energy”. The term 
entropy was first used in the middle of the eighteenth century by Rudolf Clausius and is 
a quantity to measure the level of evolution of a physical system, but can be used to 
measure the ‘disorder” of a system (Vannini, 2005, p. 94).  
 
The literature embodying systems thinking (GST) discusses the concept of entropy and 
its negative effects on system sustainability (Bertalanffy, 1950, p. 23; 1968, p. 39; 
Keren, 1979, p. 312; Checkland, 1981, p. 83; Styer, 2000, p. 1; Midgley, 2003, p. 182; 
Pidwirny, 2006; Morales- Matamoros, Tejeida-Padilla & Badillo-Pina, 2010, pp. 75-
76), where according to Callister (1997, p. 482) entropy increases with increasing 
disorder. The principle of entropy introduces into physics the idea of irreversible 
processes, such as that energy always moves from a state of high potential to a state of 
low potential, tending to a state of equilibrium (Vannini, 2005, p. 93).  
 
In discussing the concept of irreversibility Price (2003, p. 3) explains that as a concept, 
irreversibility relates to the thermodynamic arrow, or, arrow of time. The arrow is 
concerned with the seemingly irreversibility of many common physical phenomenon. 
Physical processes at the microscopic level are believed to be time symmetric. This 
approach means that the theoretical statements that describe them remain true if the 
direction of time is reversed; however, when physical processes at the macroscopic 
level are described this is not the case. The thermodynamic arrow of time considers that 
in an isolated system, entropy increases with time. As entropy can be considered a 
measure of microscopic disorder, according to the second law of thermodynamics time 
is asymmetrical, as it relates to the amount of order in an isolated system. As time 
increases, a system statistically moves towards a state of disorder. That is, entropy 
evolves in only one direction, towards death and the elimination of any form of 
organization and structure (Vannini, 2005, p. 94). 
 
However, the concept of entropy is tremendously difficult to grasp and is a concept 
previously discussed within the field of physics (Styer, 2000, p. 1; Lovey & Manohar, 
2007, p. 99). In applying the concept of entropy Rifkin (1982, p. 8) explains that the 
laws of thermodynamics provide the overarching scientific frame for the unfolding of 
all physical activity in the world. Rifkin’s (1982, p. 8) view is supported by Soddy 
(cited in Rifkin, 1982, p. 8) who states, “every single physical activity that humankind 
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engages in is totally subject to the iron clad imperatives expressed in the first and 
second laws of thermodynamics, where according to Rifkin (1982, p. 6) the entropy law 
is the second law of thermodynamics. 
4.1.1 The laws of thermodynamics 
The science of thermodynamics provides a general framework of ideas which facilitates 
the understanding of particular systems (Adkins, 1975, p. 2) and was developed as a 
means of describing physical systems during the nineteenth century. Thermodynamics 
is primarily concerned with the interchange of energy and its expression as either work 
or heat (Roos, 1997, p. 5). A thermodynamic system is that portion of the universe 
which is selected for investigation (Atkins, 1986, p. 2). For example, according to Oster 
and Desoer (1971, p. 221) an electrical network is a non-equilibrium thermodynamic 
system.  
 
The science of thermodynamics sets out to describe and correlate the directly observable 
properties of substances; the volume of gas, the expansion of a wire; the polarization of 
a dialectic wire. These are all macroscopic quantities, properties of materials in bulk. 
The laws of thermodynamics enable people to interrelate the macroscopic quantities 
without making microscopic assumptions. The avoidance of commitment to any 
particular microscopic interpretations means thermodynamics is not limited to particular 
applications. However, it is possible to associate particular macroscopic behaviour with 
certain general kinds of microscopic change (Atkins, 1986, p. 2).      
4.1.2 The first law of thermodynamics 
The first law of thermodynamics is a conservation law, the law of conservation of 
energy. This law states “all matter and energy in the universe is constant, it cannot be 
created or destroyed, only transformed from one state to another, where only its form 
can be changed but never its essence” (Landsberg, 1956, pp. 365-374; Rifkin, 1982, p. 
7; p. 78; Dillon, 1983, p. 65), where according to Roos (1997, p. 5) work is done in the 
process, therefore work, heat and energy are convertible.  
 
In discussing thermodynamics Midgley (2003, p. 171) explains that matter is anything 
which has mass (M) and occupies space. Energy (E) is defined in physics as the ability 
to do work. Matter may have (a) kinetic energy, when it is moving and exerts force on 
other matter, (b) potential energy, because of its position in a gravitational field, or (c) 
rest-mass energy which is the energy that would be released if mass were converted into 
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energy. The relation between mass and energy is expressed by the equation: E = 2, 
where c is the speed of light, m is the mass and e is the energy (Vannini, 2005, p. 96). 
Mass and energy are equivalent. One can be converted into the other in accordance with 
the relation that rest-mass energy is equal to the mass times the square of the velocity of 
light. This is the principle of the first law of thermodynamics (Midgley, 2003, p. 171).  
4.1.3 The second law of thermodynamics 
According to Midgley (2003, p. 173), Gibbs (1902) formulated the second law of 
thermodynamics, the law of degradation of energy. This second law (the entropy law) 
states “matter and energy can only be changed in one direction, that is, from an 
available to unavailable, or from an ordered to disordered state (Landsberg, 1956, pp. 
374-385; Rifkin, 1982, p. 6; p. 78). That is, when transforming energy part is lost to the 
environment. When energy lost to the environment is distributed in a uniform way, a 
state of equilibrium is reached where it is no longer possible to transform energy into 
work. Entropy measures how close a system is to its state of equilibrium, and is a 
measure of the quantity of energy which is lost to the environment (Vannini, 2005, p. 
93).  As such, Herman (1999, p. 86) broadly defines entropy as the steady degradation 
of a system—where entropy increases within a system, capability decreases—based on 
the argument that systems rely on order and cohesion.  
4.1.4 The third law of thermodynamics 
The third law of thermodynamics is derived from the second law and is the law of 
disorder. This law states “within an isolated system entropy cannot diminish. That is, 
the dissipation of energy is an irreversible process, since dissipated energy cannot be 
recaptured and used again, and that the entropy of an isolated system can only increase 
until it reaches a state of equilibrium since isolated systems cannot receive information 
or energy from outside” (Vannini, 2005, p. 93). According to Bertalanffy (1977 cited in 
Vannini, 2005, p. 98) information is any element which reduces entropy, suggesting 
information can take the form of a project, an organisation, a structure, or generally a 
system, and was referred to as neg-entropy; negative entropy. 
4.2 Entropy 
Entropy as a concept is a state function of a system (Roos, 1997, p. 5). A state is a 
description of the system in terms of its properties at any instant time. When a system 
changes from one state to another the difference in properties depend solely on the 
states and not on the manner, or pathway by which the change occurred. According to 
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Rifkin (1982, p. 6) in essence, the second law says that everything in the entire universe 
begins with structure and value and is irrevocably moving in the direction of random 
chaos and waste. For example, the laws of physics state disorder must always increase, 
as in classical physics the laws of nature are perfectly time-reversible, where all of the 
processes people see occurring do so in one direction only, as reversal would go against 
the laws of statistical probabilities (the second law of thermodynamics) (Felder, 2001, p. 
1). That is, total entropy of the universe can never decrease, as according to Lovey and 
Manohar (2007, p. 99) this law states that transformations of one form of energy into 
another in natural process is accompanied by a loss because of increasing entropy. 
Entropy is therefore a measure of the extent to which available energy in any subsystem 
of the universe is transformed into an unavailable form.  
 
Whilst the second law of thermodynamics states, “all energy in a system moves from an 
available to unavailable or from an ordered to a disordered state”, the minimum entropy 
state is one where order and concentration are highest and available energy is at its 
maximum (Rifkin, 1982, pp. 42-78). As such, an entropy increase results in a decrease 
in “available” energy (Rifkin, 1982, p. 35). Whilst entropy in closed systems is always 
positive, as closed systems rely on disordered states, where order is continually 
destroyed, in open systems the production of entropy is negative (Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 
41).  
 
In discussing the positive and negative aspects of entropy Bertalanffy (1968, p. 39) 
explains that entropy in a closed system is considered a measure or probability, and 
therefore a closed system tends towards a state of most probable distributions 
(Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 39). For example, according to Bertalanffy (1968, p. 39) when 
considering temperature as an example of a system’s macro-state, the most probable 
distribution of molecules having different velocities, is a state of complete disorder. 
That is, it is highly improbable to have all the fast molecules, high in temperature on the 
right side of a room, and all of the slow moving molecules (low in temperature) on the 
left. So the tendency is towards maximum entropy, where the most probable distribution 
is the tendency towards maximum disorder. 
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4.2.1 Microscopic/macroscopic relationship 
In discussing entropy further, Felder (1999, p. 2) explains that it is a relationship 
between macroscopic and microscopic quantities within a system, a view supported by 
Bohm and Peat (2000, p. 137) who discuss the role and influence of constituents within 
a system utilizing temperature as an example. According to Bohm and Peat (2000, p. 
137) the temperature of a system defines a macro state, whereas the kinetic energy of 
each molecule in the system defines a microstate. In this example the macro state 
variable is recognized as an expression of the average of the microstate variables, an 
average of kinetic energy for the system. Based on this example, if the molecules of a 
gas (microstate) move faster, they have more kinetic energy resulting in the temperature 
(macro state) rising (having direct affect on the macro state) (Bohm & Peat, 2000, p. 
137).  
 
According to Felder (1999, p. 2) the micro state of a system consists of a complete 
description of the state of all constituent element of the system, whereas the macro state 
consists of a description of a few macroscopically measurable quantities. As such, for 
any macro state of the system there are possibly many different microstates. Therefore 
the entropy of a system in a particular macro state can be defined as the number of 
possible microstates that the system might be in. 
4.2.2 System effectiveness 
The science of thermodynamics enables the quantity known as entropy to be measured 
objectively in terms of the amount of heat and work that is associated with a system, as 
left to itself a physical system tends to maximise its entropy accordant with the laws of 
thermodynamics (Lovey & Manohar, 2007, p. 99; Styer, 2000, p. 1). For example, 
Bohm and Peat (2000, pp. 138-139) explain the concept of entropy in an isolated system 
of interacting particles. Each particle within such a system acts as a contingency for all 
others in a way where the overall motion tends to be chaotic. When such systems are 
left to themselves they move towards what is referred to as thermal equilibrium, a 
condition resulting in zero net flow of heat or energy within the system and regular 
suborders vanishing almost entirely. In this state of equilibrium, the entropy of the 
system is at its maximum.  
 
Maximum entropy is associated with a systems inability to carry out work, transfer 
useful energy from one region to another or in any other way, and generate global 
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orders of activity. Motz and Weaver (1989, p. 168) suggests that all systems strive 
towards disorder, which when achieved the system will be in a state of equilibrium. 
Complete equilibrium in a system results in the death of the system. According to Coole 
and Brooks (2009, p. 22), for a system the situation can be represented by the formula: 
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(23) 
(Coole & Brooks, 2009, p. 22). 
4.2.3 Entropy within an open systems frame 
According to Midgley (2003, p. 39) traditionally physics only dealt with closed systems, 
as such, physicist argued the laws of thermodynamics only apply to closed systems, in 
particular the second law (Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 39). For example, as a closed system 
moves towards equilibrium energy is converted to work, but as it approaches 
equilibrium, the available energy decreases. However, Roos (1997, p. 13) explains that 
there are systems which by their nature are not closed. In addition, to maximise work 
output from a system a steady state is preferable, where the system is maintained in 
pseudo-equilibrium by new inputs and the removal of outputs.  
 
The expansion of physics to include open systems frames has enabled the generalization 
of the second law of thermodynamics to include open systems. In open systems there 
exists the production of entropy due to irreversible processes, which is also negative. 
However, open systems maintain themselves in a steady state which can therefore avoid 
the increase in entropy, and may even develop towards states of increased order and 
organization (Midgley, 2003, pp. 40-41). In an open system, the system can be 
maintained in the pseudo-equilibrium state provided inputs approximately match 
outputs. Energy is required to prevent increase in entropy to prevent the system running 
down (Roos, 1997). 
4.2.3.1 Prigogine’s open systems approach to entropy 
The earlier extension and generalization of thermodynamical theory was the work of 
Prigogine (Bertalanffy, 1950, p. 26). Prigogine (1987) proposed a way of defining 
complex systems, arguing that a wide class of systems existed which he referred to as 
dissipative systems, which tended to loos energy over time. This loss energy according 
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to Prigogine (1987, p. 98) cannot be regained, as the processes that dissipative systems 
went through were irreversible in time-they were path dependent. Prigogine (1987, p. 
98) argued that any system which tended to loos energy over time, fairly quickly 
reached thermodynamic equilibrium. As such, complex dissipative systems must make 
up for their loss of energy by importing new energy from their environment and 
exporting accumulated entropy. 
 
Prigogine focused his attention on irreversible thermodynamics and particularly on 
specific phenomenon which are far from equilibrium (Dillon, 1983, p. 119). Prigogine 
was able to show mathematically and through experiment that in near equilibrium 
conditions a natural physical system acts to minimise entropy production (Meara, 2005, 
p. 9). According to Prigogine (1950, p. 99) steady states in open systems are 1) not 
defined by maximum entropy, but by the approach of minimum entropy production; 2) 
entropy may decrease in such systems; 3) the steady states with minimum entropy 
production are , in general stable. Therefore, if one of the system variables is altered, the 
system manifests changes in the opposite direction.  
 
According to Prigogine (1947 cited in Bertalanffy, 1950, p.  26; 1968, p. 144), the total 
change of entropy in an open system can be written as: 7   S + S. Where S 
denotes the change of entropy by import, S denotes the production of entropy due to 
irreversible processes in the system. The term S is always positive, according to the 
second law of thermodynamics however,  S may be negative, as well as positive. 
Therefore the total change in entropy in an open system can be negative as well as 
positive.  
 
Nevertheless, according to Midgley ( 2003, p. xxviii) Prigogine’s theory suggests that 
while in most of the universe there is movement towards entropy (equilibrium, or the 
even distribution of energy) there are islands of structures (negentropic systems) that 
concentrate and maintain their energy levels for periods of time and exists in states far 
from equilibrium. Prigogine’s (1950; 1987) theory of dissipative structures focuses on 
the importance of bifurcations. Bifurcation points are places at which the solution to 
various equations may, at a particular point, offer more than one possible solution 
(Dillon, 1983, p. 119).  
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Prigogine’s (1950; 1987) view is the idea that systems reach points of relative instability 
where they may take alternative directions, and even the tiniest influences may have a 
major effect on the future direction of the system (Midgley, 2003, p. xxviii). In the 
Prigogine analysis bifurcation points are very important, if an equation was describing 
some physical condition of the system, at the bifurcation point two options are 
presented. If the system proceeds along option A, its structure and functions may be 
quite different than if B had been selected. It is considered that in a complicated system 
there might well be whole series of Bifurcation points (Dillon, 1983, p. 119). 
Prigogine’s (1950; 1987) theory argues dissipative structures are able to circumvent the 
second law by being open, or energy-processing in character. They feed throughputs of 
energy to sustain order or negative entropy and can remain in a sustained condition of 
disequilibrium (Morales-Matamoros, Tejeida-Padilla & Badillo-Pina, 2010, pp. 75-76).  
 
Throughout history technologies and institutions have served as transformers of energy; 
facilitating the flow of energy from the environment through to human’s social system 
(Rifkin, 1982, p. 94). The various technologies and institutions which humans have 
developed are a reflection of the kinds of energy environments which they have lived in. 
This reflection is because different energy environments require different types of 
transformers. Rifkin (1982, p. 263) states “the greatest physicist A.S. Edington, hailed 
the entropy law as the supreme law of nature”, where according to Schrodiyer (cited in 
Rifkin, 1982, p. 5) every living thing in the world survives by drawing from its 
environment negative entropy.  
4.2.4 The isomorphism of entropy 
In applying the concept of entropy to the state of various systems, the validity of its 
isomorphic application must first be considered and established. According to Morales-
Matamoros, et al, (2009, p. 72) despite the variety of specific systems and their 
complexity, there are universal laws of various phenomena which are essential to our 
understanding of systems generally. Schaefer, et al, (1977, p. 12) explains that there are 
interdisciplinary properties of General System Theory, including hierarchical structure, 
stability, teology, differentiation, approach to and maintenance of steady states, goal 
directedness etc.  Such interdisciplinary properties means that in many research fields, 
the systems approach has turned out to be the optimal and most powerful tool for 
systematic analysis (Byeon, 2005, p. 223), where according to Byeon (1999, p. 284) 
entropy is a term that whilst originated in thermodynamics is applicable to all systems.  
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The concept of entropy has been seen as a foundational concept in many current 
research trends, especially in contemporary systems theory. Although the term 
originated in the field of thermodynamics, it has both theoretical and mathematical 
interpretations, as well as wide spread applications in other disciplines (Byeon, 2005, p. 
224). According to Byeon (2005, p. 224) a large number of useful terms and concepts 
have been transported into other disciplines from their original discipline. Since its 
original inception by Clausius in classical thermodynamics, entropy has witnessed a 
series of subsequent incarnations. As such, according to Bailey (1990 cited in Byeon, 
2005, p. 224) the term entropy can be used as long as it is qualified by a prefix, as in, 
social entropy. This approach enables various isomorphic applications of entropy to be 
differentiated from Clausius’ entropy, or Boltzmann’s’ entropy, or biological entropy, 
or any other concept which lacks certain prefix. 
 
In considering the isomorphic aspects of entropy, according to Midgley (2003, pp. 74-
75) there are instances in many sciences where the techniques and general structure 
bears an intimate resemblance to similar techniques and structures in other fields. That 
is, a one-to-one correspondence between objects which preserves the relationships 
between the objects is called an isomorphism. In considering the isomorphic aspects of 
entropy, Roos (1997, p. 16) argues that it is scientifically acceptable for one discipline 
to borrow concepts from another discipline. Such a process has resulted in important 
theoretical innovations. As stated by Atkins (1986, p. 2) “the avoidance of commitment 
to any particular microscopic interpretations means thermodynamics is not limited to 
particular applications”.  
 
As such, the concept of entropy is becoming increasingly popular and used to discuss 
the state of various systems, see Rifkin, (1982; Herman, 1999; King, 2008; and Lovey 
& Nadkarni, 2007). For example, the second law of thermodynamics (entropy law) has 
been applied to many domains including information security (King, 2008), 
organisational systems (Lovey & Nadkarni, 2007), combat systems (Herman, 1999), 
communications, biology, economics, sociology, psychology, political science and art 
(Rifkin, 1982, p. 263). It is argued by this thesis that a PPS is a complex, open system, 
dependent on its elements, each element’s constituents and their interrelationships 
through systematic application. Entropy is a concept conceived to discuss the 
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degradation, disorder and decay within a system relating to a systems ability to carry out 
work.  
 
The study argues due to the isomorphic aspects of science and the literature applying 
entropy to open systems, following the path of GST the concept of entropy can be 
applied to a PPS to discuss the gradual degradation, disorganisation and decay of and 
within a PPS. That is, security decay can be explained in terms of an entropy state. The 
theory of entropic security decay recognises that entropy processes exist in PPS, where 
we can distinguish both a given entropy state at a particular time, and how the general 
processes of entropy increase and decrease over time. 
4.3 The theory of entropic security decay 
Consistent with the isomorphic principles of science (Bertalanffy, 1950; 1968) this 
study discusses and draws on the literature relating to systems theory within an open 
systems frame, Defence in Depth, and the science of thermodynamics to present a 
theory for explaining and measuring PPS degradation over time. The theory of entropic 
security decay was conceived within grounded theory principles, where according to 
Strauss and Corbin (1990 cited in Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2006, p. 266) grounded theories 
are those inductively derived from the study of the phenomenon they represent.  
 
The theory of entropic security decay has been conceived, developed and provisionally 
verified through systematic data collection and analysis of published literature relating 
to the gradual degradation in the efficiency and effectiveness of a security system. This 
development was achieved through the identification of the interrelationship between 
the concepts of Defence in Depth, the systems approach applied to implementing 
Defence in Depth and the science of thermodynamics, specifically the concept of 
entropy. In applying this literature, it is argued that the system, mapped out, with its key 
performance indicators provides a framework for defining and measuring entropic 
decay within PPS.  
 
Congruous with the writings of Bertalanffy (1950, p. 26; 1968, p. 39; Bittel, 1978, p. 
1130; Keren, 1979, p. 316; Checkland, 1981, p. 83; Corning, 1995, p. 93; Skyttner, 
1996, p. 43; Midgley, 2003, p. 386; Sheard & Mostashari, 2008, p. 296; Morales-
Matamoros, et al, 2009, p. 72) this study defined a Physical Protection System (PPS) as 
a complex, open system. Such systems have a large number of interacting components 
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with non-linear coupling and significant interactions with their environment, depending 
on it for resources to maintain its product goal. A PPS transforms energy into (1) a 
product or services towards the detecting, delaying and responding to unauthorised 
intrusions (2), the product or service results from the exchange of energy between 
system constituents, individuals and groups towards achieving the protection goal. In 
light of the available literature, this thesis applies the concept of entropy within an open 
systems frame to discuss the natural and foreseeable decaying effects on such a system 
(PPS). 
 
King (2008, p. 1) initially introduced the concept of entropy into the security literature. 
According to King (2008, p. 1) security controls inevitably degrade over time, where 
such “security system degradation is the result of such systems suffering from natural 
entropy”.  Honkasalo (1998, p. 136) explains that degradation measures the irreversible 
increase of entropy, which is the amount of usefulness lost. King’s (2008, p. 1) 
statements introduce and applies the concept of entropy to the security domain body of 
literature. King’s (2008, p. 1) view is abstractly supported by Howlet (1995, p. 222) 
who adds, even the best systems will deteriorate over time and use. The isomorphic 
application of entropy to a PPS is supported by Lovey and Manohar (2007, p. 99) who 
assert, various systems suffer from entropy. The application of the second law of 
thermodynamics, specifically the concept of entropy, to a PPS re-introduces the 
concepts of degradation and decay into the security risk management literature.  
 
The argument that security controls can degrade over time reducing their commissioned 
levels of risk treatment was first considered by Underwood (1984), who referred to this 
as decaying security, stating, “Security Decay is the most serious threat to a security 
system”, and that “security decay must be expected”, “avoided”, and “countered” 
(Underwood, 1984, p. xi). Decay is defined as a “gradual decline” in health, prosperity 
or excellence, a process of decline or deterioration (Collins Australian Pocket 
Dictionary of English Language, 1994), or less good or less strong (The New Oxford 
School Dictionary, 1991), based on these definitions, as a systems entropy level 
increases, system decay increases. 
 
System degradation results from entropy production which reduces the efficiency and 
effectiveness within a system, impeding it to achieve its output goal (Bohm & Peat, 
2000, p. 137). However, according to Denbigh (2009, p. 4) for entropy to have an effect 
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on a system it must have initially been considered orderly, where orderliness is capable 
of being quantitatively stated. For a system to be defined as orderly, its elements must 
be appropriately distributed in space and/or time, where the rule of orderliness states 
that a set of three or more objects will display a certain orderliness if they exist in a 
linear arrangement, for example objects A, B and C. In this context, the objects obey the 
rule as B is to the right of A, and C is to the right of B, etc. In addition, the same objects 
will display the kind of orderliness if a relationship also exists between successive 
separations AB, BC, AC, etc, resulting in a more comprehensive state of order. 
 
The study argues that entropy relates to a security system as the Defence in Depth 
functions must be performed in their sequential order and within a length of time, which 
is less than the time required for the adversary to complete their task (Garcia, 2001, p. 
6). These functional requirements of Defence in Depth are distributed in space and/or 
time according to Denbigh’s (2009, p. 4) entropy rule. The available literature indicates 
that the space and time distribution of the defence in depth elements create a 
comprehensive state of order in relation to a PPS macro level of effectiveness. The 
micro states within Defence in Depth include the constituents within the elements of 
deter, detect, delay, and response, which may be considered a linear arrangement 
(Denbigh, 2009, p. 4; Garcia, 2001, p. 6) Deterrence (element A) is linear to detection 
(element B), which is linear to delay (element C) followed by a linear response (element 
D). 
 
Orderliness also exists within a PPS (Denbigh, 2009, p. 4) for example, deterrence. 
Deterrence is achieved by altering the cost benefit analysis of a rational choosing 
adversary (Singh, 2005). Within a PPS each function of the defence in depth strategy 
within this linear relationship must be achieved in their sequential order, achieving 
deterrence through systematic application of detect, delay, response (Garcia, 2006, p. 
240) and recovery, in this sequential combination. Deterrence is related to an 
adversary’s chances of being detected (B), the difficulty in achieving their goal (C), and 
the chances of getting caught (D). Therefore deterrence has an orderly relationship with 
all other elements within a PPS, being A=BCD.  
 
In addition, another orderliness relationship exists between response (D) and detection 
(B). Response is an organisations means of interrupting an adversary before they 
achieve their goal; however, for response to be achieved there must be knowledge that 
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an attack is underway (detection). Therefore a relationship exists between response and 
detection, namely B×D. Further delay is the means by which the facility provides their 
response force with enough time to interrupt an adversary. Therefore delay has an 
additional kind of orderly relationship with response, C×D. Furthermore, each element 
of defence in depth has a vertical relationship with its constituents, which combined 
provides the specific capability for that element within the linear relationship.  
 
Coole and Brooks (2009) argued that for the system of Defence in Depth to be effective, 
the relationships between the constituents and elements must be orderly and each 
constituent must be at its desired level of effectiveness. That is, for a PPS a time 
penetration continuum exists (Figure 4.1) based on this integrated systems approach 
incorporating the elements of defence in depth linear, orderly relationships, and the 
elements constituents vertical orderly relationships.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Defence in Depth time penetration continuum (Adjusted from Garcia, 2001, 
pp. 6-7). 
 
Such a process is based on the definition of entropy offered by Bohm and Peat (2000, p. 
137; Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 42; Herman, 1999, p. 86; Rifkin, 1982, p.8), where 
degradation and disorder within and between elements increases, decay increases and 
capability decreases. 
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4.3.1 System sensitivity 
In applying the concept of entropy to Physical Protection Systems (PPS), the available 
literature states “a security system is only as good as its parts, when a single part fails, 
this failure can cause degradation within the total system” (Konicek & Little, 1997, p. 
184: King, 2008, p. 1). Garcia (2006, p. 29) supports this view, stating “system 
effectiveness can become degraded through the reduction in effectiveness of individual 
components” (microstates). These views are consistent with the literature relating to, 
and discussing the principles of systems theory, where according to Waldman (2007, p. 
272) if part of a system is changed, the nature of the overall system is often changed as 
well. Midgley (2003, p. xxviii) expands on such a view stating, “even the tiniest 
influences may have a major effect on the future direction of the system”.   
 
These views are consistent with Lorenz’s (1968) findings, technically termed 
“sensitivity to initial conditions”, meaning that any difference in input into a system, no 
matter how small, will eventually produce enormous differences in output (Warren, 
Franklin & Streeter, 1998, p. 363). According to Jang, et al, (2009, p. 750) for a PPS the 
sensitivity value is defined as the change of the Pi according to increments of detection 
probability and/or delay time along an adversary’s path. However, this study contends 
that response force aspects such as time are also included in this sensitivity value. In 
addition, the sensitivity of the system is also related to the location of detection 
capabilities along an adversary’s path.  
 
Such sensitivity considerations are consistent with Dillon’s (1983, p. 119) views 
suggesting within a complicated system such as a PPS there are a whole series of 
Bifurcation points. Such a focus on the relationships between the micro and macro 
states within a security system towards maintaining system effectiveness is supported 
by King (2008, p. 1) who states “it is the gradual erosion of seemingly minor security 
controls which eventually lead to major incidents”. It is this aspect of GST that applies 
the concept of entropy to discuss the health of PPS. 
 
Lorenz’s (1963; 1968) work described how small changes occur at a specific point 
(point disturbance) in a system, which then expand to the boundaries of the areas for 
which they occupy. Consistent with Lorenz’s (1963; 1968) works, entropic decay theory 
purports that constituent decay enters the systems at a specific point, regardless of 
aetiology, then manifests itself at this specific point in the PPS along an adversary’s 
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attack path, then in line with the established relationships between the elements of 
Defence in Depth, propagates through the remainder of the system along this attack 
path, directly reducing the systems macro-state measure (Pi). Such a scientific, systems 
approach to analysing the whole was supported by the early works of Isaac Newton who 
stated, “the extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility and inertia of every object 
depends on the extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility and inertia of its 
component parts (The Open University, 1976, p. 68).   
4.3.2 The effects of entropic decay on a PPS 
This study’s interpretation of the effects of entropy, specifically from a point 
disturbance, is abstractly supported by Howlet (1995, p. 220) who explains that a poorly 
maintained security system will have many unexplained alarms leading to the guard 
force losing their confidence in the system and eventually ignoring a true alarm as just 
another false alarm. As such, this study contends that consistent with Lorenz’s (1968; 
Warren, et al, 1998, p. 363; Midgley, 2003, p. xxviii; Howlet, 2005; Waldman, 2007; 
Jang, et al, 2009, p. 750) works, the original decay, located within the detection element 
(point disturbance), expands to the boundaries of the detection elements key 
performance indicator, resulting in a failure to effectively detect the threat. This failure 
to detect the threat, due to the interrelationships between the defence in depth elements, 
results in the system becoming disordered ultimately resulting in this point disturbance 
propagating through the remainder of the defence in depth system.  
 
Drawing on the assumption that an immediate response to an event exists, either by 
guards or law enforcement, It is argued that such decay propagation, manifested in high 
nuisance alarm rates impedes on the human factor within the system reducing the 
effectiveness of the alarm assessment (PA) key performance indicator. As this 
breakdown in the various subsystem key performance indicators propagates throughout 
the remainder of the system it removes the probability of guard force communication 
(PC) performance indicator, resulting in the guard force never being dispatched, 
meaning the delay time becomes diminished. Based on the notion of an integrated 
system, subject to entropy, It is proposed that the macro-state effect of this point 
disturbance results in the adversary not being interrupted, therefore achieving their 
desired goal, resulting in the adversary defeating the defence in depth system due to 
decay manifested in the first element. 
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For example, to be effective, a detection capability must ensure its sensors are correct 
for their application, installed correctly, have a low nuisance alarm rate and be difficult 
for the threat to defeat (Garcia, 2006, p. 14). For the transmission system to be effective 
it must be able to successfully transmit an alarm from the sensor to the security control 
room, where factors such as corroded wires could impede this capability (Adams, et al, 
2005, p. 2). For the assessment system to be effective the video images containing the 
alarm source must provide quality of detail so that a person can accurately determine the 
cause of an alarm. For the entry control subsystem, the software must correctly receive 
electronic information from the installed entry control devices, compare this 
information to data stored in a data base, and generate unlock signals to the portal 
locking device when data comparisons match (Garcia, 2006, pp. 14-17). In addition, the 
systems mean times for both delay and response must be maintained at their 
commissioning levels of effectiveness.  That is, all of the various system subsystems 
must be at their commissioned level of effectives to maintain the systems commissioned 
macro-state performance measure (Pi) over time.  
4.3.3 Entropic security decay defined 
The starting point in evaluating the validity of entropic security decay in a PPS must 
include a theoretical definition of the concept. Based on the available literature it is 
argued that conforming with the concept of entropy the constituents of a PPS move 
from an available to unavailable state or from an ordered to a disordered state. Such 
entropy production impedes on a systems capability to achieve its macro-state output, 
therefore reducing the effectiveness of the “whole” system. Whilst the concept of 
entropy is becoming increasingly popular and used to discuss the state of various 
systems see Rifkin, 1982; Herman, 1999; Lovey & Nadkarni, 2007; King, 2008), as a 
concept entropy is tremendously difficult to grasp. Entropy is a concept previously 
discussed within the field of physics (Styer, 2001, p. 1; Lovey and Monahar, 2007, p. 
99) where its meaning is difficult to define and not well understood outside of academic 
circles. Such definitional ambiguity has lead to ubiquitous usage and minimal general 
understanding. Whilst various definitions and understandings are applied to entropy, a 
central theme or common thread is how various components of a system relate to one 
another towards producing a coherent whole. Where according to Bohm and Peat 
(2000) entropy is characterised by terms including disorganisation, disintegration and 
decay, whilst Herman (1999, p. 86) adds steady-degradation.  
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This study argues that the concept of entropy provides a framework for explaining and 
measuring the gradual degradation of a physical protection system after its 
commissioning. For example, according to Aslakse (2004, p. 272) the condition or state 
of an element within a system is represented by the ability of that element to support 
interactions with other elements, which have some form of internal structure of their 
own. If left to themselves, that is remained closed, each element will decay or fail. As 
such, if a system is to continue in some form of operating state there needs to be 
processes and maintenance to achieve this. It is argued that such a view is what 
Underwood (1984, p. xi) refers to when he wrote, decay occurs when building fabric 
and hardware deteriorate and frequently, when human frailties accumulate. 
4.4 The measurement of security decay 
In considering the measurement of security decay, Thompson (2002, p.1) explains that 
entropy is an idea born from classical thermodynamics and is therefore a quantitative 
entity rather than something intuitive, defined via an equation.  This view is supported 
by Dillon (1983, p. 183) who points out that mathematics is a significant and important 
aspect of science and therefore, it is only natural that mathematical techniques will be 
employed. That is, according to Lindsay (cited in Dillon, 1983, p. 183) physics is 
quantitative in the sense that it aims to answer the question how much, rather than 
merely “how”.  
 
As the expression of quantity requires numbers, physicist’ use mathematics to deal with 
the numbers and the various operations which may be performed by them. Mathematics 
provides the simple means of expressing functional relations between symbols to which 
operational significance can be attached, and from such relations logical deductions can 
be drawn (Dillon, 1983, p. 183).  For example, according to Thompson (2002, p.1) the 
specific definition of entropy via an equation comes from Clausius (1865) who defined 
entropy by the equation:  
7  M/ 
(24) 
Where S = the entropy, Q is the heat content of the system, and T = the temperature of 
the system. 
 
The benefits of such a quantitative approach are emphasised by Martin (2000, p. 210) 
who states “when conducting research one of the first things to do is to establish a base-
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line, that is a steady state”, where according to Martin (2000, p. 210) the amount of 
change can be considered as a percentage of a preset threshold level. Such an approach 
is supported by Lorenz (1968, p. 290) who considered that once the initial state of a 
system is known, then any change in this state , beyond its preset threshold level, can be 
regarded as its measure of error. Accordant with Coole and Brooks (2009, p. 23) the 
study argues that entropy can be quantitatively measured for a Defence in Depth system 
by drawing on the EASI equation: 
P(I) = P(D1)  P(C1)  P (R/A1) + ∑  !" (R/Ai) P(Ci) P (Di) ∏ ( %&'!& 1  P(Di)) 
(25) 
This equation was used to establish the systems commissioning, or operational level 
macro-state (Garcia, 2001) in chapter two. Congruous with the premises of systems 
theory EASI quantitatively demonstrates the various mathematical relationships among 
the constituents and elements performance measures within PPS. The elements key 
performance measures are the cumulative sum of the various subsystems within a PPS, 
where any changes in these inputs have an overall effect on the output (probability of 
interruption). Therefore, accordant with the principles of systems theory, changes in the 
microstates have a direct effect on the macro-state of the PPS. For example, Table 4. 1 
indicates the direct effects on the macro-state of the PPS with small changes in the 
microstates when calculating the probability of interruption using EASI adversary path 
analysis. For Table 4.1 probabilities are numbers between 0 and 1, however it is 
common practice to convert such probabilities to a percentage. Therefore Table 4.1 
represents the probability of interrupting an adversary as a percentage. 
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Table 4.1: Adversary path comparison table (Coole & Brooks, 2009, p. 24). 
 
 
 
For Table 4.1, condition 1 presents a Pi of 90% (very high chance of interruption) after 
entering the microstate data from condition 1 Table 4.2. However, condition 2 indicates 
a much lower Pi after making small changes in the systems microstates as a result of a 
detection sensors reduced effectiveness due to decay resulting in a higher nuisance 
alarm rate and by slight increases in response time due to decay in the facilities response 
capability. This condition indicates a Pi of just 53% (medium chance of interruption) 
after entering the microstate data from condition 2, (Table 4.2). Condition 3 (Table 4.1) 
indicates how the probability of interruption can be further reduced with a change in the 
facility’s probability of communication due to decay in the communications system. 
This condition shows Pi of just 28% after entering the microstate data from condition 3 
(Table 4.2).  
 
Table 4.2: Physical Protection System microstate data (Coole & Brooks, 2009, p. 24). 
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With small changes in the systems microstates through correcting the detection fault, 
slightly increasing the facility’s mean delay time and correcting the communication 
systems degradation, condition 4 (Table 4.1) shows an increased Pi of 84% (high 
chance of interruption) after entering the condition 4 microstate data from Table 4.2. 
These examples emphasise that the macro-state of the Defence in Depth system is 
recognised as an expression of the average of the microstate variables collectively, 
where sensitivity changes in microstates (Defence in Depth constituent elements) 
directly affect the macro-state. These results from an EASI analysis are concordant with 
Lorenz’s (1963) findings indicating that small differences can, over a long period of 
time, build to produce a large effect. For example, the first half of the EASI equation 
interlinks the probability of alarm (P/A) with the delay and response aspects of the 
system. However, the second half of the equation considers the probability of non-
detection (PND), therefore, as probability of detection decreases, the probability of non-
detection increases. 
 
Consistent with the quantitative aspect of entropy, and the sensitivity of the systems 
macro-state to changes within the various micro-states, this study argues that once a 
systems state has been established, based on the security risk management requirements, 
then any change within the various key performance indicators, and the systems macro-
state, beyond a preset threshold level, quantitatively represent both the amount of decay 
and its location within the PPS. In considering this assertion, Tester and Modell (1997, 
p. 82) point out that entropy meters do not exist. According to Tester and Modell (1997, 
p. 82) a change of state is defined by a change in the value of at least one property, 
where Pitzer (1995, p. 30) highlights that entropy is an extensive property, where the 
entropy of a system is equal to the sum of the entropies of its parts. That is, the entropy 
of as system is a macro-state.  
 
In considering the entropy of and within a PPS, Pitzer (1995, p. 26) explains that when 
measuring a quantity a standard must initially be chosen. Then there needs to be a 
means of comparing the measurement of the object of interest with this standard. Based 
on the available literature, specifically drawing on Clausius’s (1865) reasoning, it is 
argued algebraically that entropic security decay within a PPS can also be represented 
through Clausius’s (1865) entropy equation:   
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7  M −  
(26) 
 
Where S = the measure of system entropy (entropic security decay); Q = the initial 
commissioning state of a PPS (Pi); and T = the current analysed state after a defined 
period of time (Pi).  
4.5 Security decay and risk management 
In applying the concept of decay into the security risk management literature, this study 
argues that such decay within a PPS reduces the effectiveness of risk controls which 
increases facility vulnerability. This view is supported by Garcia’s (2001, p. 272) 
vulnerability equation, highlighting vulnerability through the formula:  
Vulnerability = 1 – () 
(27) 
Such increase in vulnerability increases a facilities security risk state. Such a view is 
uniform to Standards Australia HB 176 (2006, p. 62) which states “it is also important 
to consider that a small change in control effectiveness may have a substantial effect on 
vulnerability”. This premise is congruous with the definition of entropy offered by 
Bohm and Peat (2000, p. 137; Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 42; Herman, 1999, p. 86; Rifkin, 
1982, p.8), where degradation and disorder within and between elements increases, 
decay increases and capability decreases. For example, Somerson (2003, p. 13) explains 
that where strategies in place are insufficient to deter, detect, delay, respond to and 
where necessary recover from risks, then a higher opportunity vulnerability exists for an 
organisation. That is, based on the Normal Distribution, as control shrinkage occurs, the 
population samples with the capabilities to penetrate a facility would increase, rather 
than the desired decrease as decay manifests. In addition, for the defined threat the 
situation becomes more compounding, as demonstrated by Figure 4.3. 
 
The concept of decay is one of “gradual” degradation, where, as stated by King (2008, 
p. 1), “it is the erosion of seemingly minor security controls which eventually leads to a 
security incident resulting in a loss event”. That is, congruous with McCrie (2004, p. 
16) the result of decay interlinked with a facility’s risk rating and the effectiveness of its 
security controls can be summarized through the equation:  
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(28) 
For example, Figure 4.2 indicates that as the constituent’s key performance indicators 
decay gradually, the system as a whole decays, reducing the macro-state effectiveness 
measure below its commissioning measure. Such decay is congruous with the data from 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2. However, perceptually the system may appear to maintain its steady 
state. It is argued that this premise is supported by the writings of Howlett (1995, p. 
219) who states “from the time of taking a system into use it will start to deteriorate. No 
system, however well designed, can be completely reliable without proper maintenance. 
If left without attention, it will become unserviceable. However, the operator may not be 
aware of it, but the system will not perform as intended”. This “subtle” degradation 
results in the system performing below the level of risk control considered necessary for 
a specific security risk context. That is, in relation to the normal distribution of a 
defined threat’s capabilities, the systems effectiveness may be below its defined threat. 
In addition, as the system is perceived to be degraded by potential adversaries it can be 
argued that the deterrence element of Defence in Depth is also degraded (see Figure 4.2) 
leading to the perception by opportunistic offenders that the benefits outweigh the costs 
leading to a decision within the rational choice framework to attempt a penetration.  
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Figure 4.2 Effects of decay on implemented security levels (Adopted from Underwood, 
1984; Martin, 2000; Garcia, 2001, 2006; Pidwirny, 2006; HB 167, 2006). 
 
Consistent with the principle of equifinality (Figure 2.5,see Section 2.2.6.2), Figure 4.2 
indicates the effects of decay on the systems commissioning level of effective security 
when utilizing the Pi and Risk Equation to establish cost benefit based levels of 
security.  Adjusted from Underwood (1984; Martin, 2000, p. 210; Garcia, 2001, 2006; 
Pidwirny, 2006; Standards Australia HB167 Security Risk Management, 2006). 
4.5.1 The effects of entropy on the critical path  
The study operationally defined security as “a stable condition stemming from a 
systematic process which effectively combines people, equipment and procedures, 
within a security context, to restrict unauthorised access to either people, information or 
physical assets through their ability to deter, detect, delay and respond to attacks which 
may lead to loss of, or, harm to protected assets manifested by a malevolent human 
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adversary/s who seek/s to gain a level of unauthorised access”.  When considering the 
concept of entropic decay in relation to such a definition Garcia (2001, pp. 242-247) 
explains there are many possible paths for an adversary into a facility, however it is the 
critical path which characterises the effectiveness of the overall protection system in 
detecting, delaying and responding and interrupting an adversary. 
 
The critical path is defined as the most vulnerable path, that is, the path with the lowest 
probability of interruption (Pi). However, the theory of entropic security decay 
considers that constituent degradation along the other alternative paths into a facility 
may result in effectiveness regression so they become the critical path. That is, the 
alternative paths effectiveness in detecting, delaying and responding to an adversary’s 
actions are lesser than those calculated measures for the critical path.  
4.6 Avoiding and countering entropic security decay 
Systems are subject to dynamic behaviour which includes growth, unstable growth, 
stagnation, cyclical instability and decay (Bittel, 1978, p. 1135). In addition, open 
systems exist in a dynamic relationship with their environment, receiving various inputs 
which are transformed in some way and then export outputs (Byeon, 1999, p. 285). The 
receipt of inputs in the form of matter/energy and information enables open systems to 
offset the natural entropy processes (Laszlo cited in Byeon, 1999, p. 285). That is, due 
to natural entropy, survival of the system would not be possible without continuous 
inflow, transformation and outflow (Byeon, 1999, p. 285). Consistent with Hankasalo 
(1998, p. 131), like any other open system, a PPS needs low-entropy input where low-
entropy means both ordered materials and available energy, and it must be able to emit 
high entropy output into its environment.  For example, a physical system which is 
totally isolated from all information and energy inputs (closed) will quickly degrade, 
just as will the classical thermodynamic closed system (Byeon, 2005, p. 283).   
 
According to Byeon (1999, p. 287) non-equilibrium thermodynamics suggests that open 
framed systems are able to circumvent the effects of the second law of thermodynamics 
(the thermodynamic arrow of time) through their feedback processes. That is, certain 
systems have the property of feedback, that is, a portion of their outputs or behaviour is 
fed-back as input to affect succeeding outputs (Midgley, 2003, p. 73). According to 
Midgley (2003, p. 73) man-made system possess many of the properties possessed by 
natural systems, where simple notions such as wholeness, segregation and summativity 
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have meaning for both types of systems. This feedback process is aimed towards the 
irreversible aspects of the laws of statistical probabilities, by importing negative entropy 
(negentropy) into the system above that amount of entropy production (S), therefore 
reversing the effects of natural entropy upon the system. From a thermodynamic view 
point, a PPS where the appropriate feed-back mechanisms are in place would be 
negentropic, where transfers of information and energy/matter from the external 
environment can decrease entropy production so that total system entropy may remain 
constant, or even decrease over time.   
 
The available literature suggests that a PPS should be designed, implemented and 
managed as a system. In applying an open systems frame to the discussion of decay 
within a PPS this study contends that for a PPS to be managed as a system, the 
necessary open systems feedback must be included within the risk management cycle. 
Where feed-back is achieved during the monitor and review process. As such, the 
concept of security decay should be considered an important component of security risk 
management. Such a view is supported by the writings of Lovey and Manohar (2007, p. 
99) who assert that various systems suffer from entropy, therefore organisations must 
understand that for a system to operate efficiently they must continually invest in 
resources to maintain system adequacy to reduce natural entropy. Underwood (1984, p. 
249) supported this view, stating “After an attack the immediate reaction is often to 
increase the originally established security resources. However, usually this is not 
necessary, as all which may be required is the re-establishment of the intended level of 
protection”.  
 
To some degree, such security decay is recognised by Standards Australia HB167 
(2006, p. 87), which incorporates a monitor and review stage in the risk management 
process. Standards Australia HB167 (2006) suggest that the monitor and review stage is 
a critical component in security risk management, based on the argument that security 
risk environments are dynamic rather than constant, sometimes discretely changing and 
other times, dramatically over short periods. According to Robinson (1999, p. 58) for 
systems it is also important to know when a process is not fully satisfying the 
performance criteria, to plan for corrective action. Therefore the security risk 
management cycle has to in some form incorporate the effects of decaying risk 
reduction strategies (Figure 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3 Security risk management cycle (Coole & Brooks, 2009, p. 25). 
 
It can be argued the monitoring and review stage of the security risk management 
process should aim to energise or put-back energy into the system to eliminate entropy. 
That is, it is at this stage where a PPS engages in the necessary feedback mechanisms to 
maintain the system in a steady state, and detect micro changes within the systems 
constituents to ensure an appropriate level security is maintained to ensure the necessary 
level of risk reduction.   
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter completes phase one of the study; the establishment of a systems framed 
security decay benchmark. The chapter applied the concept of entropy within systems 
theory literature to discuss how the output goal of a Physical Protection System (PPS) 
can be impeded by the effects of natural entropy characterised by terms such as 
disorganisation, disintegration, decay and steady-degradation. It has been argued in this 
chapter that the concept of entropy within a system approach has isomorphic application 
encompassing all systems (see Section 4.2.3), and without the appropriate feedback 
mechanisms which characterise open systems, a system is either closed or becomes 
closed.  
 
Closed systems inevitably move towards a state of thermodynamic equilibrium. That is, 
accordant with the laws of thermodynamics, closed systems attain a time-independent 
equilibrium state resulting in the death of the system. However, by importing 
negentropy from their environment, open systems can reach a time-independent state 
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where the system remains constant as a whole, referred to as a steady state, that is, a 
state encompassing very little change over time (see Section 4.6). For a PPS the 
objective is to commission a system which implements measures that combine to deter, 
detect, delay and respond to adversary threats based on a defined threat, where such a 
system maintains its commissioned level of risk treatment over time, that is, it is able to 
circumvent the effects of natural entropy to ensure it constantly achieves it output goal.  
 
Phase one of the study presents the argument that the concept of entropy provides a 
framework towards measuring the gradual degradation of a Physical Protection System 
(PPS) after its commissioning. Study Phase 1: Security decay textual benchmark; the 
theoretical foundation of security decay, lead to the proposition that security decay 
could be defined as: 
The gradual degradation of the microscopic quantities (constituents), or the 
gradual degradation in the relationship between the microscopic and 
macroscopic quantities within a security system. 
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CHAPTER 5 
MATERIALS AND METHOD 
5. 0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the methodology and supporting literature drawn on to achieve 
phases two, three and four of the study. The chapter presents the study design (Section 
5.2) and a number of supporting theories (Section 5.3) which provide the research 
design’s scientific frame. This presentation includes a description of the Delphi method 
used for conducting research that draws on expert groups and the concept of expertise 
and expert opinion which underpins the Delphi method. In addition, the literature 
describing the use of interview techniques in qualitative research is presented. Section 
5.4 presents a potential alternative methodology and explains the reasoning supporting 
the choice of a qualitative design. Furthermore, Section 5.5 presents the study’s target 
population (N=6) with a discussion on the difficulties in establishing a valid security 
expert sample, and how participants for the study were selected based on Section 5.3. 
 
This chapter also presents Section 5.6 materials, explaining the informed consent 
process and interview questionnaire. Section 5.7 discusses the research procedure and 
ethics, and Section 5.8 presents how the study’s collected data was analysed in a two 
stage process facilitating the interpretative design of the study. Section 5.9 presents the 
concepts of reliability and validity and their underpinnings in qualitative research. This 
discussion is facilitated through a description of the safe guards within qualitative 
research which aim to ensure research findings are considered both reliable and valid, 
and how these techniques have been employed within this research design towards 
establishing truthfulness in this study’s interpretation of collected data. The chapter is 
summarised with a conclusion in Section 5.10.   
5.1 The theory of entropic decay 
The theory of entropic security decay was conceived based within grounded theory 
principles, where according to Strauss and Corbin (1990, p. 23) such theories are “those 
which have been inductively derived from the study of the phenomenon they represent”. 
A theory is a set of concepts used to define and/or explain some phenomenon, where 
such concepts form the basic units of analysis when researching into specific 
phenomena. Theories consist of plausible relationships produced among concepts and 
sets of concepts (Silverman, 2002, p. 77), where in the development of grounded theory, 
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concepts, categories and themes are identified and developed whilst the research is 
being conducted (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, pp. 23-25).  
 
Theory building occurs in an ongoing dialogue between pre-existing theory and new 
insights generated as a consequence of research (Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2006, p. 266). 
The theory of entropic security decay was inductively conceived within the principles 
put forward by Strauss and Corbin (1990, p. 23), where researchers’ do not begin with a 
theory then seek to prove it, rather they begin with an area of study and what is relevant 
to that area is allowed to emerge. As such, the theory of entropic security decay was 
inductively conceived through the conceptual review of literature relating to a systems 
approach towards security risk management, the argument that security controls degrade 
over time and the application of systems degradation literature, specifically the concept 
of entropy. This study aimed to evaluate and expand this inductive theory utilizing a 
qualitative research approach.  
5.2 Study design 
A qualitative approach was adopted to achieve the outcomes of this study. Such a 
design enabled the study’s sub-questions and research question to be responded to 
through the gathering of security expert’s knowledge and experience within their 
respective security domains as it related to the concept of security decay. Security 
experts’ “expertise” within their discipline specific areas provided the research data 
towards establishing whether they through their experience, supported the various 
premises presented within the theory. An interpretation of such support required a 
consensus of security expert’s opinions relating to the factors associated with each of 
the research sub-questions, underpinned by their deep thoughts, feelings and emotional 
insights.  
 
The choice of a qualitative research methodology is supported by Morrison (1998 cited 
in Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2005, p. 22) who states, “for people multiple 
interpretations and perspectives exist in relation to events and situations”. “Therefore 
“reality is multi-layered and complex”. As such, researchers should therefore examine 
phenomenon through the eyes of participants rather than themselves. Cohen, et al, 
(2005, p. 24) explain that such research designs enables the investigation of knowledge 
which is considered “commonsense”, “taken for granted” assumptions from lived 
experience. This approach is achieved by way of “reflexivity” that is, imputing meaning 
retrospectively, by the process of looking back on the past.  
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5.3 Research theories 
To explore the theory of entropic security decay required participants who intuitively 
understand this theory’s basis and where necessary, were able to move their previously 
established positions relating to security decay based on new, incoming information. 
This exploration required a specific depth of knowledge from professionals who had 
extensive expertise in the security industry. It was therefore argued that a panel study in 
the form of a Delphic poll was the most appropriate methodology for such a 
contemporary, rigorous query of expert’s opinions relating to the concept of security 
decay.  
5.3.1 The Delphi Methodology 
The Delphi technique is a viable research methodology for building theory, specifically 
the generation of grounded theory (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004, p. 27). It is therefore 
argued the Delphi methodology is more appropriate than a traditional survey 
questionnaire for evaluating theory inductively derived at utilizing grounded principles. 
Such an argument is based on the literature of Okoli and Pawlowski (2004, p. 19).  
According to Okoli and Pawlowski (2004, p. 19) traditional surveys require researchers 
to select a sample size suitable for averaging and detecting statistically significant 
effects in a population.  Their focus is towards random statistical sampling of a 
population of interest, towards generalizing their results to a larger population. In 
contrast to this focus, a Delphi study aims to arrive at an answer to difficult, technical 
questions through purposive panels of chosen experts.  
 
As Okoli and Pawlowski (2004, p. 19) explain, Delphi study results do not depend on 
sample sizes and statistical power, but rather group dynamics towards arriving at a 
consensus among experts. The Delphi approach has been supported by studies which 
have consistently shown that for questions requiring expert judgment, the average of 
individual responses (survey results) is inferior to results produced by group decision 
making processes.  
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5.3.1.2 Delphi methodology benefits 
Delphi studies build theory (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004, p. 27), specifically, data 
gathered during Delphi studies can be analysed as part of an inductive process for the 
generation of grounded theory (Eggers, Ohio & Jones, 1998, p. 58). This characteristic 
of the Delphi technique was of significant importance for this study as the theory of 
entropic security decay was inductively conceived by drawing on grounded theory 
principles.  Because Delphi studies solicit information from experts who have a wide 
range of experience, they extend the empirical observations from which initial theory is 
based, strengthening the grounding of the theory and increasing the likelihood that the 
resulting theory will hold across multiple settings (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004, p. 27).  
 
As a research methodology, Delphi originated from a series of studies by the RAND 
Corporation during the 1950s (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004, p. 16), referred to as project 
DELPHI (Dalkey & Helmer, 1963, p. 458). Delphi is a carefully designed, systemic 
iterative research method towards providing information for better decision making. 
This method is utilized for structuring anonymous group communications from 
geographically dispersed individuals who have special knowledge to share relating to 
complex and important issues which can be collated for judgment. Delphi employs 
sequential individual interrogations interspersed with information and opinion feedback 
(Ribbens & Cole, 1989, p. ii; Eggers, Ohio & Jones, 1998, p. 54; Okoli & Pawlowski, 
2004, p. 16).  
 
As a research methodology Delphi is based on the premise that several heads are better 
than one when formulating conclusions from incomplete evidence and that experts, 
within a controlled intuitive process, will make such conjectures based upon rational 
judgment and shared information as opposed to simply guessing (Eggers, et al, 1998, p. 
54). This premise is supported by a series of studies conducted by Dalky (1969) which 
found that when anonymous and controlled feedback was provided to members of a 
decision making group, more accurate decisions were produced than when such groups 
engaged in face to face discussions.    
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According to Delbecq, Van de Ven and Gustafson (1975, p. 10) Delphi is used towards 
the achievement of various objectives, including: 
1. To determine or develop a range of possible program alternatives; 
2. To explore or expose underlying assumptions or information leading to 
judgments; 
3. To seek out information which may generate a consensus on the part of a 
respondent group; 
4. To correlate informed judgments on a topic spanning a wide range of 
disciplines; 
5. To educate the respondent group as to the diverse and interrelated aspects of the 
topic. 
This study drew on these Delphi objectives to gather security expert’s knowledge and 
experience as it related to the concept of security decay. The strength of these objectives 
in explaining contemporary issues is supported by Okoli and Pawlowski (2004, p. 16) 
who state “researchers have applied the Delphi method to a wide variety of situations as 
it does not attempt to be representative of any population through statistical sample but 
rather is a group decision tool”, to consider opinions for solving research problems 
utilizing a group of subject matter experts (Schmidt, 1997, p. 764).  The purpose of a 
Delphic Poll is to gather a consensus of expert opinions relating to a topic under 
investigation using several rounds of questionnaires or interviews (Sproull, 1995, p. 
242), and can be used to notify study participants of recent scientific advances.  
 
Delphi as a research methodology facilitated the identification, evaluation, and 
clarification of factors pertaining to the concept of security decay from a systems 
approach, and established positions by drawing on the current knowledge of the study’s 
participating experts (Delbecq, et al, 1975, p. 84). This approach is supported by 
Schmidt (1997, p. 764) who explains that Delphi has been used in fields such as “public 
administration (Preble, 1983), medicine (Spiby, 1988), technology diffusion (Gray & 
Nilles, 1983), social work education (Ruskin, 1994), and operations management” 
(Malhotra, Stelle, & Grover, 1994). Delphi is used in situations where complex issues 
are to be understood which do not lend themselves to precise analytical solutions 
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(Eggers, et al, 1998, p. 55). A specific strength of the Delphi technique is that it can deal 
with very technical issues (Effective Engagement, N.D., p. 2).  
 
Such strength characteristics of the Delphi technique provided significant benefits for 
this study as the concept of security decay within the framework of the theory of 
entropic security decay is a concern framed by very technical literature. That is, Delphi 
studies encourage innovative thinking towards a research problem (Sproull, 1995, p. 
242) and play a vital role in research projects where developing consensus among 
experts in a particular discipline field is critical (Eggers, et al, 1998, p. 64). Such a 
philosophy was considered significant in achieving the aim and objectives of this study 
due to the contemporary nature, and scale of the subject matter and the dearth of 
dedicated published literature surrounding the concept of security decay generally, and 
from a systems approach.  
 
According to Sproull (1995, p. 242) Delphi research designs are based on a number of 
assumptions, including:  
 Experts are the best sources of opinions, 
 Expert opinion will be even better if experts respond independently and 
anonymously, 
 Opinions will be even better if respondents are allowed to modify their 
responses after receiving feedback on how the rest of the group responded 
 Several rounds of questionnaires and feedback of results will bring about a 
consensus of opinions.  
5.3.1.3 Delphi methodology disadvantages 
Nevertheless, Delphi polls do have some disadvantages. As Sproull (1995, p. 242) 
advised, Delphi is a time consuming and costly research methodology. Delphic polls 
usually require 3-5 rounds of interviews or questionnaires. Sproull’s (1995, p. 242) 
concerns were considered in establishing this study’s procedure, and cognisant with 
these disadvantages, due to budgetary and time constraints this issue was overcome by 
conducting only two (2) rounds of interviews, following the pilot study. Conducting 
only two (2) rounds of interviews produced some limitations within this study’s 
findings (see Section 10.3).  
 
103 
 
In considering such limitations Delbecq, et al, (1975, p. 106) explains that some Delphi 
studies do stop after a second round, in particular if an additional round is not required 
or further clarification is not important. Concordant with Delbecq, et al, (1975, p. 106) it 
was not considered necessary to conduct further additional rounds of panel interviews. 
It was considered more appropriate to analyse, reflect and interpret the data gathered 
across this study and based on this study’s outcomes, make future recommendations 
towards refocusing the research enquiry, adding additional, objective insights.  
5.3.2 Expertise 
Based on its methodology and underlying principles, the selection of experts is critical 
to the results of a Delphic poll. The use of experts’ opinions provides a particular study 
with the benefit of relatively fast utilization of the expert’s compressed knowledge 
(Erricsson, Charness, Feltovich & Hoffman, 2006, p. 749). According to Erricsson, et 
al, (2006, p. 749), the core aspect of an expert’s role consists of providing experience-
based knowledge which novice individuals could themselves attain if they had enough 
time to undertake the necessary learning. The overall objective is to obtain the most up-
to-date and reliable consensus of opinions from a study’s expert panels (Okoli & 
Pawlowski, 2004, p. 16).  However, experts should be selected using a defensible 
selection method (Sproull, 1995, p. 242). In considering the above, according to Eggers, 
et al, (1998, p. 55) the term “expert” and how it is used is a controversial issue. Walton 
(1992 cited in Eggers, et al, 1998, p. 54) contends there are three ways to distinguish 
experts from lay people: 
 Experts are people with sufficient knowledge and experience to have 
mastered the advanced skills of a particular domain of knowledge or 
experience; 
 Experts are proficient in their actions and have specific ways of applying 
their knowledge to a task in their area of expertise; 
 Experts are also proficient at identifying problems in their areas and then 
being able to tell if identified problems are solvable, then experts solve 
them. 
This view is supported by Delbecq, et al, (1975, p. 88) who consider the key points in 
selecting an expert is to identify the desirable knowledge and qualifications of potential 
participants. For example, according to Bedard and Chi (1992, p. 135) studies have 
shown that a large, organized body of domain knowledge is a prerequisite to expertise. 
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That is, experts have a greater quantity of domain-relevant knowledge than do novices. 
In addition, the knowledge of experts is organized in ways that makes it more 
accessible, functional, and efficient. Also, experts knowledge is extensively cross-
referenced with a rich network of connections among concepts resulting in richer 
processing, whereas, novices have fewer and weaker links among concepts (Bedard & 
Chi, 1992, p. 135). Cornford and Athanasou (1995, p, 11) add, occupational expertise is 
based on case and episodic knowledge accumulated over extensive periods of time, and 
involves both positive and negative instances. Weiten (2002, p. 223) explains, the 
episodic memory system is constructed of chronological, or temporally dated 
recollections of personal experience. That is, episodic memory is a personal record of 
things a person has done, seen or heard. 
 
It is argued that significance in defining an expert is the concept of knowledge, where 
knowledge can be discussed in terms of its quantity or its structure (Bedard & Chi, 
1992, p. 135). According to Novak and Gowin (1984 cited in Brooks, 2007, p. 3) 
knowledge is constructed, through the expansion of existing concepts. As new 
knowledge is gained, it changes a person’s understanding of their existing knowledge. 
According to Bedard and Chi (1992, p. 135) such knowledge may be based on previous 
knowledge (built upon) and individual’s experience, and an individual’s interaction 
within their environment. Such a large organized body of domain knowledge influences 
the perceptual processes and strategies of problem solving.  A view which is supported 
by Rennie and Gribble (1999 cited in Brooks, 2007, p. 4) who point out, knowledge can 
be considered a perceptual understanding towards a subject matter and may not be 
necessarily concrete or fact. Cornford and Athanasou (1995, p, 11) add, episodic 
knowledge is associated with isolated pieces of knowledge or incidents which, when 
brought together by cognizant individuals, build up a more coherent domain specific 
picture.  
 
Stake (2010) supports the application of knowledge to the concept of expertise. 
According to Stake (2010, p. 13) professional work depends on science, but each 
profession has its own separate body of knowledge. It is therefore considered that 
professional knowledge differs from scientific knowledge, although overlaps exist. 
Professional knowledge is the lore gained from working with others having similar 
training (scientific knowledge) and depth of experience. What especially characterises 
professional knowledge is a focus on the fact that how knowledge is applied varies with 
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the situation, that is, congruous with Walton (1992 cited in Eggers, et al, 1998, p. 54) 
experts draw on their expertise (episodic knowledge) to solve problems.  For example, 
Bedard and Chi (1992, p. 136) found, in problem solving, the greater amount and better 
organization of an expert’s knowledge compared to novices, results in two very 
different styles of problem solving.  
 
Bedard and Chi (1992, p. 136) point out these differences have been shown to exist in 
problem representations, problem solving strategies and the quality of decisions. For 
problem representation, representations consist of a person’s interpretation or 
understanding of the problem. Such an interpretations are based on people’s domain 
related knowledge and their organisation of this knowledge. People represent problems 
by classifying them as a particular type, where classification is based on a person’s 
solution procedures attached to each type of problem. However, to classify a problem 
one needs to pick out the most relevant features, or must infer additional aspects about 
the problem, given the explicitly stated features. Both these feature-identification 
processes are more efficient and superior among experts.  
 
In addition, such identified differences are more salient in ill defined problems, where 
the problems structure lacks definition in some respect. In solving ill defined problems 
experts spend considerable amounts of time developing problem representations by 
adding many domain-specific and general constraints to the problem, as if they are 
modifying the problem from an ill defined to a well defined problem. However, novices 
attempt to solve the problem without defining it (Bedard & Chi, 1992, p. 136).  
 
Cornford and Athanasou (1995, p. 12) explain that in problem solving, the situation can 
be summed up as; novices seek logical, fairly consistent all purpose rules to guide their 
behaviour. Advanced beginners start to employ experience problem solving processes. 
Competent level practitioners exercise greater authority in problem solving, they set 
priorities and make plans, they determine what is important and that the order of priority 
may change. Proficient practitioners may no longer consciously think about 
adjustments, for them intuition or “know-how” becomes important. These practitioners 
notice similarities between events, with greater analysis and decision making with more 
flexible observance of rules. However, experts have an intuitive grasp of situations, 
where their performance is fluid and qualitatively different.  
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According to Cornford and Athanasou (1995, p. 12) the knowledge of experts contains 
fewer rigid classifications of areas of data, with mastery of understanding of the 
interrelationships and linking between the different areas of knowledge. Expert’s store 
solutions and use them again, they learn from their mistakes, and tend to portray what 
they are solving in familiar elements. These elements describe the operations to be 
performed and allow the expert to find an optimal solution under conditions of 
uncertainty. Bussing and Herbig (2003, p. 145) suggest professional expertise includes 
the intuitive knowing how, and less the theoretical thus formalised knowing what.    
 
Based on the available literature, according to Erricsson, Charness, Feltovich & 
Hoffman (2006, p. 3) an expert is defined as a person widely recognised as somebody 
with extensive knowledge or ability based on factors including; research, experience, 
occupation, or education and training within a specific area of focus (domain) beyond 
that of the average person, sufficiently that others may rely upon that individual’s 
opinion. Cornford and Athanasou (1995, p. 10) add, domain experts are defined, in 
serious professional fields, by their reasonably skilled peers with whom they work. This 
study drew on this literature to establish its target sample of participants congruous with 
Bedard and Chi (1992, p. 136) as security decay is at present an ill defined problem. 
However, experts have an intuitive grasp of solutions, “intuitive knowing” stemming 
from their knowledge and experience (Cornford & Athanasou, 1995, p. 12). 
5.3.2.1 Security Expertise 
This study required an expert with domain specific episodic knowledge and experience 
within the security profession. However, in establishing a security expert Phinney and 
Smith (2009, p. 2) argue that the knowledge domains of security are relatively 
unknown. For example, Brooks (2007, p. 1) advices, “security is a multi-disciplined 
industry, constructed from knowledge stemming from a multitude of disciplines”. That 
is, according to Brooks (2007, p. 2) security practitioners provide a wide range of 
services in areas including security management, human resources, risk management, 
crisis management, investigations, information technology and computing, physical 
security and security technology.  
 
For example, towards defining security through the presentation of security knowledge 
categories Brooks (2007) conducted a study to establish: 
 What are the knowledge categories of security; 
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 What are the subordinate concepts of security 
 What is the expert knowledge structure and subordinate concepts of security as 
measured by expert interviews; 
 Can security be defined through knowledge categorization and supporting 
concepts? 
Brooks’s (2007) study results presented security categories which included (N = 14) 
categories across many associated industries (Table 5.1), within many occupations.  
Table: 5.1 Security knowledge categories   
Security knowledge categories  
 
Security category descriptors 
 
 
Criminology 
 
Emergency/contingency 
planning 
 
Fire science 
 
 
 
Facility management Industrial security Information and 
Computer 
Investigations Physical security Security principles 
Risk management Safety Security law 
Security management Security technology  
 
Accordant with Delbecq, Van de Ven and Gustafson (1975, p. 88); Cornford & 
Athanasou, 1995, p. 10; Okoli and Pawlowski (2004, p. 22); Erricsson, Charness, 
Feltovich & Hoffman (2006, p. 3); and Brooks (2007) for this study, security experts 
were defined based on their biographical information relating to their qualifications, 
length of years of experience, and tenure in government positions, and advice they 
provide across the various security discipline categories established by Brooks (2007). 
In accordance with Cornford and Athanasou (1995, p. 10), security experts were 
selected through peer nomination based on their revered reputations across these 
categories and have been peer nominated (defined) as experts.  
5.3.3 Interviews 
This research enquiry adopted a qualitative approach, responding to this study’s sub-
questions and research question through the gathering of security expert’s knowledge 
and experience by employing a semi-structured interview questionnaire. Interviews are 
a systematic means of discussing with people an area under investigation towards 
collecting data and constructing knowledge in research. The use of interviews in 
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research considers that knowledge is something generated between people, often 
through conversation. Interviews enable research participants in a study to discuss their 
interpretations of the world in which they live, and to express how they regard issues 
under investigation from their personal experience (Cohen, et al, 2005, p. 267). 
 
Interviews differ in their openness of purpose, their degree of structure, and the extent to 
which they are exploratory or hypothesis testing, and whether they seek description and 
interpretation (Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2006). To respond to this study’s questions semi-
structured interviews were conducted to gather data from security experts via direct 
verbal interaction drawing on an interpretative analysis (Cohen, et al, 2005, p. 268). 
Semi-structured interviews can also be referred to as in-depth interviews, or focused 
interviews (Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2006, p. 56). Such interviews focus on participants’ 
subjective responses to a known situation in which they have been involved, and which 
has been analysed by the researcher prior to the interview.  
 
Based on the outcome of such interviews researchers are able to support or reject 
previously formulated ideas relating to their focus of inquiry (Cohen, et al, 2005, p. 
273). Semi-structured interviews are very common in qualitative research. They draw 
on an interpretative theoretical framework emphasising a belief that meanings are 
continually constructed and reconstructed during interaction. In this research 
methodology, participants’ become constructors of knowledge in collaboration with 
their interviewer (Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2006, p. 57). That is, the interview 
methodology facilitates for interviewers to bring in their own knowledge of an area 
under investigation, enabling them to probe for deeper views and opinions of the 
interviewee (Cohen, et al, 2005, p. 273). In drawing out security expert’s intuitive 
knowledge relating to the concept of security decay, it was argued that such a process 
underpinned by the available literature was an excellent means of explaining such an ill 
defined problem. 
5.3.3.1 Disadvantages of interviews 
According to Liamputtong and Ezzy (2006, p. 72) interviews as a research methodology 
do have their disadvantages.  First, interviews are resource intensive, that is, they take a 
great deal of time and expense to collect data. Second, in-depth interviewing is difficult 
to do well. However it is argued that these disadvantages were overcome by various 
advantages interviewing provides towards achieving research goals. These advantages 
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included the fact that semi-structured interviews are an excellent means of discovering a 
person’s interpretations of their relevant experiences. In addition, they allow for new 
understandings and theories to be developed during the research process.  
 
It was this strength of the interview technique which the study sought to draw on 
towards establishing whether security experts support the premises and principles 
underpinning the theory of entropic security decay. In addition, according to 
Liamputtong and Ezzy (2006, p. 72), participants generally find the interview process 
rewarding. Consistent with this view, during the interviews all participants reported that 
they did enjoy the process and found the subject matter under investigation very 
interesting. As such, it is argued that this research methodology enabled participants’ 
(interviewer and interviewee) to discuss their point of view with regards to the concept 
of entropic security decay where concordant with the writings of Cohen, et al, (2005, p. 
267) experts’ were able to offer their deep thoughts and feelings either supporting or 
refuting the premises underpinning the theory of entropic security decay. 
 
5.4 Potential alternative methodology   
An alternative means of collecting data relating to the concept of security decay may 
have been facilitated through the use of a psychometric survey questionnaire (attitude 
test) in the form of a rating scale. There are three types of scales that have been utilized 
in the construction of such attitude tests, including Guttman Scaling, Thurnstone scales 
and Likert Scales (Kline, 2000, pp. 91-95). For example, a Likert scale is a survey 
rating scale which measures attitudes, opinions and motivations by asking study 
participants to indicate whether they agree or disagree with each statement in the 
questionnaire (Martin, 2000, pp. 223-224). In designing a scale Loewanthal (2001, p. 3) 
suggests a multi-item measure is needed where there is an underlying central conceptual 
entity with a number of facets which may not be tapped by a single question.  
 
However, the variables and factors underpinning the theory are still under investigation 
at the conceptual stage. Until further research is carried out, factor analysis showing that 
specific constructs or factors are correlated with the phenomenon under investigation is 
limited in its validity. Nevertheless, according to Loewenthal (2001, p. 31) a good 
means of sourcing items to be included in psychometric measures is through qualitative 
interviews. This approach is based on the premise that in qualitative research, data 
analyses is carried out concurrently with data collection. That is, with qualitative 
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studies, a constant interplay exists between collection and analysis which produces a 
gradual growth in understanding of the phenomenon under investigation (Walliman, 
2005, p. 188). 
5.5 Participant sample 
In determining a suitable research sample, Best (1989, p. 10) highlights that it is not 
possible to study an entire population. As such, according to Okoli and Pawlowski 
(2004, p. 19) many research methodologies are focused towards random statistical 
sampling of a population of interest, with the aim of generalizing their results to a larger 
population. In considering a valid research population Lin (1976, p. 146) explains that 
the total group of people (cases) who meet certain criteria of interest set by researchers 
is referred to as its research population. Such a focus requires researchers to select a 
sample size suitable for averaging and detecting statistically significant effects in a 
population (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004, p. 19). In discussing the selection of a suitable 
participant sample for a research study Martin (2000, p. 219) suggests that a 
representative sample is one where the extent of the sample truly represents the 
population under investigation. Cohen, et al, (2005, p. 93) add, that such samples have a 
measure of randomness and therefore a degree of generalizability.  
 
However, in considering the issue of a statistical sample representing the security 
industry, Brooks (2007, p.1) explains that security as a profession is a multi-disciplined 
industry. This eclectic mix has resulted in a profession which lacks clear definition, 
potentially the result of its diversity and inter-disciplinary structure, as security draws its 
breadth of knowledge from many disciplines. For example, as Brooks (2007) study; 
mapping the knowledge structure of security, highlighted fourteen (14) security 
knowledge categories including: criminology, emergency/contingency planning, facility 
management, fire science, industrial security, information and computer security, 
investigations, physical security, principles, risk management, security law, security 
management, technology and threats. In addition, Brooks (2007) reported a list of 
supporting subordinate security concepts (N=2001). Brook’s (2007) views are 
supported by Borodzicz and Gibson (2006, p. 181) who adds that due to its diverse 
tasks, security is both difficult to define and practice. That is, security practitioners 
provide a significant range of professional services.  
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In addition to definitional concerns, Borodzicz and Gibson (2006, p. 191) highlight that 
researching in the security domain is tremendously difficult given that the industry often 
shrouds itself in secrecy. Many of the practitioners within the security industry often 
decline to be researched by academics even though they wish to draw on a body of 
knowledge towards stronger professional standing. This very aspect of the security 
industry was experienced during the study, where some security “expert” practitioners 
declined to participate irrespective of its research focus and abstract nature of the 
interview questionnaire. These combined issues impede the successful poling of a 
statistically representative security expert sample. Furthermore, when considering the 
suitable size of a research sample Cohen, et al, (2005, p. 93) explain that no clear 
answer exists, therefore consideration of statistical analysis, that is, the research 
methodology, is what drives the selection suitable sample size.   
 
In considering the issues effecting a valid security industry statistical sample and the 
writings of Cohen, et al, (2005, p. 93), Okoli and Pawlowski (2004, p. 16) point out that 
the Delphi method does not attempt to be representative of any population through 
statistical sample. Rather it is a group decision tool to consider individual’s opinions 
towards solving research problems utilizing a group of subject matter experts (Schmidt, 
1997, p. 764), using several rounds of questionnaires or interviews (Sproull, 1995, p. 
242). More specifically Rundblad (2006, p. 2) explains that a suitable participant sample 
size for qualitative research designs using interviews requires very few participants.  
 
In addition, when considering an appropriate sample size for grounded theory 
Liamputtong and Ezzy (2006, p. 51) suggest that sample size is determined on 
theoretical as opposed to statistical grounds. It is the representativeness of concepts not 
of persons which is crucial. Such a view is faithful with Silverman (2002, pp. 138-250) 
writings who explains that participants for qualitative research generally stem from 
purposive sampling, as researchers seek out specific groups and individuals to evaluate 
the processes under investigation (Silverman, 2002, pp. 138-250).  
 
Based on the available literature, participants’ for this study consisted of peer nominated 
security experts (N=6) selected and solicited to participate who were employed to 
provide security category knowledge advice across the varied security related 
occupations. Their selection was based on their meeting such criteria, where based on 
their extensive knowledge or ability, their experience, occupation and/or education and 
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training others rely upon them for professional opinion within the multi-disciplined 
security industry and they were considered by their peers (peer revered) as experts. 
These experts formed a non-probability (purposive) sample, enabling the full scope of 
their professional experience and judgement of the issue to be explored. Purposive 
sampling is supported by Cohen, et al, (2005, p. 102) who state “such samples are 
selected when researchers target a particular group based on very specific research 
needs”.  
5.6 Materials 
Accordant with the requirements of informed consent, an information letter was 
prepared (Appendix A). The letter presented the aims and benefits of the study. In 
addition, the letter briefly discussed the premises underpinning the theory of entropic 
security decay and explained the workings of a Delphi poll. In addition, potential risks 
and discomforts were presented to participants, where it was anticipated that there 
would be no foreseeable risks and discomforts within the study. The explanation letter 
also explained that there was no penalty for withdrawing from the study as participation 
was voluntary. Conforming to Edith Cowan University ethical requirements, an 
independent contact person was nominated and their contact details were provided to 
participants as part of the research letter. The last page of the research letter was an 
attached informed consent acknowledgement slip, where participant’s informed consent 
was formally recorded. 
 
A semi-structured interview questionnaire was prepared (Appendix’s B & C) consisting 
of open ended questions supplemented with closed questions. The questionnaire sought 
to obtain participants’ deep feelings, concerns and experience (Cohen, et al, 2005, p. 
148) associated with decaying PPS. Questions were drawn from the conceptual 
benchmark (Chapters 2, 3 and 4). Participant’s responses were written on the survey 
questionnaire using a pen, with additional writing pad materials provided to ensure 
answers were not limited to available space on the questionnaire. The interviews were 
transcribed into word documents (Appendix D) for validity checks and analysis. 
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5.7 Research procedure and ethics 
5.7.1 Procedure 
To achieve the research goals a sequential multiple phase methodology was applied 
(Lin, 1976, p. 5) incorporating a Delphic Poll, employing semi-structured interviews to 
gather data from security experts through direct verbal interaction (Cohen, et al, 2005, 
p. 268). This research process required the repeated individual interviewing of 
participating experts. Congruous with Eggers and Jones (1998) individuals 
identified/nominated as experts were contacted by telephone or email and solicited to 
participate in the study. Once contacted, potential participants were informed about the 
objectives of the study, the nature of the panels, the obligations of participants, the 
length of time the Delphi process was going to take (1-2 hours), and the information 
which would be shared among the study’s other participants (Delbecq, et al, 1975, p. 
88). Those who respond favourably were sent the research letter explaining the research 
methodology and premises formed. This study then followed a multiple sequential 
phase process towards achieving its desired outcomes. These steps and activities are 
outlined in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1 Study procedural steps. 
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Given the difficulty in conducting research in the security domain, research data was 
recorded manually by the interviewer during the interview process. This method is 
considered suitable when the potential exists for participants to constrain their answers 
when faced with mechanical means as manual recording appears less threatening to 
participants (Cohen, et al, 2005, p. 281). For answers where interpretation was 
subjective, clarification was asked during the interview to increase internal validity.   
5.7.2 Ethics 
In moving into the data collection phase of the study, it must be acknowledged that 
ethics are an essential aspect of scientific research. The concept of ethics stems beyond 
specific principles or abstract rules applied to a research design. They are about the 
issues or potential problems each research situation presents (Davies & Dodd, 2002, p. 
281). According to Davies and Dodd (220, p. 281) within a research framework, ethics 
exist in researchers’ actions, and in their ways of doing and practicing their research, 
they are always in progress, never to be taken for granted, flexible and responsive to 
change.   
 
In the pursuit of an ethically robust study congruous with Forshaw (2004, p. 48) ethical 
approval for conducting the study was gained from Edith Cowan University’s ethics 
committee. In addition, all participants solicited to take part in the study were given 
information pertaining to what they were agreeing to participate in to ensure the 
protocols of informed consent. All participants were informed that there was no penalty 
for refusal to participate (Forshaw, 2004, p. 47), and no undue pressure was placed on 
any participants if they declined to participate in the study (Forshaw, 2004, p. 45), as 
this did occur. In addition, all interviews were conducted without any time limits, and 
no financial or other material benefits were offered to individuals for their participation 
in this study.   
 
For some participants there was a legal obligation to protect their identity and keep their 
data/personal information confidential. In-light of this to ensure the confidentiality of 
participant’s data and identities, participants were not asked to supply their names or 
other identifying details outside of research data requirements. All participants who 
agreed to participate in the study were interviewed utilizing the pre-established semi-
structured interview questionnaire which had been submitted to Edith Cowan 
University’s ethics committee for prior approval.  
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5.8 Analysis 
An essential part of research is data analysis to measure, make comparisons, and 
examine phenomena relationships towards generating explanations (Walliman, 2004, p. 
301). In qualitative research data analysis is predominately interpretative (Cohen, et al, 
2005, p. 282), where according to Patton (2002, pp. 453-454) qualitative analysis is 
typically inductive in the early stages, where the final, confirming stage is deductive. 
Conforming with Patton (2002, p. 453) and Liamputtong (2006, p. 265) the study was 
evaluated through the use of an interpretative analysis, where stage one of the analysis 
initially drew on an inductive methodology, where at the completion of all interviews, 
responses were analysed (Gillham, 2000, p. 69), inductively identifying themes 
(Krippendorff, 2004 cited in Liamputtong, 2006, p. 259) using line-by-line analysis of 
panel members responses. The inductive analysis was aimed towards generating natural 
units of meaning, looking for explanations and/or constructs which provide the data 
patterns and themes (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 72). This analysis focused on the 
themes of important messages inherent in the participant’s responses, such messages 
stems from the interviewee’s perspective of research subject matter, being security 
decay (Liamputtong, 2006, p. 111).  
 
Stage two of the study’s analysis subjected the inductive analysis to a deductive 
analysis. This analysis was achieved using informed intuition to deductively connect the 
inductive data (participant’s responses) with the literature benchmark, and interpreted 
by comparing participant’s responses with the textual data, and considered in relation to 
this study’s research sub-questions, establishing a chain of evidence towards making 
inferences in relation to responding to this study’s research question.  
 
The deductive analysis was achieved drawing from a benchmark (Chapters 2 and 3) 
conceived in phase one of the study from the literature stating that security is applied 
within a systems approach (Underwood, 1984, p. xi; Fennelly, 1997; Garcia, 2001, p. 6; 
Fisher & Green, 2003, p. 164), where such systems are only as good as their parts 
(Konicek & Little, 1997, p. 184: Fisher & Green, 2003, p. 164; Garcia, 2006; King, 
2008, p. 1). This literature was combined with literature published from systems theory, 
specifically how the macro state of any system is directly related to the sum of its 
microstates (Bertalanffy, 1950; Churchman, 1968; Bittel, 1978; Checkland, 1981; 
Waldman, 2007). This literature is supported by research conducted by Lorenz 
117 
 
(Butterfly Effect, see, Lorenz, 1963; 1969; Peirce, 2000), and literature supporting the 
isomorphic application of entropy to discuss the irreversible processes suffered by a 
system without the appropriate feed-back mechanism (Bertalanffy, 1950; Bittel, 1978; 
Keren, 1979; Prigogine, 1987; Pidwriny, 2006; Morales- Matamoros, Tejeida-Padilla & 
Badillo-Pina, 2010, p. 75-76).  
 
This synergy of literature brought together knowledge from laws, theories and concepts 
across multiple textual documents. This process identified major and minor themes 
towards developing a benchmark for framing the deductions in response to this study’s 
research sub-questions and research question, by comparing the messages and themes 
stemming from the questionnaire with those stemming from the theory’s document 
benchmark (Cohen, et al, 2005, p. 283).  According to Silverman (2002, p. 229) such 
textual data are in principle reliable sources for analysis, where in-line with Patton 
(2002, p. 453) such a conceptual review provides a framework for data to be 
deductively analysed.  
 
The aim of the analysis was to establish a level of theoretical validity for the study 
where, congruous with the literature from Sections 4.3.1 and Section 4.3.2 it was argued 
that by comparing the themes inherent in the security experts responses stemming from 
the semi-structured interview questions, to those inducted themes in the theory’s 
embodying literature suitable evidence to respond to the study’s research question could 
be drawn. To strengthen the reliability and validity of the deductive analysis closed 
questions were also employed to provide confirming data, establishing a chain of 
evidence of whether a consensus among the panels was achieved, aiding the 
interpretative analysis. The closed questions provided additional evidence supporting 
the interpretations and conclusions drawn for this study’s research sub-questions, and 
provided the supporting data to enable an interpretation of consensus amongst the 
research panels, in-line with the methodological principles of the Delphi technique.  
 
5.9 Reliability and Validity 
Qualitative research, in its broad sense, embodies that research which produces findings 
not arrived at through statistical analysis or other means of quantification. Rather, 
qualitative research draws its findings through the use of analytical procedures utilized 
to interpret data stemming from observations and interviews (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 
18). That is, qualitative research does not seek to measure a phenomenon under 
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investigation, rather, it seeks to understand, represent or explain it (Pyett, 2003, p. 
1170). However, faithful to the quantitative research philosophy, validity and reliability 
are two factors which must be considered when designing such studies, analysing 
results, and judging the quality of a study (Golafshani, 2003, p. 601). As Creswell and 
Miller (2000, p. 124) explain, a consensus exists amongst qualitative researchers that 
qualitative inquires’ need to demonstrate their research studies are credible.  
 
In quantitative research the terms reliability and validity are treated very separately, yet, 
these terms are not viewed so separately in qualitative research (Golafshani, 2003, p. 
600). However, according to Bashir, Afzal and Azeem (2008, p. 35) both paradigms 
seek to find the same result, “the truth”. For example, both qualitative and quantitative 
researchers need credibility in their research, where according to Bashir (2008, p. 35) 
validity and the norms of rigour which embody quantitative research are not fully 
applicable to qualitative research. Golafshani (2003, p. 604) explains that from a 
qualitative researcher’s perspective, reliability and validity are entwined and 
conceptualised as trustworthiness, rigour and quality.  
5.9.1 Reliability 
Whilst the term reliability is a concept utilized when discussing the testing and 
evaluation of quantitative research (Bashir, et al, 2008, p. 39) it is also considered in 
qualitative research (Golafshani, 2003, p. 601). In quantitative research, reliability aims 
to ensure proposed research is creditable, dependable, consistent and trustworthy, where 
according to Cohen, et al, (2005, p148) it assumes research methods used can be 
employed to duplicate the sample with results being consistent. In applying the concept 
of reliability in qualitative research, Patton (2001 cited in Golafshani, 2003, p. 602) 
argues, in such a study, reliability is more a consequence of validity. Patton’s (2001) 
view is supported by Silverman (2002) and Seale (1999, p.468) who state, reliability in 
qualitative research is framed around an examination of trustworthiness. As such 
Lincoln and Guba (1985 cited in Bashir, 2009, p. 39; Golafshani, 2003, p. 601) note, in 
qualitative research a demonstration of validity is sufficient to establish reliability.  
5.9.2 Validity 
The issue of validity has been an enduring issue in the debate relating to the legitimacy 
of qualitative research (Maxwell, 1992, p. 279). In a focused discussion on the topic 
Maxwell (1992, p. 279) highlights that if qualitative studies cannot consistently produce 
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valid results, the policies, programs or predictions based on such studies cannot be 
relied on.    
 
In discussing the issue of validity in various research designs, Loewenthal (2001, p. 17) 
describes two specific types of validity which need to be considered when employing 
questionnaires, these are face and content validity. Face validity is suggested to be 
present when questionnaire items appear to measure what they are intended to measure, 
and can be gained by asking the questions to judges who are members of a target 
population and agree that the questions intuitively represent what they are purported to 
measure. Accordant with Loewenthal (2001, p. 17) to establish a measure of face 
validity within the study’s research questionnaire, a professional security academic 
reviewed the semi-structured interview questions prior to their being tested in a pilot 
study (Face validity).  
 
Once face validity was established, a level of content validity was pursued. Content 
validity is said to be present when particular test items actually represent what they are 
intended to measure (Loewenthal, 2001, p. 17).  Content validity can be assessed by 
conducting a pilot study, which will enable actual observations of typical responses to 
researcher’s questions (Cohen, et al, 2005, p. 121).  Furthermore, congruous with 
Cohen, et al, (2005, p. 121) open-ended questions were supplemented with closed 
questions to enhance the reliability of the research design. 
 
In addition to face and content validity, the available literature argues that to ensure 
reliability and validity in qualitative research an examination of truth is crucial 
(Golafshani, 2003, p. 601). Maxwell (1992, p. 284) explains, validity is not a sole 
product of a particular methodology rather validity pertains to the data, accounts, or 
conclusions drawn by employing a particular method in a particular context for a 
particular purpose. That is, validity in qualitative research is defined as how accurately 
an account represents participants’ realities of the phenomenon under investigation, 
“truth” (Creswell & Miller, 2000, p. 1). In the pursuit of truth in qualitative research two 
specific types of qualitative validity are descriptive and interpretative validity (Maxwell, 
1992, pp. 285-291).  
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5.9.2.1 Descriptive validity 
Descriptive validity according to Maxwell (1992, pp. 285-286) relates to the factual 
accuracy in which participants responses to a situation or question are presented. For 
example, if a researcher reports that a participant made a particular statement during an 
interview, is this report correct? That is, did the participant really make that statement, 
or did the researcher miss-hear, miss-transcribe, or miss-remember their words? These 
issues of descriptive accuracy relate to what the researcher reports to have heard or 
seen.  
5.9.2.2 Interpretative validity 
Interpretative validity refers to the accounts of meaning drawn from an interview or 
observation. That is, interpretative accounts are grounded in the language and words of 
the participants studied and rely as much as possible on participants own words and 
concepts. Interpretative validity in qualitative research seeks to ensure inferences made 
from statements stems from the participants’ perspective and not the researcher’s 
perspective (Maxwell, 1992, pp. 288-291). Maxwell‘s (1992) views on validity are 
supported by Creswell and Miller (2000, p. 125) who explain that for qualitative 
research validity refers to both the data and the inferences drawn from it. 
5.9.2.3 Truth 
In qualitative research methodologies, descriptive and interpretative validity aim to 
establish truth. Truth is established through judgements in quality, where according to 
Seale (1999, p. 472) such judgements involve the objective establishment of trust, 
which is provided through the application of certain methodological procedures. 
According to Creswell and Miller (2000, p. 1) these methodological procedures include 
the application of one or more of the following techniques: triangulation, peer-review, 
external audit and thick description. This study through the Delphi methodology 
employed a number of these methodological procedures providing multiple layers of 
validity and reliability (truth) into the research design.  
5.9.2.4 Triangulation 
Throughout the study the principle of triangulation was employed, a methodology 
aimed towards establishing a level of validity and reliability in research findings 
(Golafshani, 2003, p. 603) through linking concepts and indicators which are checked 
by recourse of other indicators (Atkinson cited in Seale, 1999, p. 473). According to 
Patton (2002, p. 247) the term triangulation works in a metaphorical sense, drawing into 
conscious the world’s strongest shape-the triangle, and is used as an analogy with 
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surveying and navigation where different bearings give a correct position (Silverman, 
2002, p. 233). That is, a position on a map is discovered by taking bearings as two land-
marks, creating lines which will intersect at an observers’ position. In a research 
context, triangulation used from this analogy purports a single fixed reality can be 
known objectively through the use of multiple social research methodologies, increasing 
a study’s validity (Blaikie cited in Seale, 1999, p. 473).  
 
Triangulation aims to cancel out biases from any one research method by employing 
other, additional methodological measures (Seale, 1999, p. 473), drawing confirming 
data from multiple forms of evidence rather than a single incident or data point. These 
data points include theories, observations, documents and interviews (research 
participants) to locate major and minor themes towards establishing objective findings 
(Creswell & Miller, 2000, p. 3). Patton (2002, p. 247) explains that triangulation can 
occur in several forms. For this study, both theory and data triangulation was achieved 
drawing on a variety of textual sources to establish a benchmark (Chapters 2 and 3) 
within the conceptual review of literature which was drawn on to frame stage two of the 
study’s analysis. In addition, investigator triangulation was established utilizing three 
participants per interview panel, where inferences were drawn based on the sum of each 
participant’s responses, underpinned by the Delphi methodology. Furthermore, 
triangulation was achieved across the study by utilizing three panels, including the pilot 
panel, providing confirming data from multiple participants (researchers) and across 
multiple panels. 
5.9.2.5 Audit trail technique 
Triangulation was also pursued by means of the audit trail technique, where researcher/s 
provide clear documentation relating to all research decisions and activities enabling 
collected data to be externally evaluated for truthfulness. In achieving an audit trail, 
member checking was also employed within this study, where research data and their 
interpretations are shown to participants towards strengthening the credibility of data 
and narrative accounts. In this methodology participants add to the study’s credibility 
(truthfulness) by having the chance to react to both the data representations, and the 
final interpretations. Finally, collaboration was included in this study’s design between 
research participants and researcher during data collection and analysis phases, actively 
involving participants as co-researchers. Collaboration is closely entwined with member 
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checking, and occurs in many forms, such as building participant’s views into the study 
design.  
5.9.2.6 Validity lens 
These combined procedures shift the validity lens from researchers to persons external 
from a study answering questions such as, are the findings grounded in the data or are 
inferences logical (Creswell & Miller, 2000, pp. 3-5)? In addition, for this study both 
audit trail and member checking was conducted by research supervisors from Edith 
Cowan University as part of this thesis’s formal requirements.  
 
In final consideration of the debate encompassing reliability and validity in qualitative 
research, Seale (1999, p. 465) warns a variety of conceptions exist, with competing 
claims determining what counts as good quality research. However, this debate has 
limitations to practicing social researchers, who are, in reality pursuing a craft 
occupation which is learned “on the job” through apprenticeship like conditions, 
encompassing trial and error. Therefore, this ongoing debate should encourage a degree 
of methodological awareness, which, should be employed at a level below where it 
would create anxieties that ultimately would hinder practice. Rather this debate should 
attempt to guard against obvious errors. Conforming to Seale (1999, p. 465) the study 
employed a number of techniques towards establishing a level of trustworthiness to 
satisfy concerns of reliability and validity in its design and research findings. 
 
5.10 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the methodology and supporting literature drawn on to achieve 
this research design and its outcomes. Section 5.2 presented the study design, where 
Section 5.3 presented the supporting theories providing the scientific frame of the study. 
This included a description of the Delphi method used for conducting social research, 
and the literature describing and supporting the use of interviews in qualitative research. 
Furthermore, Section 5.4 presented an alternative methodology and the reasoning 
supporting a qualitative approach. Section 5.5 presented the study’s target population 
(N=6) and how participants were selected for participation. 
 
This chapter also presented Section 5.6 materials, explaining the informed consent 
process and interview questionnaire. Section 5.7 discussed the research procedure and 
ethics considerations, and a discussion on the safe guards within qualitative research. 
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Section 5.8 explained the study’s data analysis process, underpinning the study’s 
interpretative design. In considering the study’s research design, Section 5.9 discussed 
the concepts of reliability and validity in qualitative research and the various tools 
which will be applied across the study to ensure the study produces reliable and valid 
results.   
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CHAPTER 6 
PILOT STUDY 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the initial participant based research data analysis and 
interpretation in responding to the study’s research questions. The pilot study consisted 
of security experts (N=3) solicited as part of a purposive sample. This chapter presents 
the analysis of the pilot study’s panel member’s interview questionnaire data. Based on 
this analysis, responses are then compared against the reviewed literature (Chapters 2, 3 
and 4) towards interpreting the results in relation to the various research sub-questions 
and this study’s overarching research question. The aim was to establish whether the 
pilot panel support the premises underpinning entropic decay theory. In addition, this 
chapter identifies and explains recommended changes to the semi-structured 
questionnaire to increase both the depth of data collection and validity of this study. 
 
6.1 Pilot study 
In their pre-pilot work researchers identify specific topics central to the area or 
phenomenon under their investigation (Gillham, 2004, p. 25). These topics are then 
subjected to a pilot study, which is a small scale version of the researchers proposed 
research methodology (Martin, 2000, p. 136). The aim of such a process is to conduct a 
complete trial of the proposed methodology, and to iron out potential problems prior to 
commencing the resource intensive formal study (Martin, 2000, p. 136). As Martin 
(2000, p. 136) explains, when conducting a pilot study researchers’ sometimes find that 
what previously looked good on paper just did not work. That is, a pilot study becomes 
the guide for the future research methodology. 
6.2 Participants 
Participants’ for the pilot study consisted of peer nominated security experts (N=3) (see 
Section 5.5). These experts were selected and solicited to participate in this study based 
on the criteria that they are employed to provide security category knowledge advice 
across the varied security related occupations. Their selection was based on their 
extensive knowledge or ability, their experience, occupation and/or education and 
training others rely upon them for professional opinion within the multi-disciplined 
security industry and they were considered by their peers (peer revered) as experts, 
forming a non-probability (purposive) sample.  
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Participant one has worked within the security industry and specifically around Physical 
Protection Systems (PPS) for approximately twenty (20) years within the corrections 
environment. He holds a Bachelors Degree in Security Science from Edith Cowan 
University (ECU). This participant provides advice on the operational effectiveness of 
PPS and facilitates training in the operating of such systems, including all components 
within the system which contribute to achieving the overall design goals of specific 
systems.   
 
Participant two has worked within the security industry and specifically around PPS for 
fifteen (15) years within the corrections environment. This participant holds a Bachelors 
Degree in Security Science from Edith Cowan University (ECU) and in his professional 
capacity, provides advice on the operational effectiveness of PPS and on a daily basis 
monitors for effectiveness.   
 
Participant three has worked within the security industry and specifically around PPS 
for over twenty (20) years with both customs and within the corrections environment. 
This participant holds a Bachelors Degree in Business Management and in his 
professional capacity provides supervision and advice relating to the daily management 
of both staff operating PPS and the management of the maintenance reporting of PPS. 
 
6.3 Pilot Panel interview questionnaire analysis 
The theory of entropic security decay is framed around a functional, operational 
definition of security where security is defined as “A stable condition stemming 
from a systematic process which effectively combines people, equipment and 
procedures, within a security context, to restrict unauthorised access to either 
people, information or physical assets through their ability to deter, detect, delay 
and respond to attacks which may lead to loss of, or, harm to protected assets 
manifested by a malevolent human adversary/s who seek/s to gain a level of 
unauthorised access”. This definition is focused towards the integration of all 
heterogeneous security centred measures towards the establishment of a “systems” 
approach in implementing effective security controls. In-line with Patton (2002, p. 
454), (Section 5.8), this analysis was achieved by drawing on an inductive process, 
discovering themes categories which emerge from the collected interview data.  
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To achieve the pilot study each panel member was met individually. The aims and 
benefits of the study were discussed with each participant, and their voluntary status 
established. Conforming with Section 5.7.2 Ethics, each panel member was asked to 
complete the informed consent documentation (Appendix A). After informed consent 
was established in writing, the interviews took place, taking approximately 1 hour and 
30 minutes each for the first round, and approximately 30-40 minutes for the feedback 
interview. For some panel members the feedback process was achieved utilizing e-mail 
and telephone interview due to their professional commitments.   
   
6.4 Interview Questionnaire Analysis  
   
6.4.1. Question One: Security’s organisational role  
Questions one of the semi-structured interview questionnaire (Appendix B) asked panel 
members to state what, from their experience, the role of security is within an 
organisation, that is, the systems purpose. This question related to the functional 
approach towards security, discussed in Section 2.1.3 Security defined, and sought to 
consider the validity of this thesis’s functional, focused approach to security. This 
approach sought to validate the removal of attached disciplines such as safety from the 
security function at the tactical level of management to enable a concentrated approach 
towards discussing, explaining and defining security decay functionally and across all 
three levels of organisational management (strategic, tactical and operational).  
 
In response to this question, member one stated that security relates to the protection of 
assets, including procedural controls, physical components and electronic aids. The aim 
is to implement measures to deter, detect, delay, and respond to organisation specific 
threats. Panel member two responded with a similar theme stating “security’s role is the 
protection of assets”, adding, “Security is the practice of ensuring the protection of: 
human, physical or proprietor (information) assets, in a holistic manner to minimize the 
gaps in the protection of assets”. This holistic approach is achieved by physical means, 
technologies and procedural controls. This theme was also reported by panel member 
three, who responded “to safe guard resources including: people, property and 
information.  
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For this panel a consensus was reached that security at the “tactical level” of 
management, relates to the holistic implementation of procedural, physical and 
electronic measures which aim to protect an organisation’s assets which includes 
people, information and physical property through their ability to deter, detect, delay 
and respond against organisation specific threats.  
6.4.2 Question two: Security’s organisational purpose 
Question two sought to establish whether the pilot panel viewed security’s role as a risk 
reduction role, in-line with Section 3.4, Security and Risk Management. This question 
considered the strategic role of the system, where it is argued that as the operational and 
tactical aspects decay, so does its strategic aspect. 
 
To this question all panel members agreed that security is a risk reduction role, where 
panel member one stated “without effective controls people would conduct acts against 
the organisation”. In addition, panel member two added that security’s role is also a 
deterrent role. A consensus was reached amongst the pilot panel that security is a risk 
reduction role and a deterrence factor towards preventing security related incidents.  
 
6.4.3 Question Three: Security’s body of knowledge 
Question three asked panel members how they apply security’s body of knowledge 
including theories, principles and specifically Defence in Depth. Panel member one 
responded that the theory of defence in depth is how he employs security’s body of 
knowledge, stating “all elements need to be holistically implemented utilizing 
technology, physical components, people and procedures”. Panel member two added, 
regardless of context, that is, the protection of people, information and assets, defence in 
depth is the salient strategy. In addition, panel member three stated that Defence in 
Depth within a cost benefit process where the benefits must achieve a prescribed value, 
is how he employs security’s body of knowledge. A consensus was reached amongst the 
pilot panel that Defence in Depth, applied holistically in a manner which includes all 
elements is the salient and consistent strategy/means of employing the security body of 
knowledge.  
6.4.4 Question Four: The systems approach to security 
Question four asked panel members if they supported a systems approach to 
implementing effective security. All panel members provided an affirmative response to 
this question, achieving a consensus, with all panel members reporting that they support 
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a systems approach towards achieving security risk reduction. This consensus is 
consistent with the literature reviewed in Section 3.1 (Chapter 3), an open Systems 
Approach to physical protection. The systems approach was recommended by many 
published security professionals. It is the systems approach to security risk reduction 
which frames this research’s approach to understanding security decay.  
 
6.4.5 Question Five: Defining systems 
Question five explored panel members understanding of a system in relation to Sections 
2.2.9, the systems approach to physical protection, Section 3.1, an open systems 
approach to physical security, and Section 3.2 defining a Physical Protection System 
(PPS). This question asked panel members to explain their understanding of a system. 
To this question panel member one stated “a systems approach relates to how risks can 
be holistically reduced through the interrelation of all security controls, together”. For 
this question panel member two responded, a system relates to how separate 
components are combined together to achieve an overall goal. Panel member two 
suggested that for security, this relates to the separate security components and theories 
combined to create a more robust security strategy. However, panel member three 
considered that a system considers the combination of people, processes and resources 
to achieve a purpose.    
 
A consensus was achieved amongst the pilot panel that, a systems approach to security 
relates to how risks can be reduced through a holistic approach, interrelating the 
separate components which combine together to achieve an overall goal. A common 
theme in panel member’s responses was how separate components combine and 
interrelate to achieve a goal. The panel member’s views’ pertaining to this question are 
accordant with Sections 2.2.9, 3.1 and 3.2 (Chapters 2 and 3) of the study and indicates 
that consistent with this literature the panel have a good understanding of what 
constitutes a system.   
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6.4.6 Question Six: A micro-macro relationship 
Question six asked panel members if they consider the relationships between a system’s 
micro state and its macro state. This question aimed to establish whether it could be 
interpreted that panel members, accordant with Sections 4.3.1, System sensitivity, 
support the argument that security systems effectiveness can be become degraded 
through the reduction in effectiveness of individual components (microstates). In 
addition, Section 4.3.3, Entropic decay defined, specifically considers such 
interrelationships between the systems microstates and its macro-state.  
 
Panel members one and three both stated that they do consider this relationship; 
however, member two expanded on this response, stating “yes”, there exists a serious 
relationship between all components of a defence in depth system, where each 
component is useless without its interrelations”. A consensus was reached amongst the 
pilot panel that in considering a system, a serious relationship exists between the 
systems microstates and macro-state, and that this serious relationship does exist within  
a Defence in Depth system, where each component within the Defence in Depth system 
is useless without its interrelationships.  
 
6.4.7 Question Seven: System interrelationships 
 In considering the systems approach in detail, specifically the various relations between 
the microstates and macro-state question seven asked panel members what they think 
this involved. Panel member one stated that he considered the relationships between the 
systems micro states and its macro-state involves the interrelations between the various 
individual components which make up a security program towards the achievement of 
the systems overall output goal. For this question panel member two stated “this 
involves specifically the interrelationships within the system”. In addition, panel 
member three stated “this involves the breaking of the system down into its micro 
component parts to evaluate it with regards to the systems macro purpose”. 
 
This question relates to the literature discussed in Sections 2.2.5, Different Types of 
Systems, and Section 3.1.3, Systems Performance. A consensus was reached amongst 
the panel that this involves the interrelationships between the various individual 
components within the system, where it was reported that such consideration requires 
the system to be broken down into its component parts (microstates) for evaluation 
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(analysis), then combined (subjected to a synthesis process) for purpose evaluation 
(macro-state).  
 
6.4.8 Question Eight: The Butterfly metaphor 
A concept termed the “Butterfly Effect” is a significant principle within systems 
literature (Lorenz, 1963; 1968; Peirce, 2000, p. 5), and is used in this research to explain 
how decay propagates through a Defence in Depth System. As such, question eight 
asked panel members if they agree with the principle that small changes within a 
specific part of a system can lead to a large change at the output of the system.  
 
Panel member one responded “yes”, that he does agree with the principles underpinning 
the “Butterfly Effect”. Panel member two also supported the application of this 
principle to security, and stated “There was a nexus between every single component 
within a defence in depth system, and if there is a small change, this changes the whole 
system”. Panel member number three also supported the use of the “Butterfly” 
metaphor, stating “A small bit of change in any system has an overall change down the 
track through the system”. A consensus was achieved amongst the pilot supporting this 
premise of systems theory relating to the principle of the “Butterfly Effect”.  
 
6.4.9 Question Nine: Physical security and key performance indicators 
In considering the systems approach towards security risk reduction it is argued within 
the systems literature that “the ultimate aim is to discover those components whose 
measures of performance truly relate to the measures of performance of the whole 
system”. As such, question nine asked panel members that, based on their understanding 
of a systems approach and their industry experience, what they believed the key 
performance indicators are within a Physical Protection System (PPS).  
 
In response to this question panel member one responded that the initial focus for the 
systems key performance indicators is the detection system, specifically, the probability 
of detection is a key performance indicator. In considering this key performance 
indicator, panel member one states “the system must be set to minimize false alarms”. 
In addition, after detection panel member one considered the delay aspects of the system 
are the next key performance indicators, where this overall key performance indicator 
must be linked to your response time and capabilities over all key performance 
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indicator. Panel member one considered that response times across the facility must be 
tested for both their time of arrival and efficacy against the systems defined threat. 
 
For this question panel member two responded that a system’s key performance 
indicators relates to the security time line, which starts at the commencement of the 
attack. As such, the first system key performance indicator is the detection function of 
the system. According to panel member two, after detection the next key performance 
indicator is the accurate assessment of the alarm source, then a key performance 
indicator relating to the communication of a genuine alarm event to a response force 
must be included. Once successful communication has occurred, panel member two 
considered the next key performance indicator is the systems delay time, followed by 
the response forces arrival time. Panel member two stated “in establishing these two key 
performance indicators the delay time must exceed the response forces arrival time key 
performance indicator”. 
 
In his response to this question, panel member three responded that the systems key 
performance indicators relate to the percentage of error in the system. The key 
performance indicators start with the detection function, then accurate alarm 
assessment, then successful communication followed by physical barrier delay time in 
relation to actual response time.     
 
A consensus amongst the pilot panel was achieved listing the PPS key performance 
indicators in sequential order as: The initial detection of an unauthorised intrusion, the 
accurate assessment of such an alarm event, then communication of an intruder at a 
location to a responding person/group. Following the detection sub-system, the next key 
performance indicators are the sum delay time impeding the progression of the intruder, 
and the responding forces arrival time to interrupt the intruder, and where required the 
response forces ability to neutralize the threat based on the systems defined threat.  
 
6.4.10 Question Ten: Key performance indicators and system effectiveness 
Question ten asked panel members if, based on their experience, they believe the key 
performance indicators of a PPS are related to the systems overall effectiveness. Panel 
member one responded that he did believe the key performance indicators of a PPS are 
related to the PPS’s overall effectiveness. Panel member one stated, “Each component 
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of the system is given score, and then, the overall system is given a score. Once this 
overall system score has been achieved it provides a benchmark of the system for future 
audits”. For this question both panel members two and three agreed that the key 
performance indicators of a PPS are related to the PPS’s overall effectiveness. All panel 
members responded positively to this question, providing a consensus amongst the pilot 
panel, that they believe the key performance indicators of a PPS are related to the 
systems overall effectiveness.  
6.4.11 Question Eleven: Security decay 
Question eleven asked panel members if, based on their experience, do they believe that 
security systems decay. This question related to Section 4.1, Physical System 
degradation, which postulates that, based on the available literature, all physical 
systems, if left to themselves’, move towards a state of decay. That is, maximize their 
entropy. All panel members responded yes to this question, providing a consensus 
within the panel that, based on their experience, the panel believe, in-line with this 
research’s literature review, security systems suffer from decay.  
 
 6.4.12 Question Twelve: Understanding security decay 
Question twelve explored each panel members understanding of Security Decay in 
relation to the literature review and asked panel members what their understanding of 
Security Decay is. For this question panel member one stated that decay relates to many 
facets of the PPS. These facets include a failure to maintain systems at their operational 
level in order to deliver the required output for the system. This includes failures 
towards engineering controls maintenance, where failures to maintain these controls to a 
standard and monitor the systems maintenance to such standards causes technical based 
system decay.  
 
Furthermore, panel member one considered that a lack of system spare parts and 
adequate redundancy processes for spares triggers extended time lags between systems 
faults being reported and proper repairs being carried out; to re-instate commissioning 
levels of operation, leading to decay. Panel member one considered that such time lags 
leave the security system vulnerable to technical attack during these periods.  In 
addition, panel member one considers decay to be related to the people component of 
the systems as well, stating that a failure to maintain system commissioning levels of 
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training over time, beyond initial contractual obligations, leads to decay throughout the 
PPS overall effectiveness.    
 
Panel members two and three were asked whether they agree with panel member one’s 
views relating to the concept of Security Decay, where a consensus was achieved with 
panel members two and three supporting panel member one’s views relating to Security 
Decay. Furthermore, Panel member two responded that Security Decay relates to the 
slow continuing degradation of components of a security strategy, which ultimately 
makes redundant that specific component as it relates to the system as a “whole”. 
During the feedback process panel members’ one and three reported that they supported 
panel member two’s view towards the concept of security decay. A consensus was 
reached amongst the panel with regards to panel member two’s views, with panel 
members’ one and three agreeing with panel member two’s views relating to these 
aspects of security decay. 
 
Furthermore, panel member three stated that any specific single part of the system can 
decay, where this decay affects the rest of the “system”. During the feedback process 
panel members one and two reported that they agree with panel member three’s views 
relating towards security decay. A consensus amongst the pilot was achieved, that in-
line with the heterogeneous aspect of a PPS, any specific single part of the system can 
decay, and based on the systems interrelationships, this decay affects the rest of the 
system. 
6.4.13 Question Thirteen: An experience approach to Security decay 
Question thirteen sought to achieve an evidence based approach, exploring real world 
examples of a time when panel members’ had experienced security controls degrading. 
This question asked panel members to provide an example of a time when they 
experienced security decay.  
 
For this question both panel members one and two responded that they had experienced 
system degradation, which had impeded the key performance indicator relating to the 
probability of accurate assessment. According to panel member one, he experienced a 
time when decay, manifested in the security systems lighting sub-system, had lead to a 
diminished ability to reliably assess (discriminate) alarm events initiated by the systems 
intrusion detection system. Panel member one reported that this specific decay 
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ultimately impacted on their ability to guarantee an effective interruption based on the 
theory of Defence in Depth.  
 
Panel member two reported that he had experienced a time when specific sub-system 
degradation had also impeded the key performance indicator relating to the probability 
of accurate assessment (discriminate). According to panel member two, system 
degradation within the detection sub-system’s performance resulted in a very high 
nuisance alarm rate. This high nuisance alarm rate lead to control room operators 
assuming that all incoming system alarm inputs were false alarms, ignoring them. This 
ultimately diminished the probability of accurate assessment key performance indicator 
through procedural breakdown, meaning the remaining system was worthless.  
 
During the feed-back process panel member three was asked if he had experienced such 
decay manifestation and whether he identifies with panel member’s one and two’s 
experience. Panel member three identified with this experience, establishing a 
consensus that specific component decay can negatively impact on one of the systems 
key performance indicators. This provides a consensus amongst the panel that decay 
does occur, and can manifest in individual components, affecting specific key 
performance indicators, which, based on the PPS interrelations, affects the systems 
macro-state output product. 
 
Furthermore, during the feedback process panel member one stated that if the key 
performance indicators are not maintained then the overall PPS is vulnerable, and in 
some cases worthless. This view is compatible to Section 4.5, Security decay and risk 
management, where the result of decay interlinked with Section 3.4.2, Defining risk, is 
the direct change in vulnerability state, purporting that Vulnerability = 1 – Pi, indicating 
a systems framed mathematical link between system effectiveness and system 
vulnerability. Panel member one’s statement supports such a mathematical relationship, 
stating that as system performance decreases, vulnerability increases.  
6.4.14 Question Fourteen: A systems approach to security decay 
Question fourteen related to the systems approach to implementing effective security 
controls and asked participants how security controls degrade within a systems 
approach. According to panel member one, if one component fails, its key performance 
indicator is reduced and such individual component failure reduces the effectiveness of 
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the response force key performance indicator, ultimately reducing the overall protection 
process. Panel member two stated “the systems approach relies on all components 
working correctly where component change due to decay changes the whole system”. 
Furthermore, panel member three responded that consistent with the systems approach 
which combines people, procedures, technology and physical components into a system, 
the effects of the environment on the system contributes to decay, where changes in 
aspects such as the degradation of components, routines and procedures due to 
environmental influence contributes to decay.  
 
A consensus was achieved with regards to how decay occurs in a system from a 
causation focus. According to panel member three, decay is the result of whole system 
pressure on the various heterogeneous components, stating that environmental effects 
on systems contributes to their decay at the component level. In addition, total system 
degradation can occur when people change their procedures affecting the human-
technology coupling. This view of decay may explain how from a systems approach, 
how various influences on different aspects of the system can manifest and impact on 
the systems macro-state output. 
 
6.4.15 Question Fifteen: Error propagation in Physical Protection Systems  
Question fifteen related to the interrelationship aspect of systems thinking, and asked 
participants if they agree with a premise within the theory of entropic security decay 
that the concept of decay within a PPS occurs within the individual constituents, within 
the PPS, and its effects propagate through the system from this point. This aspect of 
security decay was discussed in Section 4.3.2, the effects of entropic decay on PPS. 
Panel member one supported this aspect, stating “if one process was not working 
properly this degradation affects the overall process down the line”. In addition, panel 
member one stated “such degradation also affects the deterrence aspect of the system”. 
For this question both panel members two and three responded that they agree with this 
premise, within the theory of entropic security decay, that decay within a PPS occurs 
within the individual constituents, within the PPS, and its effects propagate through the 
system from this point. 
 
During the feedback process, a consensus was reached amongst the panel, supporting 
the argument that decay does occur within a PPS at the component level, within the 
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system individual constituents, which then propagates through the remainder of the 
system from this entry point, or point disturbance.  
 
6.4.16 Question Sixteen: The Butterfly effect 
Question sixteen related to aspects of systems decay discussed in Sections 2.2.4, 
Butterfly Effect, and 4.3.1, System Sensitivity, specifically an effect referred to as the 
“Butterfly Effect”. This effect considers how small changes within a system can result 
in large changes at its macro output.  
 
To this question, panel member one responded that he agreed with this premise within a 
systems approach to implementing effective security controls. For example, according 
to panel member one, he had encountered the result of this effect during a security audit. 
According to panel member one, he had inspected a high risk work place, where to 
reduce specific risks the organisation had installed staff emergency duress buttons to be 
activated if staff felt threatened. However, during the audit he discovered that 
individuals on staff, in the locations the duress buttons had been installed, did not know 
either about them or how to use them. Panel member one reported that for him, this 
experience supports the application of the butterfly effect to PPS. Since staff did not 
know about the system or how to use it, there would not have been any response to 
assist them should the need have arisen. Panel member one stated this experience 
supports his earlier statement that decay in security training ultimately leads to more 
holistic security decay. 
 
Panel member two responded that he agrees with the premise that small changes within 
a system, specifically a security system, can result in large changes at the system’s 
macro output. According to panel member two, he experienced a time where individual 
staffs reduced alertness levels and vigilance stemming from ongoing boredom had 
resulted in the systems key performance indicators becoming reduced in their 
effectiveness, specifically reducing the capacity and effectiveness of the system’s 
response force. 
 
Panel member three also reported that he agrees with this principle within systems 
theory. Panel member three reported experiencing a time where high numbers of system 
faults resulted in staff losing their confidence in the system. This lost confidence 
resulted in the overall system becoming vulnerable, weakening the overall protection 
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system. Panel member three provides the example of PTZ camera faults diminishing the 
capability for staff to accurately assess alarm causes, leading to decay in this area of the 
system (probability of assessment). Based on these responses, a consensus was achieved 
amongst the pilot panel that this aspect within the systems literature does relate to PPS. 
 
6.4.17 Question Seventeen: The effects of security decay 
Question seventeen asked panel members, what they consider the effects of decay are. 
To this question panel member one responded that decay is similar to an apple rotting, 
where its effects result in whole system not working properly, directly impacting on 
individual sub-system key performance indicators. However, panel member two 
focused on the strategic goals of the system, stating “decay ultimately diminishes the 
security objective”. According to panel member two, security decay increases the 
vulnerability of the asset being guarded/secured. This increased vulnerability modifies 
the risk equation, where likelihood ratings become elevated and risk factors become 
increased.  
 
Panel member two’s views were supported in panel member three’s response. 
According to panel member three, decay degrades the effectiveness of the “system”; 
therefore the risks associated with the asset being protected are increasing rather than 
being decreased. A consensus was reached amongst panel members that, in-line with 
previous responses, decay at the component level results in the gradual degradation of 
systems individual key performance indicators, reducing individual subsystem’s 
commissioning key performance indicator scores. This aspect of security decay was 
discussed in Section 4.4, The Measurement of Security Decay. Furthermore, a 
consensus was reached amongst the panel that decay at the macro-level results in a 
diminished security objective, where the risks being treated/reduced are increased due to 
the effects of decay which force changes to the facilities risk equation where likelihood 
and vulnerability ratings become elevated diminishing risk reduction.  
 
6.4.18 Question Eighteen: Correcting security decay 
Question eighteen related to security systems management and asked panel members if 
they believed that once decay had set in, whether its effects, both at its point of 
manifestation and throughout the remainder of the system are reversible. Panel member 
one responded that he believed the effects of decay could be reversed; however, 
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qualified this with the belief that this process of reversal was dependant on the 
availability of resources and how far the system had decayed. For this question panel 
member two agreed with panel member one, reporting that he did believe the effects of 
decay could be reversed, however, according to panel member two, this would require a 
full systems audit to facilitate locating the point of decay within the system. For this 
question panel member three responded that he did believe the effects of decay could be 
reversed through proper maintenance of the systems components. All panel members 
responded yes providing a consensus within the panel that the effects of decay can be 
reversed, once decay was located.  
 
6.4.19 Question Nineteen: Avoiding security decay 
In considering the ability to reverse the effects of security decay, question nineteen 
explored whether panel members’ opinions whether decay could be avoided. All panel 
members agreed that decay could be avoided through active monitoring of the system. 
For example, panel member one stated “decay could be avoided through proper 
maintenance, with systems components maintained at agreed operating levels in a 
timely manner”.  
 
In addition, panel member one considered that decay could be avoided through proper 
planned maintenance, scheduled redundancy management, ongoing education and 
awareness training relating to the system holistically, so that individuals understand the 
system fully. For this question panel member two considered that decay can be avoided 
at the initial stage (design stage) of the security project through the implementation of 
an effective system, which is actively monitored and reviewed utilizing a systems based 
auditing process. However, panel member three considered that security decay is 
inevitable to a point, as a system has a life span. Therefore after a period of time 
processes must be put in place to reduce decay. 
 
Furthermore, it was established that decay, to a point, can be avoided through full 
systems based audits which focus on individual system aspects/components and their 
interrelationships. In addition, it was agreed that decay up to a point, could be reduced 
through the designing of an effective and suitable system from the beginning, where 
factors such as environmental and budgetary influence can be considered when systems 
would be designed to minimize decay. 
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6.4.20 Question Twenty: Security decay and risk management  
It is argued in the literature that security is a risk reduction role and a consensus 
amongst the pilot panel was achieved supporting that security is a risk reduction role. 
As such, question twenty asked panel members if they believed the concept of decay 
has a place in the risk management formula.  
 
All panel members responded affirmatively, stating that the concept of security decay 
has a place in the risk management formula, specifically in the monitor and review stage 
of the risk management formula. These responses provide a consensus that the concept 
of security decay should be considered in the monitor and review process of the risk 
management formula. This finding is in-line with the discussion from Section 4.6 
Avoiding and countering entropic security decay, where Standards Australia HB 167 
(2006, p. 87) incorporates a monitor and review stage in the security risk management 
process. 
6.5 Interpretation 
Security is a multi-disciplinary industry (Brooks, 2007, p. 1) and Physical Protection 
Systems (PPS) are heterogeneous, where such parts are brought together to achieve an 
output goal. To achieve this output goal a PPS aims to (A) deter, (B) detect, (C) delay 
and (D) respond to security events. Congruous with Section 4.3, the theory of entropic 
security decay, the sum of detect, delay and response (BCD) leads to A. In addition, for 
an adversary, Detect (B) (Action) and Delay (C) (Interaction) leads to Response (D) 
(Consequence). These interrelations are achieved utilizing people, procedures, and 
technology and physical properties. These combined phenomena draw on many 
heterogeneous categories with varying domain specific specialization, achieved by 
putting resources through a process to achieve an output function. Figure 2.6, Section 
2.2.6.2, Open systems, and Figure 3.6 Section 3.2 Defining a physical protection 
system, indicate this process. Such a process is accordant with the principles of General 
Systems Theory (GST) which provided the scientific systems frame for the study.  
 
6.5.1 Research sub-question one. 
General Systems Theory (GST) is a meta-disciplinary approach towards understanding 
systems of all types, regardless of purpose or make up, and provides the skeletal frame 
of enquiry towards discussing, explaining and defining the phenomenon of security 
decay. As such, based on the heterogeneous nature of Physical Protection Systems 
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(PPS) research question one stems from GST’s approach and seeks to investigate 
whether security experts support such a systems framed approach to implementing 
effective security controls accordant to the principles of GST.  
 
In responding to the study’s research question, sub-question one asks: Do security 
experts support the systems approach to implementing effective security controls?  
 
The aim is to interpret whether panel members support a General Systems Theory 
(GST) approach, as it applies to physical security, to implementing effective security 
controls. Congruous with Patton (2002, p. 454) (Section 5.8) this interpretation will be 
achieved by drawing on the conceptual review of literature as an existing benchmark to 
deductively test and affirm the research data in response to the sub-questions. This 
interpretation will be framed around the core principles underpinning GST as they apply 
to physical security, and will involve comparing the inductive analysis from panel 
interviews with the literature drawn from the study’s benchmark (Chapters 2, 3 and 4). 
6.5.1.2 Research sub-question one Interpretation 
All panel members responded “yes” that they support a “systems approach” to 
implementing effective security. Their response is accordant with the writings of 
Underwood (1984, p. xi; Fennelly, 1997, p. 59; Garcia, 2001, p. 6; Fisher & Green, 
2003, p. 164). For example, according to Fisher and Green (2003, p. 147) every security 
program must be an integrated “whole”, where Underwood (1984, p. xi) adds, and seen 
as a “whole”. In exploring the panel’s understanding of a systems approach, the pilot 
panel reported that a systems approach to physical security relates to how risks can be 
reduced through a holistic approach, interrelating the separate security components 
which combine together to achieve an overall design goal. For example, member two 
stated “a system relates to how separate components are combined together to achieve 
an overall goal”. Furthermore, according to member three, it includes people, processes 
and resources which combine to achieve a purpose. Such a viewpoints are congruous 
with Bertalanffy (1968, p. 19) who considers a system to be “a set of elements standing 
in interaction”.  
 
Congruous with the writings of Bertalanffy (1950; 1968) the pilot panel reported that 
within a systems approach, a serious relationship exists between the systems micro-
states and its macro state. Uniform with the systems literature the panel considered that 
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each component within a system is useless without its interrelationships, where all panel 
members responded “yes” when asked if they consider the relations within a system. 
For example, member two stated, “A serious relationship exists between all components 
of a defence in depth system, where each component is useless without its interrelations. 
This viewpoint is consistent with Midgley’s (2003) who states “the systems approach is 
focused strongly towards the interrelationships within, where, it is these 
interrelationships which tie the system together”.  
 
Consistent with Midgley’s (2003) viewpoint the panel reported that a systems 
interrelations involve the relations between the various individual components which 
collectively make up a security program towards the achievement of the systems overall 
output goal. For example, members two and three stated;  
“this relates to the interrelationships between the carious individual 
components which make up the whole security program and the 
achievement of the system’s overall goal or output function”. Where 
member three stated, “such interrelations involve breaking the system down 
into its micro component parts to evaluate it with regards to the systems 
macro purpose”.  
Such viewpoints are congruous with the writings of Bittel (1978, p. 1130) who 
considers the systems approach to be “sets of interrelated components that function 
together within constraints towards a common purpose”.  
 
In considering the panel’s support towards a systems approach, Checkland (1980) stated 
that all physical systems are created for a specific purpose. In determining the systems 
purpose within a physical security context, the pilot panel agreed that from a functional 
perspective, security, therefore the “security system’s” purpose, relates to the reduction 
of an organisation’s risk. It was argued that such reduction is achieved through the 
holistic implementation of procedural, physical and electronic measures which combine 
to protect an organisation’s assets which includes people, information and physical 
property through their ability to deter, detect, delay and respond to adversary threats. 
For example, member one stated “I employ the theory of Defence in Depth where I 
consider that all elements need to be implemented within a holistic approach including 
procedures, barriers and electronic systems”. Member one’s view was supported by 
member two who stated “I see Defence in Depth as the salient strategy towards 
protecting any asset including information, physical or people”. Consistent with this 
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consensus, the panel reported that the salient approach to reducing security risk 
concerns was the employment of the theory of Defence in Depth, as a “system”.  
 
The panel’s consensus conforms to the writings of Smith (2003, p. 8) and Standards 
Australia (HB 167: 2006), Security Risk Management, which states, “In addressing 
security risk concerns, the key elements of organisational, community and individual 
security controls are those components which contribute to the management of risk 
through their ability to deter, detect, delay, respond to and recover from adversary 
attack”. In addition, member two stated that “as well as a risk reduction role, security 
(the system) has a deterrent role”. A view supported by panel member one who stated 
“without the controls people would conduct acts against the organisation”. 
Furthermore, in applying security’s body of knowledge towards achieving an effective 
security state, all panel members supported the view that the parameters achieving 
defence in depth (levels of detect, delay and response) must be based on a defined 
threat, that is, based on risk. 
 
In responding to sub-question one, one of the underpinning principles of systems 
thinking is found in the writings of Chruchman (1968, p. 43) who stated “within a 
systems thinking approach, the ultimate aim is to discover those components whose 
measures of performance are related to the measure of performance of the whole 
system, where a systems performance is proven by providing objective evidence of its 
effectiveness”. Accordant with this principle the pilot panel reported that they believe 
the key performance indicators within a PPS are related to the systems overall 
effectiveness. For example, members three and one stated; 
“the systems key performance indicators relate to the percentage of error in 
the system”, where according to member one “each component of the system 
is given a score”. “Once the overall systems score has been established, it 
provides a benchmark of the system for future audits”.  
 
This approach indicates support towards the quantitative aspect of systems theory and 
specifically the quantitative approach to security decay, where the panel reported that 
within a systems approach to physical security the key performance indicators for a PPS 
in their sequential order are: the initial detection of an unauthorised intrusion, the 
accurate assessment of such an alarm event, the communication of the event to a 
responding force/group. Following the detection sub-system, the remaining key 
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performance indicators are the sum of delay time impeding then adversary’s 
progression, and the responding forces arrival time to interrupt the intruder, and where 
necessary, the response forces ability to neutralize the threat, based on the systems 
defined threat. The panel’s views relating to PPS key performance indicators are 
compatible to the writings of Garcia (2001, p. 6) who states “the performance measures 
of a PPS, within a systems approach, are a complex configuration of detection, delay 
and response elements, where the best effectiveness measure (macro state) for a PPS is 
one which combines these functional elements into a “whole” (Garcia, 2001, pp. 242-
249). 
 
The panels viewpoint towards the systems key performance indicators is compatible 
with the writings of Barton and Haslet (2007, p. 145) and Holton (cited in Barton and 
Haslet, 2007, p. 145) who state, “in science, analysis must precede synthesis, based on 
the argument that without a previous analysis, attempting synthesis does not lead to 
truth”, where Ritchy (1991, p. 10) considered that every synthesis is built upon the 
results of a proceeding analysis, where every analysis requires a subsequent synthesis in 
order to verify and correct results. To this aspect of science Barton and Haslet (2007, 
pp. 147-148) explain that systems thinking involves, and provides a distinct means of 
framing this dialectic where systems thinkers recognize that individual (analysis) events 
are part of a pattern (synthesis) of events. 
 
Congruous with the writings within the study’s documentary analysis the pilot panel 
agreed that based on the interrelationships within PPS which achieve its macro-state 
output, small changes within a specific part of a system can lead to a large change at 
their output. For example, member two stated that “I believe there is a serious nexus 
between every single component within a defence in depth system, and if there is a small 
change, this changes the “whole” system”. Such a viewpoint is uniform to Waldman’s 
(2007, p. 272) who stated, “as part of a system changes, the nature of the overall system 
changes”.  Waldman’s (2007, p. 272) standpoint was depicted by member three who 
stated “a small bit of change in any system has an overall change down the track 
through the systems”. This aspect of systems interrelations is what Lorenz (1968, p. 
306) referred to as the “Butterfly Effect”, which describes how error propagation occurs 
within a system.  
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It is argued that the panels support towards applying the “Butterfly” principle to 
physical security is considered in the writings of Konicek and Little (1997, p. 18; 
Garcia, 2006, p. 26; and Standards Australia HB167, 2006, p. 62). For example, 
Konicek and Little (1997, p. 18) state, “a security systems is only as good as its parts, 
when a single part fails, this failure can cause degradation of the total system. In 
addition, Garcia (2006, p. 26) states, “System effectiveness can become degraded 
through the reduction in effectiveness of individual components”, where according to 
Standards Australia HB167 (2006, p. 62) a small change in control effectiveness may 
have a substantially magnified effect on vulnerability. In considering the Butterfly 
principle, according to Churchman (1968, pp.42-43) Lorenz’s (1963; 1968) works are 
considered in many variations of systems theory, where the systems approach is based 
on the premise that as individual measures of performance of constituent components 
increase, so does the holistic measure of performance of the total system.   
6.5.1.3 Research sub-question one deductions 
The panel reported that they support a systems approach to implementing effective 
security. For example, all panel members responded “yes” to this question. Analysis of 
the interview process indicates that the pilot panel’s views relating to the 
implementation of effective security controls are congruous with the underpinning 
principles of General Systems Theory (GST) applied to the theory of Defence in Depth. 
That is, the panel recognise the systems purpose, its functions and its architecture within 
a GST frame. In addition, accordant with the GST approach the panel comprehends the 
various interrelations, organisation and orderly aspects which achieve the systems 
output goal. Furthermore, the panel understand how, based on the systems interrelating 
aspects, small changes in one area of a system are associated with changes throughout 
the remainder of the system, and how these changes directly affect the various sub-
systems and “whole” systems macro-state (key performance indicators). Based the 
available data, it is argued that the evidence supports an interpretation that the pilot 
panel do support a systems approach within a GST frame to implementing effective 
security controls.    
6.5.2 Research sub-question Two 
Research sub-question two directly relates to the premises of Underwood (1984) and 
McClure’s (1997) writings, where according to Underwood (1984, p. xi) “security 
decay” is the most serious threat to a security systems, and “security decay” must be 
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expected. Research question two asks, “Do security experts support the argument that 
security systems can suffer from decay”?    
 
In response to research sub-question two, the aim is to interpret whether panel members 
support the argument that “security systems” suffer from decay. Congruous with Patton 
(2002, p. 454) (Section 5.8) this interpretation was achieved by drawing on the 
conceptual review of literature as an existing benchmark to deductively test and affirm 
the research data in response to this research question. The interpretation was framed 
around the panel’s understanding of, and real world experience (evidence) relating to 
decay within Physical Protection Systems (PPS). This interpretation will be achieved by 
comparing the data analysis of the panel interviews to the embodying literature 
presented in the conceptual review of literature (chapters’ two and three).   
6.5.2.1 Research sub-question Two Interpretation 
Congruous with the works of Underwood (1984, p. xi; Howlet, 1995, p. 222; McClure, 
1997; King, 2008, p. 1) the panel reported that they believe “security systems” suffer 
from decay, with all panel members responding “yes”, where member three emphasized 
“yes definitely”. The results of this question are accordant with King (2008, p. 1) who 
applied Lovey and Manohar’s (2007, p. 99) and Styer’s (2000, p. 1) views to explain the 
decay of physical protection systems, stating that security controls inevitably degrade 
over time as a result of natural entropy.  
 
In responding to sub-question two, the pilot panel provided their understanding of 
security decay. For example, member one stated; 
“security decay relates to a failure to maintain security systems at an 
operational level required to deliver their commissioned output 
capabilities”. This depiction was supported by member two who stated 
“decay relates to degradation, that is, the slow continuing degradation of 
components of a security strategy which ultimately makes redundant that 
specific component as it relates to the system as a whole”.  
These combined views towards security decay are uniform to the Australian Pocket 
Dictionary of English Language (1994) which defines decay as “a gradual decline” in; 
health, prosperity or excellence, a process of decline or deterioration, and the New 
Oxford Dictionary (1991) which defines decay as being less good or less strong.  
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Furthermore, within a General Systems Theory (GST) frame, the pilot panel spelt out 
that security decay relates to the slow, continuing degradation of, or decline in 
effectiveness of individual components which, based on their interrelations, affects the 
system as a whole, reducing its macro-state (Pi). That is, the systems approach to 
physical security relies of the effectiveness of each component interrelated with the 
effectiveness of other interrelated components to achieve a macro-state output goal (Pi). 
For example, according to panel member three “any specific part of the system can 
decay, where this decay affects the rest of the system”. This viewpoint is consistent with 
Konicek and Little (1997), Garcia (2006) and Standards Australia HB 167, 2206).  
 
In discussing their understanding of security decay, the pilot panel considered that 
security decay was as heterogeneous as the Physical Protection System’s makeup. That 
is, a PPS combines and integrates as a “whole” people, procedures, physical measures 
and technologies to protect an organisation’s assets, where decay relates to a failure to 
maintain such systems at their operational levels of effectiveness to deliver the required 
output goal. The pilot panel reported a number of real world examples where, based on 
their understanding, they have experienced aspects of security decay. For example, the 
pilot panel reported that security systems suffer from decaying training standards. This 
aspect of security decay relates to the systems approach which interrelates the categories 
of detect, delay and response to achieve the systems desired output goal through the 
utilization of people, procedures, technology and physical properties into a collective 
“whole”. That is, a systems approach relies on an effective coupling of people, 
procedures and technology and this aspect of decay focuses on a gradual degradation in 
the effectiveness of this coupling impeding the achievement of the systems output goal.  
 
Furthermore, panel member three suggested that either environmental effects, or 
changes to security operating procedures within PPS contributes to their decay. 
According to member three, changes in aspects such as component degradation, 
routines and procedures contributes to “total system decay”. This response is uniform to 
an example offered by Broder (2006, p. 30) who states that he observed procedural 
decay to bypass perceived excessive access control strategies. According to Broder 
(2006, p. 30) to overcome perceived excessive access controls at a computer department 
of an airline, staff took to propping doors open for simplicity of movement during 
working hours. 
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In addition, the pilot panel reported that within a systems approach, if one component 
fails, its key performance indicator is reduced, and such component failure reduces the 
effectiveness of the response force key performance indicator, ultimately reducing the 
overall protection process. Panel member two stated,  
“the systems approach relies on all components working correctly, where 
component change, due to decay changes the whole system”. 
The panel’s responses and views are congruous with the systems literature stemming 
from Waldman (2007, p. 272) who stated, “If a part of a system is changed, the nature 
of the overall system is often changed as well”, where Midgley (2003, p. xxvii) points 
out, even the tiniest influence may have a major affect on the future of the system.    
6.5.2.2 Research sub-question two deductions 
In response to research sub-question two, the evidence indicates that a consensus 
amongst the expert panel supporting the argument that security systems do suffer from 
decay was reached. It is indicated that such decay relates to a failure to maintain 
security “systems” at their “operational levels of effectiveness” to deliver the required 
output goal (risk reduction).  
6.5.3 Research sub-question Three 
Research question three directly related to the premises of Coole and Brooks (2009), 
and focused on the heterogeneous aspects of the Physical Protection “System” (PPS) in 
response to writings of Lovey and Manohar (2007, p. 99) and Styer (2000, p. 1).  Lovey 
and Manohar (2007, p. 99) and Styer (2000, p. 1) stated “all physical systems, if left to 
themselves, tend to maximise their entropy, in-line with the laws of thermodynamics”, 
where according to Pitzer (1995, p. 30) entropy is an extensive property, where the 
entropy of a system is equal to the sum of the entropies of its parts. That is, the entropy 
of as system is a macro-state, where according to Konicek and Little (1997, p. 184) 
when a single part of a security system fails, such failure can cause degradation within 
the total system. As such, research question three asks “Do security experts support that 
security decay lies within the systems elements, constituents and their 
interrelationship”?  
 
Conforming to Patton (2002, p. 454) (Section 5.8) this interpretation was achieved by 
drawing on the conceptual review of literature as an existing frame work to deductively 
test and affirm the research data in response to this question. This interpretation was 
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framed around the panel’s understanding of how security decay occurs and the effects 
of its occurrence manifest, within a General Systems Theory (GST) frame.  
6.5.3.1 Research sub-question Three Interpretation 
A consensus was reached congruous with the conceptual review of literature indicating 
that security decay occurs at the component level (constituent) and that this affects 
specific sub-system key performance indicators.  For example, member three stated 
“any specific single part of the system can decay, where this decay affects the rest of the 
system”. Member two identified that “Security Decay relates to the slow continuing 
degradation of components of a security strategy, which ultimately makes redundant 
that specific component as it relates to the system as a whole”. Such a viewpoint was 
also offered by member one who stated “one subsystem process not working properly 
affects the overall process down the line” 
 
Furthermore, member one explained that decay relates to many facets of the PPS, which 
includes failures towards engineering controls maintenance, where failures to maintain 
these controls to a standard and monitor the systems maintenance to such standards 
causes technical based system decay. Member one states,  
“a lack of system spare parts and adequate redundancy processes for 
spares triggers extended time lags between systems faults being reported 
and proper repairs being carried out to re-instate commissioning levels of 
operation, leading to decay”.  
Panel member one considered that such time lags leave the security system vulnerable 
to technical attack during these periods.  Member one’s views are consistent with the 
writings of Howlet (1995, p. 220) who stated “a poorly maintained system will have 
numerous unexplained alarms and the guard force may lose confidence in it and 
eventually ignore it”. In such a case according to Howlet (1995, p. 220) they may treat a 
genuine alarm as just another false alarm. This view was expressed by member three, 
stating “eventually staff will lose confidence in that specific system”. In addition, 
Howlet’s (1995, p. 220) writings support panel member three’s example of CCTV 
decay, where panel member three gave an example of such decay within the mechanical 
aspects of a PTZ camera, where such degradation means that specific cameras cannot be 
used for assisting with alarm assessment purposes. According to Howlet (1995, p. 220) 
slow degradation of a CCTV monitor is not normally self evident.  
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The pilot panel reported that they believe the phenomenon of decay occurs within a 
PPS’s individual constituents, and that such degradation at the constituent level, based 
on the orderliness interrelations, propagates throughout the remainder of the system. As 
member one stated “with one sub-system process not working properly it affects the 
overall process down the line, where it also affects the deterrence aspect of the systems 
as well”. These responses are congruous with the literature stemming from Bertalanffy 
(1950; 1968; Konicek & Little, 1997; Waldman, 2007, and Garcia 2006, Mosely and 
Coleman, 2000, p. 101, and Broder, 2006).  Such a view point is also congruous with 
the Gestalt approach to deterrence discussed in Section 3.1.1(Chapter 3). For example, 
member three reported that he agrees with the application of the “Butterfly Effect” to a 
PPS, member three states;  
“high faults in one system affects the whole system where eventually staff 
will lose confidence in that specific system. This results in that specific 
aspect of the system becoming vulnerable within the system, weakening the 
overall system”.  
These collective views are true to the early works of Isaac Newton who stated, “The 
extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility and inertia of every object, depends on, 
the extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility and inertia of its component parts” 
(The Open University, 1976, p. 68).     
 
The “Butterfly” metaphor has been used to articulate the interrelated aspects of specific 
systems. For physical security within a systems approach to security decay, it is argued 
that however decay is manifested in one component, its effects expand to affect that 
components effectiveness within the specific sub-system, and that this component 
degradation propagates throughout the remainder of the system, from its point of entry, 
based on the systems interrelationships. This view was supported by panel member two 
who explained that during a security review that he had conducted, he observed the 
capacity of the response force had degraded stemming from decayed training processes, 
and a lack of alertness and vigilance due to boredom, adding to the response forces 
arrival time and ultimately reducing the probability of interruption key performance 
indicator.   
 
Panel member one supported member two’s views, who considers decay to be related to 
the people component of the systems as well. Member two stated,   
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“a failure to maintain system commissioning levels of training over time, 
beyond initial contractual obligations, leads to decay throughout the PPS 
overall effectiveness”.  
For example, according to member one system degradation in security training leads to 
decay at the systems macro output level. Member one stated “during security auditing 
in a high risk work place I found that individuals in the work place did not know of the 
existence of, or understand, how to use the staff duress system”. As such, should the 
requirement for external assistance eventuate, the response would be negatively 
impacted against, as staff may have to use alternative means for notifying the 
requirement for a security response, ultimately adding to the overall response time.  
 
These views relating to security decay are compatible to Section 4.3.2, the effects of 
entropic decay on PPS. Section 4.3.2 purports the original decay within a PPS expands 
to the boundaries of that specific subsystem component, resulting in a failure within this 
specific part of the system. Based on the system interrelationships between the Defence 
in Depth elements individual failure results in the system becoming disordered, 
ultimately resulting in this point disturbance propagating through the remainder of the 
defence in depth system. In considering this aspect of security decay, all panel members 
supported the application of the “Butterfly” metaphor to PPS, where according to 
member one “decay is like an apple rotting, with its effects resulting in the whole system 
not operating properly as per their individual key performance indicators 
commissioning scores, ultimately resulting in operators losing confidence with the 
system”. The loss in system confidence by operators was an outcome reported by 
Howlet (1995, p. 220).  
 
According to member two decay results in a diminished security objective, ultimately 
increasing the vulnerability of the asset being guarded/secured. Member two stated, 
“decay alters the risk equation, where likelihood becomes elevated and the risk factors 
become increased”. Such a view was also reported by member three, who stated “decay 
degrades the effectiveness of the system, increasing the risks associated with the asset 
being protected rather than decreasing them”. These views are congruous with equation 
28 (Section 4.5).  
 
In addition, member one stated, “one sub-system process not working properly affects 
the overall process down the line, where it also affects the systems deterrence aspect as 
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well”. The affects on the system’s deterrence aspect was presented in Figure 4.2 
(Section 4.5), where according to Walker (1988, p. 11) the psychological aspects 
governing offenders needs to persuade them that it is not worth trying an attempt 
against an asset because if they try, they will fail or be caught, in-line with Winoto’s 
(2003, p. 2) rational choice formula. Whilst the pilot panel reported that they believe 
security system decay is inevitable to a point, they argued its affects could be countered 
or avoided through full system based audits which focus on individual system 
aspects/components and their interrelationships.  
6.5.3.2 Research sub-question three deductions 
It is argued that the available evidence indicates the pilot panel support the argument 
that security decay lies within the systems elements, constituents and their 
interrelationships. That is, all pilot study members supported that decay occurs at the 
constituent level, manifests, then expands to incorporate and affect specific sub-system 
key performance indicators, then expands to the specific defence in depth element for 
which it is located, then propagates throughout the remainder of the defence in depth 
system from that point, ultimately affecting the systems macro-state key performance 
indicator (Pi) based on the systems interrelations congruous with the writings of 
Bertalanffy (1950; 1968). 
 
6.6 Pilot study Security decay preliminary item bank 
Consistent with the writings of Loewanthal (2001, p. 3) Table 6.1 presents the pilot 
panel’s preliminary pool of variables and factors associated with the concept of security 
decay. This item bank is underpinned by the panel’s thoughts feelings and experience 
with degradation within Physical Protections Systems (PPS). Table 6.1 highlights the 
pilot panel participant’s real world experiences and explanations relating to security 
decay.  
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Table 6.1 Pilot study Security decay preliminary item bank 
 
Decay 
Categories  
PPPS Components 
Conditions Phenomenon Consequence 
 
Technical  Poor maintenance, failing 
to maintain systems 
technical components at 
operational levels. This 
includes both scheduling 
and fault repairs. 
 
 
Specific sub-system key 
performance indicators not 
maintained. 
 
Decay manifests in 
individual key 
performance 
indicators. 
 
 
 
 
Decay manifests in 
individual key 
performance 
indicators. 
 
 
 
 
 
Specific element 
interrelations not 
achieved, 
significantly 
reducing the macro-
state output key 
performance 
indicator.  
 
 
People Poor system 
management/supervision. 
 
 
 
People changing their 
procedures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Failure to maintain training 
standards overtime. 
 
Poor monitoring 
leads to small 
changes in work 
practices. 
 
This decays the 
human-technology 
coupling as 
personnel don’t 
fulfil their duties 
based on the desired 
KPI’s. 
 
 
Decay relating to the 
technology-human 
coupling which is 
required in a 
complex system. 
 
 
Various sub-system 
KPI’s are reduced 
due to lack of 
conscientiousness 
which propagates 
through the 
remainder of the 
system. 
 
 
 
Total system 
effectiveness 
degraded. 
Physical Slow continuing 
degradation which contuse 
as it remains undetected. 
 
Individual components 
decay. 
 
 
Environmental effects on 
individual components.  
 
 
 
 
This decay 
propagates through 
the remainder of the 
system. 
 
 
Decays individual 
components, 
impacting on their 
sub-systems KPI’s. 
 
 
 
Degradation of 
specific sub-system 
key performance 
indicators. 
 
 
Degradation of 
whole system 
performance based 
on system 
interrelationships. 
 
 
 
(Adjusted from Gillham, 2000, p. 68). 
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6.7 Adjustments to semi-structured survey questionnaire 
 
Pilot studies enable researchers’ to ascertain what worked well and what changes could 
be made to enhance the effectiveness, and depth to the study. The semi-structured 
interview questionnaire relating to the theory of entropic security decay was subjected 
to a pilot study to ensure that prior to engaging in the formal research component of this 
study the questionnaire was subject to test conditions congruent with those which the 
formal study would be subjected. As a result of this pilot study, in-line with Martin 
(2000), and (Gillham, 2004), a number of changes were recommended and implemented 
to enhance the semi-structured interview questionnaire effectiveness in drawing out 
responses which would contribute towards answering this study’s sub- research 
questions and overarching research question.   
 
The following changes were made to the research questionnaire: 
 
The first change to the research questionnaire was the removal of the alphabetical 
sequencing and bulleted sub-questions to incorporate a simpler numerically sequenced 
interview questionnaire. It was considered that this change would facilitate a simpler 
interview questionnaire to administer and report findings.  Based on the numerical 
sequencing of the interview questionnaire, question three’s (3) wording was slightly 
changed to: Can you tell me how you apply security’s body of knowledge, including 
security methodologies and concepts? If participants do not mention the application of 
the theory of defence in depth, then the question; do you use the theory of defence in 
depth will be asked. Table 6.2 displays the remaining changes that were incorporated 
into the semi-structured interview questionnaire: 
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Table: 6.2 Semi-structured interview questionnaire changes  
 
Question No.    Question wording changes 
 
 4 Can you please explain to me your understanding of a system? Do you          
consider the relationships between the components and the goal of the 
system? 
 5 Do you support a systems approach towards security? Yes/No. 
 
 6 What do you think the systems approach towards security involves? 
 
7 According to the principles of systems theory small changes within a 
specific component can lead to a large change at the output of the 
systems. Do you agree with this premise? Yes/No Can you explain 
why? 
 
 9 Based on your experience, do you believe the key performance 
indicators of the systems are related to the systems effectiveness? Can 
you explain how? 
11 What is your understanding of security decay; 
 
13 In considering the argument that security controls decay, how do you 
think this occurs within a systems approach to security? 
 
14 
 
The concept of security decay argues that decay within a PPS occurs 
within the individual constituents, within the PPS, and its effects 
propagate through the system from this point. Based on your 
experience, do you support this premise Yes/No, why, why not? 
 
15 
 
Do you feel this applies to a PPS? Yes/No. Can you give me an 
example where you have come across this? 
 
16 
 
 
Based on your experience, what do you consider the effects of decay 
are? 
 
17 
 
Once decay has set in, do you think its effects, both at the point of 
manifestation and throughout the remainder of the system are 
reversible? Yes/No. How do you think so? Or, why don’t you think so? 
  
20 
 
Based on your experience, is there any facet of security decay which 
you can add to the research enquiry? This may include factors 
associated with either the cause of decay or impacts from it. 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the Pilot study with the aim of conducting a complete trial of the 
proposed methodology to both establish the feasibility of continuing into the main study 
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phase and to identify and rectify potential problems prior to commencing the resource 
intensive formal study. The findings from the pilot study were that the pilot panel 
reported support towards the three sub-research questions, where it could be interpreted 
that the panel support the argument that Physical Protection Systems (PPS) suffer from 
decay, and that such decay is manifested at the component level which then expands to 
that components specific sub-system, affecting this sub-systems key performance 
indicator. Then, based on the interrelationships within the system, propagates 
throughout the remainder of the system, therefore negatively impacting on the “whole” 
systems key performance indicator, and ultimately decreasing the implemented level of 
risk treatment.  
 
The pilot study demonstrated the viability of the study, supporting the progression into 
the main study with minor changes to the semi-structured questionnaire. As such, this 
chapter presented a number of changes which were made to the semi-structured 
interview questionnaire towards enhancing data collection practices and processes, and 
towards drawing out deeper research data framing the concept of security decay.  
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CHAPTER 7 
ANALYSIS: PANEL ONE 
7.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the first stage of phase three of the study, research panel one (n=3) 
interview questionnaire analysis. The aim of this chapter was to produce a gradual 
growth in experienced based knowledge towards developing a deeper understanding of 
entropic security decay. To achieve a successful outcome, an inductive analysis was 
conducted with research participant responses providing an analysis suitable for 
deductive evaluation in Chapter 9 (Phase 4). As previously stated, to-date there is dearth 
of knowledge relating to the gradual degradation of security systems. The variables and 
factors underpinning the theory of entropic security decay are still under investigation, 
at the conceptual stage.  
 
This chapter is broken into a number of sections, providing participant responses to the 
interview questions (N=20).  Section 7.1 presents this study’s research panel one 
participant’s biographical information, establishing each participant as a security expert 
within their respective security domains. Section 7.2 presents the interview data 
inductive analysis which will be drawn on in phase four of the study to achieve the 
required deductive analysis enabling responses to the study’s research question. Section 
7.3 provides a reflection of themes and core principles which evolved from this panel 
interview data that will be taken forward to research panel two (Chapter 8). Section 7.4 
concludes the chapter, presenting a summary of achievements.  
6.1 Participants 
Participants’ for this research, in-line with Section 4.4 participant sample, consisted of 
peer nominated security experts (N=6) divided into two research panels, research panel 
one (n=3) (this chapter) and research panel two (n=3) (Chapter 8). These experts were 
selected and solicited to participate in this study based on the criterion that they are 
employed to provide security category knowledge advice across the varied security 
related occupations. Their selection was based on their extensive knowledge or ability, 
their experience, occupation and/or education and training others rely upon them for 
professional opinion within the multi-disciplined security industry and they were 
considered by their peers (peer revered) as experts, forming a non-probability 
(purposive) sample.  
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7.1.1 Research Panel One 
Panel member one 
Panel member one is a client relationship manager for a large security engineering 
organization. Panel member one holds an electrician’s qualification, electrical 
technician’s qualification and a Diploma of Applied Science. His area expertise and 
duties include security risk management and the design of technical, physical and 
procedural security controls to reduce various organisation identified risks. Once 
strategies have been identified, panel member number one leads the implementation of 
large scale security engineering projects to achieve client’s risk reduction needs. Panel 
member one has over twenty (20) years experience in security risk management, and the 
technical design and implementation of capital works security projects. 
 
Panel member two 
Panel member two is the coordinator capital works projects for a correctional 
department. His duties and focus is the security aspects of capital works project 
management within the justice portfolio. He provides advice and project management 
services towards building, refitting and maintaining effective security infrastructure to 
ensure his organisation can meet its business needs. Panel member two served in the 
Australian Defence Forces for nine (9) years, has worked in customs in the area of 
strategic assessments (one year) and has been with the corrections department for 
approximately eleven (11) years. Panel member two holds a Bachelors Degree in 
Security with a minor study area in Management from Edith Cowan University in 
Western Australia. 
 
Panel member three 
Panel member three is the state-wide security manager for a correctional Department, 
whose region covers 2.5 million squared kilometres. This position provides security 
services advice towards maintaining the Department’s Security Directorates business 
component. The position means that panel member three is required to implement and 
coordinate both physical security audits and procedural audits. In addition, the manager 
reports on security practices and emerging technologies and is required to ensure 
ongoing development of security risk management processes. Panel member three has 
been in this role for five (5) years, prior to this he worked in the security and emergency 
unit within the Corrective Services for approximately twenty (20) years.   
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7.2 Research Panel one interview questionnaire analysis 
The theory of entropic security decay is framed around a functional, operational 
definition of security where security is defined as “A stable condition stemming 
from a systematic process which effectively combines people, equipment and 
procedures, within a security context, to restrict unauthorised access to either 
people, information or physical assets through their ability to deter, detect, delay 
and respond to attacks which may lead to loss of, or, harm to protected assets 
manifested by a malevolent human adversary/s who seek/s to gain a level of 
unauthorised access”. This definition is focused towards the integration of all 
heterogeneous security centred measures in the establishment of a “systems” 
approach in implementing effective security controls. In-line with Patton (2002, p. 
454) this analysis will be achieved by drawing on an inductive process (Section 
4.7), discovering themes categories which emerge from the collected interview data.  
 
To achieve the data collection phase of the study each panel member was met 
individually. At the beginning of the interview the study’s aims and benefits were 
explained to each participant, and their voluntary status was established. Concordant 
with Section 5.7.2 Ethics, each panel member was asked to complete an informed 
consent form. After informed consent was established in writing, the interviews took 
place, taking approximately 1 hour and 30 minutes each for the first round, and 
approximately 30-40 minutes for the feedback interview. As with the pilot panel, due to 
some panel member’s professional commitments, some second round interviews were 
conducted utilizing e-mail and telephone interviews. However, where possible second 
round interviews took place in a face-to-face exchange.    
   
7.2.1 Question One: Security’s organisational role 
Question one of the semi-structured interview questionnaire (Appendix C) asked panel 
members to state what, from their experience, the role of security is within an 
organisation, that is, the systems purpose. This question related to the functional 
approach towards security, discussed in Section 2.1.3 Security defined, and sought to 
consider the validity of this thesis’s functional, focused approach to security. This 
approach sought to validate the removal of attached disciplines such as safety from the 
security function at the tactical level of management to enable a concentrated approach 
towards discussing, explaining and defining security decay functionally and across all 
three levels of organisational management (strategic, tactical and operational).  
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In response to this question, panel member one stated that security depends on context; 
however, for him security primarily relates to the protection of people, not occupational 
safety and health, although this does come into it, rather the safety of people from 
malicious people. In addition, it also encompasses asset protection, secure containment 
and incident management. Panel member one stated that security is embodied within a 
triangle (Figure 7.1), interlinking management, technology with the built environment.  
 
Figure 7.1 Panel member one’s security management diagram. 
 
To this question, panel member two stated that security relates to the protection of 
assets, including people, information and physical, integrated to assist the organisation 
achieve its specific business objectives. In considering this approach, panel member 
three stated that security for him is about the secure containment of offenders 
(institutional approach), approaching security from an organisational context, and states 
this is achieved through the provision of physical, procedural and dynamic 
(intelligence) security measures in a balanced and holistic manner.  
 
During the feedback process (round two) panel members supported each other’s 
responses. Therefore, for this panel, a consensus was achieved that security relates to 
the protection of an organisations assets, including people, information and property to 
achieve organisational specific business objectives, that is, context specific. For this 
question within the research panel a consensus was also achieved, supporting the pilot 
panel’s results. The research panel supported that security at the tactical level of 
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management, relates to the holistic implementation of procedural, physical and 
electronic measures which aim to protect an organisation’s assets which includes 
people, information and physical property through their ability to deter, detect, delay 
and respond against organisation specific threats in order for an organisation to achieve 
its business objectives.  
 
7.2.2 Question two: Security’s organisational purpose 
Question two sought to establish whether research panel one viewed security’s role as a 
risk reduction role in-line with Section 3.4 Security and risk management. All panel 
members responded “yes” to this question. Panel member one stated “without 
knowledge of risk there is no baseline for security”. In addition, panel member two 
stated “security’s role is to mitigate known or perceived risks”. During the feedback 
process the panel supported the interpretation that a consensus was reached within the 
panel that security is a risk reduction role.  The research panel supported the pilot 
panel’s views that security is a risk reduction role at the strategic level of management. 
Furthermore, the research panel supported the pilot panel’s view that security also has a 
deterrent role for any organisation towards preventing security related incidents.  
 
7.2.3 Question three: Security’s body of knowledge 
Question three asked panel members how they apply security’s body of knowledge 
including theories, principles and specifically Defence in Depth. Panel member number 
one responded that it does depend on the security context; however, Defence in Depth is 
an absolute underpinned by security risk management, that is, you need to understand 
the context. Furthermore, panel member one stated that security must be very 
functional. To this question, panel member two stated that he employs Defence in Depth 
along with crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) and risk 
management. According to panel member two, all these aspects need to be interrelated. 
Panel member two stated that security intelligence (SYNT) needs to be integrated with 
risk management to ascertain how Defence in Depth will be achieved. In addition, panel 
member two states that Defence in Depth is achieved across a site based on the access 
control requirements, considering different zoning contexts. Panel member three also 
reported that he employs Defence in Depth and CPTED, stating “security incorporates 
procedural, physical, technical, intelligence and risk management in a balanced 
approach”.      
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For this question a consensus was achieved, in-line with the results from the pilot study, 
that Defence in Depth coupled with CPTED and risk management applied holistically, 
based on a hierarchical system of access control is the salient and consistent 
strategy/means of employing security’s body of knowledge, and that the employment of 
such a body of knowledge must be very functional. 
 
7.2.4 Question Four: Defining systems 
Question four explored panel members’ understanding of a system in relation to Section 
2.2.2 Defining systems and Section 2.2.3 the systems approach, and asked panel 
members to explain their understanding of a system. To this question panel member one 
stated a system approach is a “top down process”. A systems approach considers strong 
interrelations between the components in achieving their and the system’s objective, 
and the interrelationship between the design stage and the operator interface. According 
to panel member one, a systems approach requires a structure with good interactions 
between components (highly interrelated) which is seen as a “whole”. Panel member 
two responded that a system ties together a group of elements and constituents which 
maintain a role towards an overall outcome, where all aspects are interrelated. Panel 
member three’s views were similar, stating that systems are components linked, that is 
physical and procedures linked to achieve a goal. 
 
In addition, the research panel supported the pilot panel’s consensus that a systems 
approach to security relates to how risks can be reduced through a holistic approach, 
interrelating the separate components which combine to achieve an overall goal. For 
this panel a consensus was reached that a systems approach is a top down process 
(systems purpose) which ties together the separate components/constituents that have a 
defined role, which are interrelated with other aspects to facilitate the achievement of 
the systems overall goal. The panel’s views and understanding were accordant with 
Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 (Chapter 2) and indicates that accordant with this literature, the 
panel have a good understanding of what constitutes a system.  
 
7.2.5 Question Five: The systems approach to security 
Question five asked panel members if they supported a systems approach to 
implementing effective security. All panel members provided an affirmative response to 
this question, achieving a consensus, with all panel members reporting that they support 
a systems approach towards achieving security risk reduction. However, panel member 
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one stated “as long as systems are designed properly to manage the security risks they 
are intended to manage”. This consensus is consistent with the literature reviewed in 
Section 3.1 (Chapter 3), an open systems approach to physical security, where such an 
approach was recommended by many published security professionals. It is the systems 
approach to security risk reduction which frames this research’s approach to 
understanding security decay. It is therefore interpreted that a consensus exists amongst 
the panel supporting the systems approach to security and specifically, security risk 
management.  
 
7.2.6 Question Six: Defining the systems approach to security 
Question six asked panel members what they believed the systems approach to security 
involves. Panel member one responded the systems approach is a holistic approach that 
recognises the main contributions to the security solution. This approach includes the 
built environment, the technology, physical security aspects, procedures and 
management processes, and how each of these elements are implemented, recognising 
the importance of each other and how the interactions compliment and influence each 
other (Figure 7.1). According to panel member one, each element is configured or 
implemented to support each other, recognising the Swiss cheese approach (Figure 7.2) 
towards achieving holistic security. The Swiss cheese model proposes that under normal 
circumstances the holes in each slice of cheese will be covered up by subsequent layers 
of controls, where the summation of these controls represents the effectiveness of the 
system in managing an attack against the system.  
 
Figure 7.2 The Swiss cheese approach to security (Standards Australia; HB 167, 2006, 
p. 60).  
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Panel member one’s views were supported by panel member two, who stated “the 
systems approach to security is the same as the systems approach with any organisation 
aiming to achieve business objectives”. According to panel member two, the Physical 
Protection System (PPS) broken down into its component parts relies on the other 
components within the system, where if one component is broken, or removed, this 
changes the whole system. For example, Defence in Depth relies on all its elements to 
be integrated and at their measure of effectiveness. To this question, panel member 
three focused on the design aspects of a systems approach, stating for him, the systems 
approach is about having sound security practices in place before an event occurs, 
across all body of knowledge domains.   
 
The panel reached a consensus that the systems approach to security is a holistic 
approach, which achieves its objective through the integration of separate security 
components/ constituents, being physical, technical and procedural, each with a defined 
role, that are implemented in a manner where their interrelations compliment and 
influence each other to reduce security related risks in a preventative manner. 
Specifically, panel member one utilized the Swiss cheese analogy to emphasise the 
systems approach to achieving holistic security. During the feedback process both panel 
members two and three supported this analogy, with panel member three stating “this 
model was a good example”.    
 
7.2.7 Question Seven: System sensitivity 
Question seven related to a premise within systems theory that small changes within a 
specific component can lead to a large change at the output of systems, and asked panel 
members whether they agree with this premise and explain their reasons.    
 
Panel member one responded to this question stating that he does agree with this 
principle. According to panel member one, due to the reliance on each element, small 
changes can have a domino effect on each of the other elements that combines to the 
systems base structure. These changes may be small, but if not considered in a holistic 
manner or without clear understanding of why an element was implemented or 
structured in the first place, you can change the basic premise of why and how it 
supported other elements within the system. Once again, panel member one drew on the 
Swiss cheese model, stating that you can actually move the “holes” so that it now aligns 
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with another hole (Figure 7.3). If you do this with several or many small changes you 
can create a weakness that is substantial, yet difficult to recognise.  
 
 
Figure 7.3 The Swiss cheese model where the holes line up, creating a system 
weakness. 
 
To this question panel member two stated, “It comes down to a cause and effect”. By 
one small element changing, results in a larger-more-macro change, stimulating a chain 
reaction through the system. A consensus was reached within the research panel 
supporting both this principle within systems theory, and that it applies to PPS. In 
addition, a consensus was reached supporting panel member one’s Swiss cheese 
analogy of how small changes in a PPS can lead to a weakness within the “system”, 
based on the interrelations, which can be difficult to recognise.  
 
7.2.8 Question Eight: Physical security and key performance indicators 
Question eight related to an aspect of systems theory which focuses on those key 
performance indicators that are directly related to the “whole systems” key performance 
indicator, where it is argued within the systems literature that “the ultimate aim is to 
discover those components whose measures of performance truly relates to the 
measures of performance of the whole system” (Churchman, 1968, p. 43). As such, this 
question asked panel members within their understanding of a systems approach, what 
they believe the key performance indicators are within PPS. 
 
Panel member one responded that key performance indicators are those items that you 
can use to monitor the effectiveness of the ongoing performance of each element of a 
system. Panel member two stated that key performance indicators give you a measure, 
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where you set the goals in an organisation to ensure you are achieving what the system 
is designed for, it is a monitoring process. According to panel member one, if the key 
performance indicators are not being met, this could strongly suggest that a specific 
element is not delivering the full capacity of the outcomes for which it was specifically 
designed. Panel member one stated “if an element is not delivering required 
performance it may not be supporting other elements within the total system in the 
manner for which it was intended to, designed and implemented”. According to panel 
member one, shortfalls in elemental performance is very likely to have an impact on the 
whole of the systems performance, therefore if “whole of system key performance 
indicators” are correctly identified, structured and monitored, these will be directly 
influenced by elemental key performance indicators. 
 
In considering this approach, panel member three stated “the key performance 
indicators for a PPS are the core elements of Defence in Depth”, where according to 
panel member two “the elements of PPS become the key performance indicators”. For 
this panel, a consensus was achieved that the key performance indicators for a PPS at 
the tactical level of management, were based on the Defence in Depth elements, starting 
with detection as an element, that is, the systems probability of detection, then the 
probability of successfully transmitting the alarm actuation, followed by a measure of 
accurate assessment (discrimination) of the alarm cause, then a probability of 
communicating that alarm source (probability of communication) to the appropriate 
response component of the system. Once detection has been achieved the next key 
performance indictors include delay aspects measured against the response capability, 
based on the mean averages, become the systems measures.      
 
In his initial response panel member one provided a list of key performance indicators 
which he believed related to “whole of system effectiveness”. However, a consensus 
was reached within the research panel that these represented operational key 
performance indicators which make up, and achieve the tactical level key performance 
indicators. That is, they contribute to ensuring and achieving the elements of Defence in 
Depth tactical level key performance indicators. The pilot panel responded through 
consensus that constituent performance measures across the built environment, 
management processes, and technology provide the operational level key performance 
indicators, for example, key performance indicators such as probability of detection, 
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nuisance and false alarm rate, vulnerability to defeat provide detection system key 
performance indicators.  
 
7.2.9 Question Nine: Key performance indicators and system effectiveness 
Question nine asked panel members, in relation to their responses to question eight, do 
they believe the key performance indicators of systems are related to the systems 
effectiveness, and explain their answer. In answering this question, panel member one 
responded “yes”, stating the key performance indicators should be related to system 
effectiveness. The key performance indicators are a measure of whether an element and 
therefore a “system”, is delivering the outcomes and functionality for which it was 
designed. Panel member two supported this approach, stating “this is your means of 
ensuring elements are achieving your design goals”.  
 
To this question panel member two added that key performance indicator reduction at 
the micro-level reduces key performance indicator reduction at the macro-level. “As 
panel member two stated “The overall key performance indicator provides a strategic 
level of monitoring effectiveness”. Panel member one supported this approach, stating 
“this directly determines or impacts on the elements effectiveness as a single element 
performing its required function and effectiveness in supporting other elements in its 
functions within the total system”. These responses were also supported by panel 
member three, who stated “I do believe the systems performance indicators are related 
to the systems overall key performance indicator”. We select individual components 
from their individual key performance indicators, then, combine them together into a 
“designed whole”. It is interpreted, in-line with the responses from the pilot panel, that 
the panel support that the key performance indicators of the systems are related to the 
systems effectiveness.      
7.2.10 Question Ten: Security decay 
Question ten asked panel members if, based on their experience, do they believe that 
security systems decay. This question related to Section 4.1 (Chapter 4), which 
postulates that all physical systems, if left to themselves (become closed) move towards 
a state of decay, that is, maximize their entropy. All panel members responded 
positively to this question, providing a consensus that based on their experience, they 
believe, consistent with this research’s literature review, security systems decay.  
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7.2.11 Question Eleven: Understanding security decay 
Question eleven asked panel members what their understanding of security decay was. 
For this question, panel member one responded “security system decay is the 
degradation in the performance of an element of the security solution ... Both as a single 
element performing a specific function, and the elements role in supporting other 
elements in their function within the total system”.  To this question panel member three 
responded that security decay goes right across all aspects of a security program, across 
dynamic (intelligence), physical, technology and procedural security. For example, 
according to panel member three, all technology decays, as technology decays it 
constantly false alarms, then staff ignore them, where ultimately they lose confidence in 
it (the system) and their work practices decay.  
 
In explaining his understanding of security decay, panel member one states “decay may 
not be a major failure of this system, but more incremental decrease in performance that 
occurs over time”. To this point, panel member two believed that decay could be 
gradual or rapid over time. For example, procedural decay can occur rapidly. Panel 
member one added, “decay may however occur incrementally and continue over an 
extended period to the point it has a significant impact on performance and 
effectiveness”. This aspect may be compounded further where this decay occurs over 
many or all elements within a system, which can lead to major failure. However, panel 
member two states that decay is something you can have an element of control over, 
that is, the rate of decay. There are elements of decay you can have control over such as 
training and awareness, whilst some things decay, they can be brought back up to 
commissioning levels. Nevertheless, for engineering or built environment there is a life 
span. 
 
According to panel member one, decay may be the degradation of a detection 
technology “probability of detection” (lack of testing and maintenance), degradation of 
the alarm gathering notification communication systems reliability, that is, increase 
communications alarm failures (lack of routine maintenance), degradation of daily 
testing procedures, degradation of control room operator’s knowledge of correct 
procedures, and the degradation of the physical environment.  
 
A consensus was achieved within the research panel that decay embodies all aspects, 
constituents and elements within PPS. That is, consistent with the pilot panel’s results, 
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any single part of the system can decay, and based on the systems interrelationships, 
this decay affects the rest of the system. 
 
7.2.12 Question Twelve: An experience approach to security decay 
Question twelve sought to achieve an experienced based approach, exploring real world 
examples of a time when panel members had experienced security decay. This question 
asked panel members to provide an example of a time when they experience security 
decay. Panel member one responded that there are many practical examples where he 
has come across security decay as a security consultant, both elemental and/or systems 
decay. For example, panel member one experienced a lack of maintenance in perimeter 
detection systems sterile zones (weeds and other feral growth), triggering increased 
nuisance alarm rates, causing lack of confidence and increasing operator’s 
complacency. According to panel member one, a lack in electronic system maintenance 
causes these same outcomes. Furthermore, panel member one stated “poor or total lack 
of daily testing procedures resulted in a failure to identify systems not working”. In 
addition, a lack in ongoing formal training where new training in how to operate 
systems occurs for new staff by handed down experience rather than from formal 
training processes, meaning incorrect procedures or bad habits are passed on. Also, a 
lack of ongoing training for qualified staff leads to decay.  
 
Panel member one also reported having experienced physical deterioration of physical 
elements, which are not maintained, reducing their effectiveness of the element as a 
barrier, or what-ever function it performs. Furthermore, changes to the built 
environment, or adjacent areas without considering the perimeter detection and 
surveillance systems, and changes to systems aspects to suit personal preference, 
without consideration to, or reference to, initial design considerations and integrated 
response requirements. Panel member two also reported experience with fluctuations in 
staff competencies leading to security decay. According to panel member two, staff 
competency’s fluctuations alters key performance indicators, where decay occurs in 
relation to the reduction in competencies and capabilities of the people component 
within PPS. Panel member two states that most agencies work at the lowest common 
denominator where system key performance indicators are based on the lowest standard, 
this includes training. Panel member two states “system key performance indicators 
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increase with competency increase, and of course decrease as those competencies 
decrease”.  
 
Both panel member one and two’s responses relating to staff competencies was also 
reported by panel member three, who provided a situation involving staff’s lack of 
familiarization/awareness with procedural security during perimeter alarm checks as an 
example of security decay. This very aspect was also reported by panel member one. 
According to panel member three a system they had commissioned incorporated a 
microphonic detection technology into the cowling on top of a barrier. Often staffs do-
not test this system properly, where decay relates to improper testing around its 
designed requirement, in-line with their procedures, resulting in technical decay as it is 
not known if the system is working based on its design configuration. Also, during staff 
testing, they do not test all aspects such as alarm preset positions and field of view 
objectives for closed circuit television cameras.  
 
According to panel member three, he has experienced environmental impact on physical 
structures leading to security decay, for example, a high security fence (barrier) they 
had installed. The plinth was not designed to move water; therefore water sat at the base 
of the fence and due to high salt content within the environment, premature physical 
decay of the barrier occurred. According to panel member three, such decay needs to be 
considered at the design stage of a security project.  
 
Each participant’s examples were put to the other panel members during the second 
round interviews. A consensus was reached with all aspects of the each participant’s 
examples of security decay, showing that decay occurs within each aspect of the PPS. 
For example, Figure 7.4 indicates the interrelated aspects of people, technology and 
physical engineering which combine to achieve a PPS, where decay can occur in each 
aspect, and based on the systems interrelations, affect another aspect of the system.  
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Figure 7.4 The interrelated aspects of a Physical Protection System.    
 
7.2.13 Question thirteen: A systems approach to security decay 
Question thirteen asked panel members that in considering the argument that security 
controls decay: how did they think this occurs within a systems approach to security. To 
this question panel member one stated “decay within a Physical protection System 
(PPS) occurs within its individual elements and propagates through the system”. 
According to panel member one, decay occurs at the base element level over time. This 
decay at element level occurs through many causes and the effect can result in major 
system breakdown. Once again panel member one draws on the Swiss cheese model of 
Defence in Depth, where failure can occur across the “system” if not planned, 
implemented and individual elements integrated correctly.  
 
Panel member one’s views were also reported by panel member two, who stated “decay 
occurs at the elemental level”. According to panel member two, the efficacy of the 
system decays as small changes occur, changes start small, however, spread when not 
detected and managed. Panel member two stated that systems are delivered 
(commissioned) based on a desired benchmark and are commissioned against this 
benchmark including physical, procedural and electronic aspects. According to panel 
member two, what changes initially is procedural security, where decay occurs when 
staff no longer maintain initial personnel based key performance indicators, where this 
initial decay propagates throughout the remainder of the system. Panel member three 
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also reported similar views stating “as one component decays, this affects other aspects 
of the security system; and its deterrence aspect as well”. For example, according to 
panel member three, multiple false alarms can propagate through the rest of the system, 
then complacency sets in, alarm inputs are not discriminated (assessed) or reported, 
ultimately affecting the response aspect of the system. Any aspect of decay affects the 
rest of the system.  
 
A consensus was reached within the panel, that within a systems approach to security, 
decay starts in one aspect of the system; however, this can manifest simultaneously 
across several constituents, then based on the systems interrelationships propagates 
throughout the remainder of the system, ultimately affecting the systems response 
element and its output goal.  
 
7.2.14 Question fourteen: Error propagation in Physical Protection Systems  
Question fourteen asked panel members whether they support the premise that security 
decay within a PPS occurs within individual constituents, and its effects propagate 
through the system from this point. To this question a consensus was achieved, with all 
panel members supporting this premise, where this occurs based on the systems 
interrelations. In addition, panel member one stated that consistent with his previous 
answer, a “system” is a combination of elemental inputs, the system is very much 
dependant on the correct operation of the effectiveness of each of these elements in 
performing their function and supporting functions of other elements. Therefore, small 
decay/changes in the elements, particularly where it occurs across many/all elements 
can have a major impact on “system” output at the macro level. 
 
7.2.15 Question fifteen: The Butterfly effect 
Question fifteen asked panel members if they feel an effect referred to as the “Butterfly” 
effect, which suggest that small input changes within a system can result in large 
changes at the macro output, applies to a PPS, and could they provide an example. All 
panel members responded affirmatively, agreeing that the “Butterfly” effect does apply 
to PPS. For example, panel member one provided a substantial list of examples where 
he had experienced the “Butterfly” effect within PPS. Panel member one stated “I have 
seen a PPS that was reviewed that had contribution degradation in: 
1. High nuisance alarm rates due to poor performance in detection technologies 
due to lack of maintenance in perimeter zone. 
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2. Incorrect technical maintenance causing high false alarm rates 
3. Poor or complete lack of maintenance of physical elements, leading to decline in 
this reliability of physical barriers. 
4. Changes in CCR, adding technology, moving equipment etc, degrading their 
operational effectiveness of this area. 
5. Poor physical attribute (lighting and air conditioning) providing inappropriate 
outputs conditions for maintaining concentration and focus, degrading this 
operational efficiency in the CCR. 
6. Standard operating procedures (SOP), other procedures being modified without 
reference to holistic system requirements (To address minor elemental issues), 
degrading the performance of the operational system. 
7. Poor communications structures between CCR staff, security management and 
operational staff contributing to degradation of overall “system”. 
8. Poor or lack of formal CCR operational training specific to the subject, (training 
by operators handing down through word of mouth) leading to a lack of true 
understanding of how to use the “systems” effectively. 
9. Incorrect incompletion of both daily tests of PPS zones. 
10. Degradation in support systems functional operational or technical performance, 
affecting ability to discriminate alarms, this includes operation of lighting 
system controls, maintenance of lighting-lamp failure affects the performance of 
CCTV surveillance cameras”. 
Each of the above may have only minor degradation or degradation that is not 
significant in its own sphere, the accumulated impact of this above, however, presented 
significant risk. In this instance, it was clear that the input changes or performance 
degradation with each element had this potential to result in large change or 
performance degradation without evaluation in consideration of the total PPS.  
 
For his example, panel member two stated that he has seen how procedural decay 
stimulated through poor operator training has lead to the “Butterfly” effect. According 
to panel member two, system training has a macro level output throughout the system, 
however, over time, the training level set at the systems commissioning is allowed to 
decline, then the level of staff competency declines, affecting the remainder of the 
system. Furthermore, panel member three stated “small system changes can have a 
significant impact at a much higher level and change the strategic direction of an 
agency”.    
7.2.16 Question sixteen: The effects of security decay 
Question sixteen asked panel members what, based on their experience, did they think 
the effects of decay were. To this question panel member one stated “the effects of 
decay were as heterogeneous as the system itself”. Panel member two stated that decay 
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disrupts an organisation’s ability to achieve set goals and objectives as it disrupts each 
component or element within the system. Such views were supported by panel member 
three, who added that decay leads to a breakdown in system reliability, increases the 
risks of significant events occurring and can impact on the strategic and operational 
direction of agencies due to political encumbrance if events are realized. In addition, for 
this question the research panel supported the pilot panel’s findings that decay at the 
component level results in gradual degradation of a system’s individual key 
performance indicators, reducing sub-system key performance indicators. 
 
It is therefore suggested that a consensus exists that decay occurs at the 
component/constituent level, then, degrades system key performance indicators, 
reducing sub-system key performance indicators. Such decay ultimately affects the risk 
reduction aspects of the system, bearing a strategic impact on an organisation. 
 
7.2.17 Question seventeen: Correcting security decay 
This question asked panel members if, once decay has set in, did they think its effects, 
both at the point of manifestation and throughout the remainder of the system are 
reversible. The consensus within the group for this question was that reversing the 
effects of decay depended on what the decay related to. The panel agreed that 
procedural decay could be prevented and reversed through management, that is, 
ongoing monitoring and reviewing of the people component. However, physical and 
technical decay can only be controlled/delayed, through processes. The research panel 
agreed that all physical and technology components have a life cycle, where eventually 
they will decay beyond a repairable state.  It was considered that with proper 
maintenance decay can be slowed and managed. Nevertheless, panel member two stated 
“decay can only be countered if it is understood”. In response to the pilot panel’s 
findings that decay could be reversed once located within the system, the response from 
the research panel were that as previously stated it depends on what type of decay it is, 
where you can reverse some aspects of decay.   
    
7.2.18 Question eighteen: Avoiding security decay 
Question eighteen asked panel members if they believed decay within a PPS could be 
avoided. In response to this question panel member one stated that the majority of decay 
can be avoided; however, decay is like risk, you can mitigate some decay, and you can 
accept some decay and you can reduce the impact. The responses to panel member 
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one’s views were in-line with previous responses, that is, procedural decay can be 
avoided, through intense management strategies with regular audits and implementing 
the necessary corrections. Nevertheless, for technical and physical decay, the consensus 
was that it can be managed and its effects delayed through proper monitored 
maintenance.  
 
7.2.19 Question nineteen: Security decay and risk management  
Question nineteen asked panel members if they believed the concept of decay had a 
place in the risk management process. For this question panel member one responded 
that it belongs in the monitor and review process; however, there was a danger in not 
considering decay outside this sphere. Panel members two and three responded that 
security decay needs to be considered in your security context planning, where 
according to panel member three, consideration of decay should start at the assessment 
of risk stage, where decay is considered at the design stage and considered as a risk. A 
consensus was reached amongst the research panel that security decay should be 
considered as a “system”, at the design stage, against its consequences, with a view to 
countering it where practicable as a risk treatment, towards designing out decay, then 
continually assessed for in the monitor and review stage. Such views supporting the 
consideration of security decay in the monitor and review stage are congruous with the 
pilot panel’s findings and consistent with Standards Australia HB 167 (2006, p. 87), 
which incorporates a monitor and review stage in the security and risk management 
process.  
 
7.2.20 Question twenty: Exploring security decay 
Question twenty asked panel members if, based on their experience, is there any facet of 
security decay which they could add to the research enquiry. To this question panel 
member two stated that decay relates to the “whole” system and its interrelations, linked 
into your planning processes where, in-line with question nineteen, you should as best 
as practicable, consider future proofing within the system to minimize decay onset. 
Panel member three added that he believed security decay will always be managed 
against the level of recurrent funding available.  
 
To this point, during the feedback process, panel member two responded that panel 
member three’s views relate to the initial security project scope, stating “when you put 
your capital submission forward, you must, at a strategic level, indentify whether the 
175 
 
system you are putting in is achievable, and that you can maintain the system you are 
putting in”. According to panel member two, panel member three’s recurrent funding 
submission is required at the design stage. Panel member two’s views suggest that 
decay should be planned for at the design stage of PPS. This view is consistent with all 
panel members’ responses to question nineteen, where it was agreed that security decay 
should be considered as a risk, and countered, prior to system implementation. That is, 
decay should be budgeted for as an ongoing aspect of the security project.       
 
7.3 Reliability and validity 
Congruous with Section 5.9 this chapter incorporated reliability and validity controls. 
These controls included the principle of triangulation where three participants were used 
to construct the research panel. This provided data inputs from multiple participant 
sources where in-line with the underpinning principles of triangulation it is argued 
where consistent views were reflected and where consensus was achieved a higher level 
of confidence can be inferred towards supporting the core themes and principles 
evolving from the panel. Triangulation was also used to establish consensus support to 
each panel member’s thoughts and feelings relating to security decay. In addition, 
member checking was incorporated into the panel design, where during the second 
round feed-back process each panel member was presented with a transcript of their 
interview responses. Furthermore, each panel member was asked whether they 
supported the interpretations drawn from the data, and were provided with the 
opportunity to respond to these interpretations. This aimed to establish a level of trust 
towards the inductive analysis prior to moving forward to the deductive analysis phase.  
 
7.4 Reflection 
Reflecting back over research panel one’s interview data a number of themes and core 
principles have evolved towards developing an understanding of security decay within 
an open systems frame. According to this research panel, security starts at the strategic 
level of management incorporating a top down process, where the systems purpose is 
established based on an organisation’s risk reduction requirement, establishing a 
systems base line. Risk management then steers the establishment of a systems 
parameters at a tactical level of management, holistically integrating: technology, 
physical controls, the built environment, and procedural risk control aspects, which all 
have a defined role that are combined into an integrated “whole”, where each 
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component: functions, interacts, compliments and influences other functions towards 
achieving organisational goals. These controls are selected based on the theory of 
Defence in Depth and Crime Prevention through Environmental Control, where these 
security controls are summative, that is, their combination based on planning and design 
specifications provides the measure of risk reduction.   
 
Physical Protection Systems (PPS) are commissioned against a benchmark, based on the 
risk reduction requirements. A consensus response from research panel one was that this 
summative, integrated “whole” suffers from decay across all constituent aspects, 
including: technological controls, the built environment, physical environment, physical 
controls, procedural and management aspects within Physical Protection Systems (PPS). 
This decay is caused by many factors relating to the management of the PPS. Research 
panel one agreed that procedural decay within PPS can be reversed or avoided through 
professional management strategies, whilst physical and technical decay aspects can be 
controlled/delayed through processes where some decay can be accepted, whilst other 
decay aspects can be mitigated, such as its impact.  Research panel one concluded that 
decay starts small, but spreads if not detected and managed, propagating through the 
rest of the PPS based on the interrelated aspects of systems in general, ultimately 
affecting the organisations ability to achieve its goals therefore having a strategic 
impact.  These core themes will be presented to research panel two, where not initially 
revealed, during their round two interview process towards evaluating their robustness 
as explanations of security decay within a systems approach to security risk reduction.  
 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented phase three, research panel one (N=3) interview analysis. The 
analysis provided a detailed account of participant’s thoughts, feelings and 
understanding relating to the phenomenon of security decay, where in-line with Cohen, 
et al, (2005, p. 24) such research designs enable the gathering of information which is 
considered common sense, taken for granted, assumptions from lived experience. The 
research questionnaire required panel members to reflect back on their experiences 
within their respective security domains, inputting meaning retrospectively. This 
reflection (Section 7.4) produced a number of core themes to be taken to research panel 
two towards developing a consensus model of entropic security decay. These themes 
include the argument that security starts with a top down approach at the strategic level. 
177 
 
Risk management then steers the establishment of a systems parameters at the tactical 
level of management, holistically integrating: technology, physical controls, the built 
environment, and procedural risk control aspects which all have a defined role and are 
combined into an integrated “whole”. Based on these themes Physical Protection 
Systems (PPS) are commissioned against a benchmark as a summative integrated 
“whole” where all constituent aspects suffer from decay. Decay within these 
constituents is caused by many factors relating to the management of PPS. 
 
This chapter also presented measures of reliability and validity (Section 5.9) in-line with 
this study’s methodology. Reliability and validity was achieved by employing the 
principle of participant triangulation, drawing on multiple participant information 
sources relating to security decay underpinned by member checking, where during the 
second round interviews, panel members were provided written transcripts of their 
interview responses towards establishing a measure of truthfulness in this study’s 
research analysis.  
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CHAPTER 8 
RESEARCH PANEL TWO 
8.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the second stage of phase three, research panel two (n=3) of the 
study. The chapter aims to produce a further growth in experienced based knowledge 
towards developing an enhanced understanding of entropic security decay. To achieve a 
successful outcome for this chapter an inductive analysis was conducted with research 
participant responses to the interview questions (N=20), providing an analysis suitable 
for deductive evaluation in Chapter 9 (Phase 4).   
 
This chapter is broken into a number of sections providing participant responses to the 
interview questions (N=20). Sections 8.1 presents research panel two’s participant’s 
biographical information, establishing each participant as a security expert within their 
respective security domains. Section 8.2 presents the interview data, which will be 
drawn on in phase four of the study to achieve the required deductive analysis enabling 
responses to this study’s research sub-questions and research question. Section 8.3 
provides a reflection of themes and core principles which evolved across this study. 
Section 8.4 concludes this chapter presenting, a summary of achievement and measures 
of reliability and validity.  
 
8.1 Participants 
Participants’ for this panel consisted of peer nominated security experts (n=3). These 
experts were selected and solicited to participate in this study based on the criterion that 
they are employed to provide security category knowledge advice across the varied 
security related occupations. As per panel one’s participants (Chapter 7), they were 
selected based on their peer revere stemming from such criterion, as experience, 
occupation and/or education and training so that others rely upon them for professional 
opinion within the multi-disciplined security industry. These participants formed a non-
probability security expert sample.  
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Participant number one 
Panel member one has worked in the Oil and Gas industry for approximately five (5) 
years as a senior security adviser. He has over twenty (20) years military experience 
within the Special Forces fraternity, and holds a Bachelor of Science (Security) and a 
Graduate Certificate in Operations Management. Panel member one provides security 
compliance advice relating to Australia’s Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities 
Security Act 2003 in the pursuit of organisational goals. In addition, the panel member 
provides security advice relating to major capital works projects, prepares security plans 
and procedures and has responsibilities in the area of emergency management. 
 
Participant number two 
Panel member two is a principle security consultant for a Perth based consultancy in 
Western Australia. He has a combined twenty (20) years experience in criminal and 
civil investigations, conducts corporate risk assessments, security audits and specialist 
investigations for government and industry. Panel member two has lectured in Security 
Risk and Physical Security at Edith Cowan University (ECU) and holds a Bachelor of 
Science (Security) Honours, an Advanced Diploma in Business Management, and a 
Diploma in Criminal Investigations.   
 
Participant number three 
Panel member three is a senior security consultant with over thirty three (33) years 
experience consulting in high level security projects. Panel member three has 
professional qualifications as an electrical engineer and building services engineer, 
along with formal qualifications in security including Certified Protection Professional 
(CPP) designation. He has presented over 60 papers on security issues at both national 
and international conferences, and has lectured for sixteen (16) years in general security 
and facility counter-terrorism at Edith Cowan University (ECU), holding a post as 
Associate Professor of Security Science at ECU.  
 
8.2 Panel study two interview questionnaire analysis 
 
8.2.1Question one: Security’s organisational role 
Questions one of the semi-structured interview questionnaire (Appendix C) asked panel 
members to state what, from their experience, the role of security is within an 
organisation, that is, the systems purpose. This question related to the functional 
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approach towards security, discussed in Section 2.1.3 Security defined, and sought to 
consider the validity of this study’s functional, focused approach to security. This 
approach sought to validate the removal of attached disciplines such as safety from the 
security function at the tactical level of management to enable a concentrated approach 
towards discussing, explaining and defining security decay functionally and across all 
three levels of organisational management (strategic, tactical and operational).  
 
To this question, panel member one responded that for him, security’s role relates to the 
protection of assets, and especially company personnel to enable work/business 
objectives to continue in a safe and secure environment. This approach was consistent 
with the pilot study’s responses and research panel’s one’s views. However, panel 
member two responded that security’s role is to manage the various security related 
risks for specific organisations. An approach also taken by panel member three, who 
stated “the role is to manage the threats that pose a risk to either: institutional, 
commercial and industrial organisations to mitigate risks”. During the feedback process 
(Round two) a consensus was achieved that security’s role at the tactical level of 
management relates to the holistic implementation of procedural, physical and 
electronic measures which aims to protect an organisation’s assets, including people, 
information and property, through their ability to deter, detect, delay and respond 
against organisation specific threats. 
 
8.2.2 Question two: Security’s organisational purpose 
Question two sought to establish whether the panel viewed security’s role as a risk 
reduction role, consistent with Section 3.4, Security and risk management. This view 
was an important question, as an underlying premise framing the theory of entropic 
security decay is that when security controls decay they are in actuality still in place; 
however, their efficacy degrades as decay sets in, reducing their intended 
commissioning levels of effectiveness. It is this reduced level of effectiveness which 
may lead to an adversary determining that the balance of probabilities of success are on 
their side and it is worth attempting a penetration, ultimately leading to a security event. 
That is, the risks for an attacker are reducing therefore the strategic role of security is 
decaying as well as its tactical and operational roles.    
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For this question panel members’ one and two stated “yes it is”, where according to 
panel member three, the reason you have security is the mitigation role against those 
risks (Question one). In addition, for question one both panel member two and panel 
member three responded that security’s role is to manage security related risks. The 
pilot panel and research panel one agreed through consensus that risk reduction relates 
to security’s role at the strategic level of management. During the feedback process 
(round two) this aspect was put to the panel, where a consensus was achieved 
supporting that security’s role at the strategic level of management is the reduction of 
security related organisational risks to facilitate the achievement of organisational 
objectives.    
8.2.3 Question three: Security’s body of knowledge 
Question three asked panel members how they apply security’s body of knowledge 
including theories, principles and specifically Defence in Depth. Panel member one 
responded to this question explaining that within his organisation they work of a 
prevention, preparedness, response and recovery model, stating, “I do employ Defence 
in Depth, but Defence in Depth can be hard to implement in our environment, on the 
ground because of environmental pressures”. According to panel member one, Defence 
in Depth does work in some contexts, and he utilizes Crime Prevention through 
Environmental Design (CPTED). However, panel member two responded that he 
employs CPTED and Defence in Depth, in-line with organisation’s management 
systems. Panel member three responded “I absolutely use Defence in Depth, with 
multiple rings of protection. During the feedback process (round two) panel member 
one supported that in applying the prevention, preparedness, response and recovery 
aspects of this model relate to the functions of Defence in Depth interrelated with 
CPTED principles to achieve prevention, preparedness and initial response aspects of 
their model.  
 
In addition, to this question member three responded that he utilizes a philosophy 
incorporating a Triangle model (Figure 8.1). Member three refers to this as: The 
Campbell Triangle, stating “this provides the means of interrelating the multiple rings of 
protection”. These rings stem from the integration of Defence in Depth and CPTED 
with the systems planning and development, the technological solution and the 
management aspects of the holistic solution.  According to member three, once you 
define the multiple rings of protection, all elements of the triangle (Figure 8.1) must be 
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completed. Furthermore, for this question member two responded that he sees risk 
management, which underpins the implementation of security controls, to be part of the 
body of knowledge employed. This view was also stated by panel member three, 
research panel one. 
 
Figure 8.1 The Campbell Triangle.   
 
For this question a consensus was achieved, consistent with the results from the pilot 
panel and research panel one. This consensus agreed that Defence in Depth coupled 
with CPTED and risk management applied holistically, with all aspects integrated, 
based on multiple rigs of protection, depending on risk, is the salient and consistent 
strategy/means of employing security’s body of knowledge. The panel’s agreed that the 
employment of such a body of knowledge, in-line with member one, research panel one, 
must be very functional. 
 
8.2.4 Question four: Defining systems 
Question four explored all panel members’ understanding of a system in relation to 
Section 2.2.2 Defining systems and Section 2.2.3 the systems approach, and asked panel 
members to explain their understanding of a system. To this question panel member one 
responded that a system is something logical in sequence, with a start and an end point, 
which has a designated and predicted outcome. Panel member two responded similarly, 
stating “systems are processes working towards an output or goal. Their key factor is 
that their components are interrelated and interdependent”. According to panel member 
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two, he considers the interrelationships. Panel member three expanded this explanation, 
adding, “Each system in itself is a system of systems. Each system has to be integrated 
into other systems, where each must play its part underpinned by mission critical 
infrastructure”. In addition to this question, member one, research panel one, stated that 
“a systems approach is a top down process”; however it should be seen as a whole. 
During the feedback process all panel members supported this additional view point, 
with panel member three responding, “Yes he is right. A security system is aggregating 
a number of systems to achieve the solution”.   
 
For this question all panel members considered that a system embodies something 
purposely designed to achieve a designated goal or outcome, where a consensus was 
achieved supporting the responses that each component must be integrated and play its 
part in supporting other systems aspects. For this panel a consensus was reached that a 
systems approach is a top down process (systems purpose) which ties or brings together 
the separate components which have a defined role. These components are interrelated 
with other aspects to facilitate the achievement of the systems overall design goal.  
 
8.2.5 Question five: The systems approach to security 
Question five asked panel members if they support a systems approach to implementing 
effective security. In response to this question panel member one stated “as much as 
practically possible”, where panel member two responded “yes”. In his response to this 
question, panel member three stated “yes, any security solution is based on an 
organisation’s physical and technical needs, all of which must be compatible, 
homogeneous, and completely supporting the risk mitigation process”. A consensus was 
reached within panel two, consistent with the pilot panel and panel one, with all panel 
members supporting the systems approach to implementing effective security.   
 
Consistent with research panel one, this consensus is congruent with the literature 
reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3, establishing an open systems approach to Defence in 
Depth, where such an approach was recommended by many published security 
professionals. It is the systems approach to security risk reduction which frames this 
research’s approach to understanding security decay. Therefore it is interpreted that a 
consensus exists amongst the panel supporting the systems approach to security and 
specifically, security risk management.  
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8.2.6 Question six: Defining the systems approach to security 
Question six asked panel members what they believed the systems approach to security 
involves. Panel member one responded that the systems approach incorporates 
prevention, response and recovery, and all aspects which fall in place to minimize the 
occurrence of an event, and the processes in place to respond and recover. Panel 
member two suggested a systems approach provides a holistic approach from beginning 
to end, starting with policy, then infrastructure, and how this infrastructure relates to the 
threats where the gap is the vulnerability. Panel member three responded stating “in-line 
with my previous response”, refers back to the Campbell Triangle (Figure 8.1), “where 
each system is a system within a system”.  
 
During the feed back process panel member two participants were presented panel one 
member one’s response, where according to this panel member a system approach is a 
holistic approach that recognises the main contributions to the security solution, be they 
management processes, procedures, technology, physical barriers, built environment 
and people, and how each of these components are implemented to complement and 
support each other. In his explanation of a systems approach panel one member one 
drew on the Swiss cheese analogy presented in Standards Australia (HB 167: 2006, p. 
59), where many security controls will exist in a “layered” or Defence in Depth 
structure, under normal circumstances the holes in each layer are covered up by 
subsequent layers of controls (Figure 8.2). 
 
Figure 8.2 The systems approach to Defence in Depth (Standards Australia, HB 167: 
2006, p. 59). 
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Consistent with this approach, panel one member two, responded that the systems 
approach to security is the same as the systems approach to any other organisational 
aspect. That is, the Physical Protection System (PPS) broken down into its component 
parts relies on the other components within the system, where if one component within 
the system is broken or removed, this changes the whole system. For example, Defence 
in Depth relies on all its elements to be interrelated and at their measure of 
effectiveness.  For this question, research panel two reached a consensus consistent with 
research panel one, that the systems approach to security is a holistic approach, which 
starts with a policy (systems purpose) and achieves its objective through the integration 
of separate security components/ constituents, being physical, technical and procedural, 
each with a defined role, that are implemented in a manner where their interrelations 
compliment and influence each other to reduce security related risks in a preventative 
manner. Where accordant with panel member two, the gap is the system’s vulnerability. 
During the feedback process all panel members supported panel one member one’s 
explanation, drawing on the Swiss cheese analogy to emphasise the systems approach to 
achieving holistic security.  
 
 8.2.7 Question seven: System sensitivity 
Question seven related to a premise within systems theory that small changes within a 
specific component can lead to a large change at the output of systems, and asked panel 
members wether they agree with this premise and explain their reasons.   
 
To this question panel member one responded that it goes back to a disproportional 
effect, one small aspect of change on a system can change the output significantly. This 
view was also reported by panel member two, who stated “variable inputs can have 
significant ramifications that can become confounded. Small changes in something like 
Defence in Depth, such as a passive infrared detection sensor not detecting renders the 
remainder of the system useless”. Such a view was also reported by panel member 
three, who responded “absolutely”. Panel member three referred back to the Campbell 
Triangle, stating “there is an interrelationship between the management, planning and 
design and the technology aspects of the system, any changes in one area affects the 
other interrelated areas.  
 
A consensus was reached within the research panel supporting both this principle within 
systems theory and that it applies to PPS. In addition, a consensus was reached 
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supporting panel one member one’s Swiss cheese analogy of how small changes in a 
PPS can lead to a weakness within the “system” based on the interrelations, where 
according to panel one member one, due to the reliance on each element, small changes 
can have a domino effect on each other elements that combines to the systems base 
structure. These changes may be small, but if not considered in a holistic manner or 
without clear understanding of why an element was implemented or structured in the 
first place, you can change the basic premise of why and how it supported other 
elements within the system.   
 
According to panel one member one you can actually move the “holes” so that the holes 
in the Swiss cheese now align (Figure 8.3), where if you do this with several or many 
small changes, you can create a weakness that is substantial, yet difficult to recognise. 
In response to this, during the feedback process, panel member three stated “the holes 
may not be in a direct line, but align for a specific threat agent (defined threat) across 
the layers, where decay may only occur in one aspect of the Swiss cheese, where the 
specific capabilities across the other two layers means they now can exploit this 
vulnerability, creating for themselves ‘opportunity”.   
 
 
Figure 8.3 The Swiss cheese model where the holes line up, creating a system 
weakness. 
 
8.2.8 Question eight: Physical security and key performance indicators 
Question eight related to an aspect of systems theory which focuses on those key 
performance indicators that are directly related to the “whole systems” indicator. It is 
argued within the systems literature that “the ultimate aim is to discover those 
components whose measures of performance truly relates to the measures of 
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performance of the whole system” (Churchman, 1968, p. 43). As such, this question 
asked panel members within their understanding of a systems approach, what they 
believed the key performance indicators are within PPS. 
 
To this question panel member one responded that these relate to the amount of who can 
enter a restricted area, the identification that something has occurred, the assessment of 
the situation, the communication of an event, plus the response to the event. This theme 
was also followed by panel member two who responded that these (it) come back to 
Defence in Depth and the SANDIA EASI model. That is, the EASI key performance 
indicators linked into the operational key performance indicators that achieve a Defence 
in Depth key performance indicator. According to panel member two, whilst each set of 
measurements will be different, the structure will be the same. However, panel member 
three responded that at present there is no standard and that he does not like the term 
key performance indicator, as this potentially degrades the significance of their 
performance of ensuring ongoing performance. Panel member three stated “what 
concerns me is that you could end up with a tick in the box approach”. However, what 
we need is some quantifiable measure to ascertain the system is performing what it is 
designed for, that is, the holes in the Swiss cheese are not getting bigger or aligning 
over time.  
 
For this question, research panel one stated that key performance indicators are those 
items that you can use to monitor the effectiveness of the ongoing performance of each 
element of a system. If the key performance indicators are not being met, this could 
strongly suggest that a specific element is not delivering the full capacity of outcomes 
for which it was specifically designed. In applying panel member three’s views that we 
require some quantifiable measure, research panel one reached a consensus that the key 
performance indicators for a PPS at the tactical level of management were based on the 
Defence in Depth elements. These measures commence with detection as an element, 
that is, the systems probability of detection, then the probability of successfully 
transmitting the alarm actuation, followed by a measure of accurate assessment 
(discrimination) of the alarm cause, then a probability of communicating that alarm 
source (probability of communication) to the appropriate response component of the 
system. Once detection has been achieved the next key performance indictors include 
delay aspects measured against the response capability, based on the mean averages, 
becomes the systems measures. During the feedback process all panel members 
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supported this approach, providing a consensus in-line with the pilot panel’s and 
research panel one. 
 
Consistent with panel member two, who responded that EASI key performance 
indicators are linked into the operational key performance indicators that achieve a 
Defence in Depth, the pilot panel and research panel one reported through consensus 
that constituent performance measures across the built environment, management 
processes and technology provide the operational level key performance indicators, 
which link in to the tactical level key performance indicators to achieve the system’s 
macro state. For example, according to panel one member three’s probability of 
detection “we look at the selection of components from their individual key 
performance indicators, then combine them together into a designed whole”.   
 
During the feedback process all panel members supported this approach to articulating 
the Defence in Depth key performance indicators. Although panel member three still 
does not like the label key performance indicator, he states “I don’t disagree with this 
aspect; you need some methodology to evaluate the system. However, a significant 
cause of decay is a lack in professional management of the systems and what we don’t 
want is a tick box process where it is perceived anybody can manage the system based 
on the boxes. It still requires professional knowledge”.  
 
8.2.9 Question nine: Key performance indicators and system effectiveness 
Question nine asked panel members’ in relation to their responses to question eight, do 
they believe the key performance indicators of systems are related to the systems 
effectiveness and how? 
 
To this question panel member one responded “yes” and “no”. According to panel 
member one, quantitatively the only way to get an indication or answer of how the 
system is doing is to look at the key performance indicators. However, with security 
there are so many variables and the key performance indicators are not so clear. In-line 
with this approach, panel member two responded “yes”, as long as they are selected 
appropriately. They must show efficacy, achieving what they are designed to achieve as 
the key performance indicators aim to measure and monitor the systems level of 
efficacy. Panel member three responded that whatever you call them (the measures of 
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performance) they are related to the system’s output. During the feedback process a 
consensus was achieved, in-line with research panel one that the panel support that the 
key performance indicators of the systems are related to the systems effectiveness.  
8.2.10 Question ten: Security decay 
Question ten asked panel members if, based on their experience, do they believe that 
security systems decay. This question related to Section 4.1 (Chapter 4), which 
postulates that all physical systems, if left to themselves (become closed) move towards 
a state of decay, that is, maximize their entropy. To this question panel member one 
responded “yes” they do, if they are not maintained, where panel member two 
responded “yes of course”. Furthermore, panel member three stated “I believe security 
systems categorically decay”. For example, Figure 8.4 indicates how decay is 
considered in engineering aspects, where for a lighting system, within the systems life 
cycle, maintenance considerations are programmed in to mitigate natural decay. 
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Figure 8.4 Panel member three’s lighting system decay cycle. (Fink & Beaty, 1978, pp.  
22-42). 
 
However, panel member three stated “there is no reason in the world why you cannot 
keep the system working properly; however, to achieve this over time maintenance 
costs will increase”. All panel members responded “yes” to this question, providing a 
consensus that based on their experience, they believe, congruous with this study’s 
reviewed literature, security systems decay.  
 
8.2.11 Question eleven: Understanding security decay 
Question eleven asked panel members what their understanding of security decay was. 
Panel member one responded stating “the degradation of security systems, processes 
and hardware (security) arrangements, and personnel procedures”. Panel member two 
expanded on this response, reporting that security decay is the decline in the efficacy 
(effectiveness) and efficiency of the security function, and correlating increase in risk. 
Also, the inappropriate response to security events which causes a new or updated 
security function which has no impact in altering or managing the risk, decay leads to 
adhoc security.  
 
In response to this question, panel member three stated “people install systems that do 
not understand what underpins them”. “We do design in parameters to facilitate for 
decay, however, the lack of knowledge and management of these parameters leads to 
security decay”. That is, a number of factors leads to security decay, these include: lack 
of professional management; lack of continuity in educating management on how the 
system works; lack of formal training; where training is handed down rather than 
through formal processes; physical aspects decay through lack of maintenance; and 
technology gets old and decays. To this question panel member three, referred back to 
the Campbell Triangle (Figure 8.1); where according to panel member three, decay 
occurs in all three aspects: management, technology and physical engineering. Panel 
member three states, “You can build in quality that will maintain the system over time, 
for its life cycle, at the design stage”. 
 
During the feedback process research panel two were provided panel one member one’s 
explanation, who stated;  
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Security system decay is the degradation in the performance of an 
element of the security solution, both as a single element performing a 
specific function and its role in supporting other elements in their 
function within the total system. This may not be a major failure of the 
system, but mere incremental decrease in performance that occurs over 
time. This decay may however occur incrementally and continue over 
an extended period to the point it has a significant impact on 
performance and effectiveness. Furthermore, this may be compounded 
further where this decay occurs over many or all of the elements within 
a system.  
All research panel two members supported this explanation. Consistent with research 
panel one to this question a consensus was achieved within research panel two 
supporting that decay embodies all aspects, constituents and elements within PPS. That 
is, all aspects of PPS decay, where decay occurs when performance falls below preset 
parameters, where a lack of knowledge and professional management of these 
parameters leads to decay, where based on the systems interrelationships, this decay 
affects the rest of the system. 
8.2.12 Question twelve: An experience approach to security decay 
Question twelve sought an evidence based approach, exploring real world examples of a 
time when panel members had experienced security decay. This question asked panel 
members to provide an example of a time when they experienced security decay. Panel 
member one reported experiencing security decay stemming from people’s apathy. 
According to panel member one, for them, one day they give individuals an induction 
awareness lecture relating to security, and they walk out and forget it immediately. Then 
security processes decay over time when nothing happens, for example, people do not 
report security incidents, even though they have been told and trained to report them. 
This human failure breaks down the knowledge (intelligence) of what is occurring in the 
field.  
 
To this question panel member two responded that decay is often why he, as a 
consultant, is called in to review security after an incident. According to panel member 
two, security decay is often found in non-systems arranged approaches to security, 
where isolated security measures are failing. As an example, panel member two 
explains that during a cash handling audit he conducted for local government, where he 
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found that whilst staff were of the belief they were protected by a duress alarm, the 
alarm had been disconnected for two years. In addition, the built environment 
maintenance had decreased due to leasing issues, where complete lack of security 
management lead to security decay. However, the operational environment had also 
changed, where cash movements had increased dramatically. In one of the cash 
handling facilities a successful robbery occurred, where in response to the robbery the 
security improvements were excessive after the fact.      
 
Panel member three’s response to this question was  
I cannot name specific organisations”, however, an audit I did was on an 
old system, where I had the privilege of speaking to the people who set it, 
when I conduct a security audit I look at: management; physical and 
technical systems aspects. The system I was auditing had clearly suffered 
decay because no-body wrote down in the first place what the system was 
meant to achieve (no measures of performance). I found that a lack of 
education and awareness existed in how the system is meant to operate.  
 
According to member three, to overcome such systemic decay the systems purpose and 
aspects needs to be written down, as a document. What occurs is that changes based on 
wants are implemented; however such changes are made to satisfy people; not to 
maintain the efficacy of the security plan. The system needs a defined security plan 
otherwise changes occur which lead to decay. 
 
A consensus was reached within research panel two, supporting Figure 8.5, which 
highlights that consistent with each panel member’s experience all aspects of PPS 
decay, where decay can occur in each aspect and based on the systems interrelations, 
affect another aspect of the system.  
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Figure 8.5 The interrelated aspects of a Physical protection System.    
 
8.2.13 Question thirteen: A systems approach to security decay 
Question thirteen asked panel members that in considering the argument that security 
controls decay, how did they think this occurs within a systems approach to security? 
Panel member one responded that normally a benign security environment leads to a 
reduction in the security program, that is, small changes. These changes eventually 
leave the system vulnerable so when something does happen, everybody’s guard is 
down.  This view was also considered by panel member two, who stated “systems 
require efficiencies, where spending cuts within the system occur which can lead to a 
large change within the system. However, panel member three once again referred to 
the Campbell Triangle, stating “decay occurs in each or all aspects of the triangle 
(Figure 8.1), when based on what a system is and how the system operates, decay 
occurs according to what underpins the system”.  
 
Panel member three’s views are consistent with panel one member one’s, who stated “I 
believe that security decay within a PPS occurs within its individual elements, them 
propagates through the system. Decay occurs at the base elemental level over time”. To 
support this view, panel one member three, stated, “Any aspect of decay affects the rest 
of the system”. For example, multiple false alarms can propagate through the rest of the 
system, when complacency sets in alarm inputs are not discriminated or reported, 
ultimately affecting the response aspect of the system. In addition, the pilot panel 
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responded that decay also affects the systems deterrence aspect as well. During the 
feedback process all panel member two participants responded that they support this 
articulation of how decay occurs within a systems approach to security, where panel 
member three states “yes it can, that’s a fact”. 
 
A consensus was reached within this panel consistent with research panel one, that 
within a systems approach to security, decay starts in one aspect of the system; 
however, this can manifest simultaneously across several constituents. Then based on 
the systems interrelationships such decay propagates throughout the remainder of the 
system, ultimately affecting the systems response element and its deterrence aspects as 
well. 
8.2.14 Question fourteen: Error propagation in Physical Protection Systems 
Question fourteen asked panel members whether they support the premise that security 
decay within a PPS occurs within individual constituents, within the PPS and its effects 
propagate through the system from this point. Panel member one responded “yes”, 
stating; “something serious would have a knock on effect”. In addition, panel member 
two responded “yes”, small changes can lead to large security implications, much like a 
chain. A chain is only as good as its weakest link or point. When the weakest point 
breaks the result can be larger. In response to this question, panel member three once 
again refers to the Campbell Triangle (Figure 8.1), stating “yes, decay can occur in all 
three elements, based on the triangle”.  
 
During the feedback process all panel members were asked if they support that a 
consensus was reached supporting this premise, based on the summary that “a system is 
a combination of various inputs, where each of these inputs has a function in performing 
a specific function and supporting functions of others (interrelationships) therefore 
small changes across many/all elements can have a major impact on the system at the 
macro level”, with all panel members supporting this interpretation.  
 
8.2.15 Question fifteen: The Butterfly effect 
Question fifteen asked panel members if they feel an effect referred to as the “Butterfly” 
effect, which suggests small input changes within a system can result in large changes at 
the macro output, applies to PPS. In his response to this question panel member one 
stated, “Yes it does”, where in his organisation, if they did not conduct drug and alcohol 
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testing, then this deficiency would lead to a security or safety event. Panel member two 
responded, “yes”, as discussed earlier, “one small change leads to larger chain 
reactions”. Panel member three responded every security system has two mission 
critical aspects. First, the context is established, where the system is analysed for single 
point failure. Second, you need to apply tools to look for the single point factor, which 
leads to the “Butterfly” effect, to overcome it. According to panel member three, 
compatibility of design considers inbuilt redundancy as key. If these aspects of system 
design do not occur, yes you will have the “Butterfly” effect.  
 
For this question both the pilot panel and research panel one supported the application 
of the “Butterfly” principle to PPS. As such, a consensus was achieved across this 
study, supporting the argument that the “Butterfly” effect, certain conditions considered, 
does apply to a PPS.  
 
8.2.16 Question sixteen: The effects of security decay 
Question sixteen asked panel members what, based on their experience, did they think 
the effects of decay were. To this question panel member one responded that decay 
results in a more apathetic work force, where degradation may affect assets, personnel 
and service delivery of your product. Panel member two responded, “Invariably it will 
lead to a security related incident, a degree of loss, then in response, excessive spending, 
and potentially re-justification of the system itself”. Consistent with member two’s 
approach, member three responded that the effects of decay are directly proportional to 
the loss of risk management. This outcome was also mentioned by panel member two 
for question eleven, where according to panel member two, “decay relates to the decline 
in the efficacy and efficiency of the security function, and its correlating increase in 
risk”.  
 
This outcome was also reported by member two of the pilot panel who stated “decay 
ultimately diminishes the security objective, increases the vulnerability of the asset, 
where this increase in vulnerability modifies the risk equation, where likelihood ratings 
become elevated and risk factors become increased”. Research panel one supported this 
aspect of decay where, through a consensus they supported that decay occurs at the 
component/constituent level, then degrades key performance indicators, reducing sub-
system key performance indicators. Such decay ultimately affects the risk reduction 
aspects of the system, bearing a strategic impact on the organisation.  
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A consensus was achieved across this study, with all panel members supporting the 
argument that one of the salient effects of security decay is that risks increase as a direct 
result of decay within a security system. That is, where decay increases so does system 
vulnerability. 
 
 8.2.17 Question seventeen: Correcting security decay 
This question asked panel members once decay has set in did they think its effects, both 
at the point of manifestation and throughout the remainder of the system are reversible. 
Panel member one responded “yes”, but it does come down to leadership and 
management support, and of course the necessary resources. According to panel 
member one, “you need the will to turn decay around”. This view was also reported by 
panel member two, who stated “yes they are reversible. Whether that happens comes 
down to management structure, through maintenance review, awareness recognition, 
and preventative maintenance”. Panel member three also supported the argument that 
decay could be reversed, stating “absolutely”. According to panel member three, as 
soon as decay has been recognised, through professional management of the problem, 
the decay can be overcome. However, panel member three states that usually 
independent audit is usually required to recognise decay.  
 
During the feedback process (round two), panel members were provided with additional 
information from panel one which reported through consensus that procedural decay 
can be reversed and prevented through management, that is, ongoing monitoring and 
reviewing of the people component of the system. However, technical and decay can 
only be controlled and delayed through processes, where with proper maintenance 
decay can be slowed and managed. In response to this additional information, both 
panel members one and two supported this view.  
 
However, panel member three provided an engineering clarification to this aspect, 
stating 
Technical aspects have a finite life, as do physical aspects (life cycle) 
between 8-12 years for technology, stating “and it should be 8-10 years but 
it is pushed to around 12”. However, there is no reason why the system 
cannot be kept at its commissioned level of effectiveness, that is, at the 
original detection capabilities. Both physical and technology can be 
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maintained at that level over the cycle of the system. It can be maintained to 
ensure over the systems life cycle that it performs at the desired capabilities, 
commissioned level performance. This usually requires about 10% of its 
purchase prices per year over the life cycle.  
A consensus was reached supporting research panel one’s view that decay can only be 
countered if it is understood.  
8.2.18 Question eighteen: Avoiding security decay 
Question eighteen asked panel members if they believe decay within a PPS could be 
avoided. Panel member one responded “yes, possibly”. However, according to panel 
member one, decay is a political concern rather than a technical aspect; it comes down 
to management’s will. Panel member two also responded “yes”, stating “through proper 
management, the monitoring and review of the systems key performance indicators, as 
the key performance indicators tell you what is going wrong”. In addition, panel 
member two added, through a system driven by clear policy. Panel member three 
responded “absolutely, and unequivocally”. It can be done (avoided) through 
professional management which looks after the technology, physical aspects and 
operational aspects. If you manage the triangle (Figure 8.1) you manage the system and 
avoid decay, that is, avoid the movement below the level of inbuilt redundancy (Figure 
8.4).  
 
During the feedback process (round two) panel members were provided research panel 
one’s views, who argued that only procedural security decay can be avoided. However, 
technical and physical decay can only be managed and its effects delayed through 
proper monitored maintenance.  In response to this information, panel member three 
stated “security decay is a quantifiable factor, decay must be managed so it does not fall 
below the inbuilt redundancy level”. As such, it is argued that a consensus exists across 
the study that decay can be avoided or delayed through professional management, 
which focuses on the aspects of panel member three’s triangle, where by focusing on 
the systems performance measures (key performance indicators) enables the 
professional management of the triangle, towards avoiding decay by ensuring the 
system does not fall below its levels of inbuilt redundancy.   
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8.2.19 Question nineteen: Security decay and risk management 
Question nineteen asked panel members if they believe the concept of decay has a place 
in the risk management process. Panel member one responded “yes, the context 
section”, decay is a risk. This view was also reported by panel member two who stated 
“yes, in establishing the context, security decay is a context, recognising it as a risk”. 
Panel member three also responded yes, stating “you would have to assess for decay”. 
To this question all panel members responded yes. In addition, a theme developed 
throughout this study, supported through consensus, that decay needs to be considered 
as a risk, recognised at the design stage, considered against its consequences, with a 
view to countering it where practicable as a risk treatment, towards designing out decay, 
then continually assessed for in the monitor and review stage.   
 
8.2.20 Question twenty: Exploring security decay 
Question twenty asked panel members if, based on their experience, is there any facet of 
security decay which they could add to the research enquiry. Panel member two 
responded that security decay is very common in various forms. However, according to 
panel member one, security decay will be constantly driven by organisational culture, 
then the resource prioritization, coupled with the threat landscape. This view was 
supported by panel member three, who stated; 
Decay is caused by a lack in professional management, security 
management, that is: a lack of education, a lack of system awareness, 
and employing the wrong people to manage it, this goes back to 
quantifiable performance measures of the system”. “I have come across 
systems in Asia where there is absolutely no decay. That is, there is no 
procedural decay, and the technological and physical aspects of the 
system are professionally managed in-line with the systems 
commissioning security management plan.  
 
For this question research panel one reported that the ongoing professional management 
of the system needs to be considered at the design stage, as part of the capital works 
submission, at a strategic level of management, where you need to identify whether the 
system you are putting in is achievable, and you can maintain the installed systems.  
This response was supported by panel member three, who responded saying “decay can 
be designed out, to a point, however, the system will cost around 10% of its purchase 
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price annually to maintain it over its life cycle, and yes this should be considered at the 
design stage. 
8.3 Reflection 
Reflecting over research panel two’s interview data, based on the principle of 
triangulation, a measure of robustness has developed pertaining to the consistent themes 
and core aspects associated with security decay within a systems approach to security. 
Consistent with research panel one, research panel two supported that security 
commences at the strategic level of management, where a security systems purpose is 
established based on organisational risk reduction requirements. These requirements 
direct the tactical level of security controls towards managing the threats that pose a risk 
against organisational objectives. These controls are selected based on the Theory of 
Defence in Depth and Crime Prevention through Environmental Control (CPTED) 
achieved through the holistic integration of technology, physical controls and the built 
environment, all with a specified role, combined with procedures and management 
principles to achieve a pre-determined output goal. The aim is to implement a Physical 
Protection System (PPS) which is commission against a defined benchmark, being the 
defined risk reduction requirements “system’s purpose”.   
 
Congruous with both the pilot panel and research panel one, research panel two agreed 
through consensus that PPS suffer from decay. Such decay relates to the degradation in 
effectiveness of individual constituents/components across all aspects of the built and 
natural environments (CPTED), physical components, technological controls, security 
procedures and management aspects within PPS.  Due to the interrelated aspects of 
systems in general and specifically PPS, decay in one aspect of the system, if 
undetected or not treated/managed can propagate through the system from its point of 
manifestation, impeding the efficacy of higher order aspect of within the system, 
ultimately reducing the systems output product.  
 
Research panel two agreed that security decay can be professionally managed, where 
the system can, through professional knowledge, management support and the provision 
of resources, be maintained to ensure it maintains its commissioned output performance 
levels over its life cycle. Research panel two reported that the management of decay 
starts at the design stage, in-line with research panel two, where decay is considered as a 
risk, the system is designed to either avoid decay, or mitigate it from the beginning of a 
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security project, and that the system must be reviewed as a “system” to detect and 
correct decay before it leads to a security event. 
 
8.4 Reliability and validity 
Consistent with Chapter 7, this stage incorporated the reliability and validity controls of 
triangulation and member checking.  Triangulation was achieved using data inputs from 
all three panel members.  This principle is underpinned by the argument that where 
consistent views are reflected and where consensus is achieved a higher level of 
confidence can be inferred towards supporting the core themes and principles evolving 
from the panel.  In addition, member checking was incorporated into this panel, where 
during the second round feed-back process each panel member was presented with a 
transcript of their interview responses. Furthermore, each panel member was asked 
whether they supported the interpretations drawn from the data, and were provided with 
the opportunity to respond to these interpretations. These methodologies aimed to 
establish a level of trust towards the inductive analysis prior to moving forward to the 
deductive analysis phase.  
8.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the second stage of phase three, research panel two (n=3) 
interview analysis.  This analysis provided a detailed account of participant’s thoughts, 
feelings and understanding relating to the phenomenon of security decay. As with 
Chapter 7, the research questionnaire required panel members to reflect back on their 
experiences within their respective security domains, inputting meaning retrospectively. 
In addition, this panel was required to reflect on research panel one’s experience with 
security decay towards developing stronger support towards their thoughts and feelings 
relating to entropic security decay.  
 
This reflection enhanced and strengthened support towards the core themes which have 
evolved during this research enquiry, developing a consensus model within the study of 
entropic security decay. These themes were consistent with research panel one and 
included support towards the argument that security starts with a top down approach at 
the strategic level of management. Risk reduction requirements then guides the 
establishment of a systems parameters at the tactical level of management. This includes 
holistically integrating: technology, physical controls, the built environment, and 
procedural risk control aspects, all with a defined role are combined into an integrated 
201 
 
“whole”. Consistent with research panel one, panel two supported that based on these 
themes Physical Protection Systems (PPS) are commissioned against a risk management 
benchmark, where all constituent aspects suffer decay. Decay within these constituents 
is inevitable if not managed. 
 
Congruous with Chapter 7, this chapter also presented measures of reliability and 
validity (see Section 5.9), employing the principle of participant triangulation, drawing 
on multiple participant information sources relating to security decay underpinned by 
member checking, where during the second round interviews, panel members were 
provided written transcripts of their interview responses towards establishing a measure 
of truthfulness in this study’s research analysis. Such an approach allowed the primary 
themes to be put forward in response to the study’s research question, considered in the 
following chapter.        
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CHAPTER 9 
STUDY INTERPRETATION 
9.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents phase four of the study, the deductive analysis of security expert’s 
thoughts, feelings and experience with decaying security systems. The chapter draws on 
the conceptual review of security literature (Chapters 2, 3 and 4) and system decay 
(Chapter 4) benchmarks. The initial deductive analysis facilitated a response to the 
study’s research sub-questions. This analysis then facilitated a response to the study’s 
research question: Do security experts support the argument that security decay is 
represented by “the gradual degradation of the microscopic quantities (constituents), 
and, or, the gradual degradation in the relationship between the microscopic and 
macroscopic quantities within a security system”?  
 
In response to the study’s various research questions the chapter is divided into a 
number of sections. Section 9.1 provides the interpretative context for this study, 
explaining the interrelated aspects of Physical Protection Systems (PPS). Sections 9.2, 
9.3 and 9.4 provide responses to their relevant research sub-question, utilizing an 
interpretative analysis and linking the deductive analysis from the three sub-questions 
forming a response to the study’s research question. Section 9.5 presents a response to 
the study’s research question. This response is supported by Section 9.6 the study’s 
Security Decay preliminary item bank (Table 9.1), which provides a tabulated analysis 
of participants thought, feelings and experience with security decay. This chapter is then 
summarised with a conclusion (9.7).   
 
9.1 Interpretation: The theory of entropic security decay  
Security is a multi-disciplinary industry (Brooks, 2007, p. 1) and Physical Protection 
Systems (PPS) are heterogeneous, where such parts are brought together to achieve an 
output goal. To achieve this output goal a PPS aims to (A) deter, (B) detect, (C) delay 
and (D) respond to security events. Accordant with Section 4.3, the theory of entropic 
security decay, the sum of detect, delay and response (BCD) leads to A. In addition, 
detect (B) (Action) and delay (C) (Interaction) leads to response (D) (Consequence). 
These interrelations are achieved utilizing people, procedures, technology, and physical 
properties. These combined phenomena draw on many heterogeneous categories with 
varying domain specific specializations and are achieved by putting resources through a 
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process to achieve an output function. Such a process, indicated by Figures 2.6 and 3.6, 
conforms to the underpinning principles of General Systems Theory (GST) which 
provides the scientific systems frame for the study.  
 
In combining this diverse literature, the study’s research question seeks to determine if 
security experts support the argument that security decay is represented by “the gradual 
degradation of the microscopic quantities (constituents), and, or, the gradual 
degradation in the relationship between the microscopic and macroscopic quantities 
within a security system”, as reported by Coole and Brooks (2009). It is argued this 
research question can be responded to through the deductive analysis and synergy of the 
following research sub-questions:  
1. Do security experts support the systems approach to implementing effective 
security controls?  
2. Do security experts support the argument that security systems can and do suffer 
from decay? 
3. Do security experts support that security decay lies within the systems elements, 
constituents and their interrelationship? 
 
9.2 Research sub-question one. 
In responding to this study’s overall research question, research sub-question one asks: 
Do security experts support the systems approach to implementing effective security 
controls?  
In response to research sub-question one the aim is to interpret whether the study’s 
research sample support a General Systems Theory (GST) approach, as it applies to 
physical security, to implementing effective security controls. As with the pilot study, 
this interpretation will be framed around the core principles underpinning GST.   
Congruous with the writings of Patton (2002, p. 454) (Section 5.8) this interpretation 
was achieved through a deductive, interpretative analysis, responding to the sub-
question by drawing on the inductive analysis from each research panel and the study’s 
benchmarks (Chapters 2, 3 and 4).  
9.2.1 Research sub-question one: the systems approach to physical security. 
The systems approach towards implementing effective physical security is supported by 
many published security authors (Underwood (1984, p. xi; Fennelly, 1997, p. 59; 
Garcia, 2001, p. 6; Fisher & Green, 2003, p. 164). For example, according to Fisher and 
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Green (2003, p. 147) every security program must be an integrated “whole”. A view 
depicted by Fennelly (1997, p. 59) who states “maximum security is a concept, whereas 
alarm systems, physical barriers, guard forces and other components of a security 
system do not individually (silo thinking) achieve this”. Congruous with Fennelly’s 
(1997) view Underwood (1984, p. xi) emphasises the Gestalt approach stating “this 
combined should be seen as a whole”. Accordant with this combined literature, both 
research panels reported that they support such a systems approach to security risk 
reduction, with all panel members responding “yes” they support a systems approach 
towards security. Furthermore, panel one member one added, “as long as the systems 
are properly designed tools for the management of the security risk”. To this point, 
panel two member three stated, “any security solution is based on an organisation’s 
physical and technical needs, all of which must be compatible, homogeneous and 
completely supporting the risk mitigation process”. 
 
Research panel one reported that a systems approach to security relates to how 
organisational security risks can be reduced using a top “down process”, tying together 
separate security components/constituents that have a defined role. According to panel 
one, these components are interrelated with other aspects to facilitate the achievement 
of the systems overall goal. Such a depiction conforms to the writings of Bertalanffy 
(1968, p. 19) who considers a system to be “a set of elements standing in interaction”. 
For example, panel one member two stated “a system ties together a group of elements 
and constituents which maintain a role towards an overall outcome, where all aspects 
are interrelated”. This view was supported by panel one member one, who stated: 
 “the systems approach is a holistic approach, “seen as a whole”. It 
requires structure with good interactions between components (highly 
interrelated) interface between components, “it’s a top down 
process”.  
Panel one’s viewpoint is compatible with Midgley’s (2003, p. 64) standpoint who states 
“the systems approach is focused strongly towards the interrelationships within, where, 
it is these interrelationships which tie the system together”.  
 
Research panel two’s responses were congruous with research panel one, where 
consistent with the GST literature, panel two reported that a systems approach is a 
logical sequential process with a start and end point, which has a designated 
predetermined outcome. Panel two reported that a key factor in supporting a system 
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approach is that the components of a PPS are interrelated and interdependent, with each 
sub-system being a system of systems. That is, based on an orderly relationship each 
constituent within a PPS is unable to achieve its output without the cooperation and/or 
interaction of other constituent parts. For example, according to member three, “every 
system has to be integrated into other systems, where each must play its part 
underpinned by mission critical infrastructure”, where uniform with panel one’s 
opinion, utilizing a top down process. Such a consensus is true to the writings of 
Bertalanffy (1968) and Midgley (2003) where according to Midegley (2003) the 
systems approach is focused strongly towards the interrelationships within, these 
interrelationships which tie the system together.  
 
In responding to sub-question one, accordant with Checkland’s (1980) view that all 
physical systems are created for a specific purpose, panel one agreed that from a 
functional perspective security, and therefore the “Physical Protection System’s 
purpose”, at the strategic level of management is to reduce an organisation’s risk 
exposure, both functionally and through deterrence. For example, member one stated 
“security’s role is the protection of people”, where member two added “the protection 
of assets, including: people, information and physical property, integrated to assist the 
organisation to achieve its specific business objectives”. However, member one added 
“it needs to be very functional”. Panel one’s viewpoints were supported by panel two, 
where they reported that security’s role therefore that system’s purpose, at the “strategic 
level” of management, relates to the reduction of an organisations risk. For example, 
panel two member two stated “security’s role is to manage the various security related 
risks for specific organisations”. A view supported by member three who stated “the 
role is to manage the threats that pose to risk to either: institutional, commercial and 
industrial organisations to mitigate risks”.  
 
In evaluating the evidence supporting the systems approach to implementing effective 
security, research panel one suggested that organisational risk reduction is achieved 
through the holistic implementation of security’s body of knowledge. According to 
panel one this body of knowledge saliently employs the theory of Defence in Depth, 
integrated with Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED), as a 
“system”. For example, member one stated “Defence in Depth is an absolute”, where 
member two stated “I combine all aspects of Defence in Depth and CPTED”. Panel 
one’s standpoint was also reported by panel two, where panel members agreed that such 
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risk reduction is achieved through the holistic implementation of security’s body of 
knowledge, including Defence in Depth, integrated with Crime Prevention though 
Environmental Control (CPTED) and underpinned by security risk management. For 
example, member three stated “I absolutely use Defence in Depth, with multiple rings of 
protection’. Such views are congruous with the writings of Smith (2003, p. 8) who 
explains that Defence in Depth as a functional strategy has been applied to the 
protection of assets for centuries. 
 
In pursuing a chain of evidence to respond to sub-question one, research panel one 
reported that the systems approach to security is the same as the systems approach 
towards achieving any other business objective. Member two stated:  
“the systems approach to security is the same as the systems approach with 
any organisation aiming to achieve business objectives”. That is, “the system 
broken down into its component parts relies on the other components within 
the system, where if one component is broken, or removed, this changes the 
whole system”.  
 
According to panel one, a functional physical security system is achieved through the 
combining of procedural, physical and technological measures to protect an 
organisation’s assets, which includes people, information and physical property through 
their ability to deter, detect, delay and respond to adversary threats. Such views are 
supported by the writings of Bertalanffy (1968, p. 18) who considers the systems 
approach to be focused on forms of “wholeness”, where wholeness relates to problems 
of organisation where phenomena are not observable by respective parts in isolation.  
 
Uniform with panel one’s views panel two reported that this involves “a holistic 
approach from beginning to end”, with member two stating “starting with policy, then 
infrastructure, and how this infrastructure relates to the threats”. According to panel 
two, each aspect of a security system has a defined role and implemented in a manner 
where their interrelationships compliment and influence each other to reduce security 
risks.  Both research panel’s perspectives are congruous with Standards Australia (HB 
167: 2006), Security Risk Management, which states, “In addressing security risk 
concerns, the key elements of organisational, community and individual security 
controls are those components which contribute to the management of risk through their 
ability to deter, detect, delay, respond to and recover from adversary attack”. 
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Further evidence indicating support towards the systems approach stems from both 
research panels agreement towards a systems principle stipulated by Churchman (1968, 
pp. 42-43). This principle purports that as individual measures of performance of a 
system’s constituent components increases so does the holistic measure of performance 
of the total system. In considering this proposition, research panel one supported that 
the key performance indicators of the system are related to the systems effectiveness. 
For example, panel one members two and three stated:  
“we select individual components from their individual key performance 
indicators, then, combine then together into a “designed whole”.   The overall 
key performance indicator provides a strategic level of monitoring 
effectiveness...this is your means of ensuring elements are achieving your 
design goals”.  
 
Research panel one agreed that within a systems approach to physical security, the key 
performance indicators of a PPS at the “tactical level” of management were based on 
the Defence in Depth elements. For example, member three stated “the key performance 
indicators for a PPS are the core elements of Defence in Depth, where the panel agreed 
that these start with the probability of detection, then the probability of successfully 
transmitting an alarm actuation, followed by a measures of accurate assessment 
(discrimination), then a probability of communicating that alarm source (probability of 
communication) to the appropriate response component of the system. Once detection 
has been achieved, the next key performance indicators include delay aspects measured 
against the response capability, based on the mean averages.  
 
Panel one’s viewpoint relating to the writings of Churchman (1968) was supported by 
research panel two. For example, members one and three stated:  
“key performance indicators are those items that you can use to monitor 
the effectiveness of the ongoing performance of each element of a system. 
If the key performance indicators are not being met, this could strongly 
suggest that a specific element is not delivering the full capacity of 
outcomes for which it was specifically designed”. Congruous with this 
viewpoint, member three stated, “I don’t like the term key performance 
indicator, however, whatever you call them, we need some quantifiable 
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measures to ascertain the system is performing what it was designed for, 
that is, the holes in the Swiss cheese are not getting bigger over time”.  
 
Panel two supported that the key performance indicators (measures) for a PPS at the 
“tactical level” of management were based on the Defence in Depth elements. Member 
two stated “this comes back to the Defence in Depth and the SANDIA (EASI) model, 
that is, the EASI key performance indicators”. Research panel two agreed that the key 
performance indicators (measures) start with detection as an element, that is, the 
systems probability of detection, then the probability of successfully transmitting the 
alarm actuation, followed by a measure of accurate assessment (discrimination) of the 
alarm cause, then a probability of communicating that alarm source (probability of 
communication) to the appropriate response component of the system. Once detection 
has been achieved, the next key performance indicators include delay and response 
aspects measured against the response capability based on mean averages, become the 
systems measures. 
 
Both research panels consensus is consistent with the works of Spencer (1998, p. 3) and 
Garcia (2001, p. 246), where according to Spencer (1998, p. 3) overall system 
performance measures are achieved through the combining of component subsystem 
performance measures. Spencer’s (1998, p. 3) view is uniform to panel one member 
three, who stated “We select individual components from their individual key 
performance indicators, then, combine them together into a designed whole”, where 
according to Garcia (2001, p. 246) the overall performance measures for a PPS is the 
integrated measure of the detection, delay and response functions. 
 
Evidence indicating the research sample’s support towards the systems approach to 
implementing effective security also stems from their support towards Waldman’s 
(2007, p. 272) standpoint that as part of a system changes, the nature of the overall 
system changes. Research panel one provided consensus support towards the 
proposition that small changes within a specific component can lead to a large change at 
the output of systems. For example, panel one member one stated “due to the reliance 
on each element, small changes can have a domino effect on each of the other elements 
that combines to the system’s base structure”. In addition, consensus support towards 
this principle within the context of physical security was also reported by research panel 
two. For example, panel members three and two stated: 
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“absolutely, (referring back to the Campbell Triangle), “there is an 
interrelationship between the management, planning and design and the 
technology aspects of the system, any changes in one area affects the other 
interrelated areas”, where member two stated “small changes in 
something like Defence in Depth, such as a passive infrared detection 
sensor not detecting renders the remainder of the system useless”.  
 
Panel member two’s example is supported by Garcia (2006, p. 14) who explains that to 
be effective, a detection capability must ensure its sensors are correct for their 
application, installed correctly, have a low nuisance alarm rate and be difficult for the 
threat to defeat. Where according to Adams, et al, (2005, p. 2) factors such as corroded 
wires could impede this capability, as stated by King (2008, p. 1) “it is the erosion of 
seemingly minor security controls which eventually leads to a security incident, 
resulting in a loss event”.  
 
Waldman’s (2007, p. 272) standpoint according to Peirce (2000, p. 5) is what Lorenz 
(1968, p. 306) referred to as the “Butterfly Effect”, which describes the principles of 
error propagation within a system. Accordant with this underpinning principle of 
systems theory, research panel one supported the application of Lorenz’s (1968) 
“Butterfly” metaphor to physical security. For example, panel one member one stated: 
 “a system is a combination of elemental inputs, the system is very much 
dependant on the correct operation of the effectiveness of each of these 
elements performing their function and supporting functions of other 
elements. Therefore, small changes in the elements, particularly where it 
occurs across many/all elements can have a major impact on “system” 
output at the macro level”.  
 
Such support towards the “Butterfly” effect was also reported by research panel two, 
with all members responding “yes” they feel this effect applies to PPS. To this aspect of 
systems theory member one stated “Defence in Depth relies on all its elements to be 
integrated and at their measures of effectiveness”. In addition, member two stated “one 
small change leads to a larger chain reaction”, where member three reported that 
unless the system is designed and managed for single point failure, that is, the 
appropriate amount of inbuilt redundancy, “yes, you will have the Butterfly effect”.  
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9.2.2 Research sub-question one deductions 
In responding to sub-question one the available evidence indicates that both research 
panels’ views relating to the implementation of effective security controls are accordant 
with the various underpinning principles of General Systems Theory (GST). It is argued 
that both research panels consensually agree to the systems purpose, its functions and its 
architecture, and comprehend the various interrelations, organisation and orderly 
aspects which achieve the systems output goal. Furthermore, both panels thoughts 
relating to how, based on the systems interrelating aspects, small changes in one area of 
a system are associated with changes throughout the remainder of the system, and how 
these changes directly affect the various sub-systems and “whole” systems macro-state 
(key performance indicators) are congruous with the literature underpinning GST. 
Based this analysis, it is put forward that in response to sub-question one, it can be 
argued that both research panels do support the systems approach to implementing 
effective security controls.    
9.3 Research sub-question two: The phenomenon of security decay 
Research question two directly relates to the premises of Underwood (1984) and 
McClure’s (1997) writings, where according to Underwood (1984, p. xi) “security 
decay” is the most serious threat to a security systems and “security decay” must be 
expected. Research question two asks, “Do security experts support the argument that 
security systems can suffer from decay”?  In response to research question two, the aim 
was to interpret whether panel members support the argument that “security systems” 
suffer from decay. Accordant with Patton (2002, p. 454) (Section 5.8) this interpretation 
was achieved by drawing on the conceptual review of literature as an existing 
benchmark to deductively test and affirm the research data in response to this research 
question. This interpretation was framed around the panel’s understanding of their real 
world experience (evidence) relating to decay within Physical Protection Systems 
(PPS), achieved by comparing the data analysis of the panel interviews to the 
embodying literature presented in the conceptual review of literature (Chapters’ 2, 3 and 
4).   
9.3.1 Research sub-question two Interpretation: security decay 
Accordant with Underwood (1984, p. xi; Howlet, 1995, p. 222; McClure, 1997; King, 
2008, p. 1) research panel one reported that they believe “security systems” suffer from 
decay. For example, all members responded “yes” they believe security systems suffer 
from decay, where member one stated “I do believe that security systems can and do 
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experience decay”, with member two stating “yes they do decay”. Such a consensus 
supporting the argument that security systems decay was also reported by research panel 
two. Again all panel members responded “yes”, where member three stated “I believe 
security systems categorically decay”. Member three’s view was supported by member 
two, who stated “security decay is common in various forms”.  
 
The results of this question are uniform with King (2008, p. 1) who applies Lovey and 
Manohar’s (2007, p. 99) and Styer’s (2000, p. 1) views to explain the decay of physical 
protection systems, stating that security controls inevitably degrade over time as a result 
of natural entropy. For example, panel two member one responded, “yes they do, if they 
are not maintained”. Member one’s point is congruous with Howlet (1995, p. 220) who 
stated “without proper maintenance the system will not work”. In explaining his 
understanding of security decay, panel one member one, stated: 
 “security decay is the degradation in the performance of an element of the 
security solution, both, as a single element performing a specific function, 
and the elements role in supporting other elements in their function within 
the total system”.  
 
This approach was supported by panel one member three, who stated “key performance 
indicator reduction at the micro-level reduces key performance indicator at the macro 
level”. Member three’s viewpoint is compatible with Tables 4.1 and 4.2 (Section 4.4), 
and conforming to Pitzer’s (1995, p. 30) sentiment that entropy is an extensive property, 
where the entropy of a system is equal to the sum of the entropies of its parts (see 
Equation 26). That is, the entropy of a system is a macro state. Such views were also 
reported by research panel two, where member two stated, “decay relates to the decline 
in the efficacy and efficiency of the security function, and its correlating increase in 
risk”. Such a view was also reported by member three, who stated “the effects of decay 
are directly proportional to the loss of risk management”. Members two and three’s 
views indicates that as decay increases, risk reduction decreases and opportunity for a 
defined threat increases. These views are consistent with the propositions represented in 
Figure 4.2 and Equation 28.  
 
Furthermore, panel one member one adds “decay may not be a major failure of a 
system, but more incremental decrease in performance that occurs over time”. 
Nonetheless, panel member two added, “decay may occur incrementally or rapidly”. 
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For example, procedural decay may occur rapidly. Furthermore, decay may continue 
over an extensive period, to the point where it has significant impact on performance 
and effectiveness. This view was supported by the pilot panel’s findings, suggesting that 
if one component fails, its key performance indicator is reduced and such component 
failure reduces the effectiveness of the response force key performance indicator, 
ultimately reducing the overall protection process, (see Section 4.11, Tables 4.1 and 
4.2). In addition, according to panel one member two, decay may be further 
compounded where it occurs over many or all elements within a system, which can lead 
to major failure.   
 
The panel’s views relating to security decay are congruous with the writings of Konicek 
and Little (1997, p. 18. For example, Konicek and Little (1997, p. 18) state, “a security 
systems is only as good as its parts, when a single part fails, this failure can cause 
degradation of the total system. A standpoint supported by Garcia (2006, p. 26) who 
states, “system effectiveness can become degraded through the reduction in 
effectiveness of individual components”, where according to Standards Australia 
HB167 (2006, p. 62) a small change in control effectiveness may have a substantially 
magnified effect on vulnerability. It is these combined viewpoints which draw on the 
writings of Lorenz (1968, p. 306) who referred to this aspect of systems theory as the 
“Butterfly Effect”, to describe how error propagation occurs within a system.  
 
In examining the argument that security systems decay, research panel one considered 
that the effects of decay were as heterogeneous as the system itself, where according to 
panel one member three, “decay leads to a breakdown in reliability, and increases the 
risk of significant events occurring” (see Equation 28). Research panel one agreed that 
all Physical Protection Systems (PPS) decay, where all physical and technical aspects 
components have a life cycle. However, according to research panel one, the effects of 
decay can be managed, delaying its onset through processes, that is, with monitored 
maintenance. For example, member one stated “decay is like risk, you can mitigate 
some decay, you can accept some decay, and you can reduce the impact”. This view is 
accordant with the writings of Byeon (1999, p. 287) who states “open frame systems are 
able to circumvent the effects of the second law of thermodynamics (entropy law) 
through their feedback processes”.  
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Congruous with research panel one panel two, member three stated, “decay occurs in all 
aspects: management, technology and physical engineering”. Panel two supported the 
argument that all PPS decay, stating “all physical and technical components have a life 
cycle”, where congruous with member three, “decay occurs in each, or all, aspects of 
the triangle (see Figure 7.4), based on what a system is, and how the system operates, 
decay undermines the system”. The research sample’s views are congruous with the 
writings of Lovey and Manohar (2007, p. 99) and Styer (2000, p. 1) who argue that all 
physical systems, if left to themselves, tend to maximise their entropy true to the laws of 
thermodynamics. Within the context of physical security, this view is supported by 
Underwood (1984) and Howlet (1995), where according to Underwood (1984, p. 252) 
whatever security measures were established initially, they would not last forever, 
where according to Howlet (1995, p. 219) “that from the time of taking a system into 
use, it will start to deteriorate”. 
 
In response to sub-question two, panel two member three felt that a number of factors 
lead to security systems decaying. Member three stated:  
“people who have systems installed that do not understand what underpins 
them, systems are designed with parameters to facilitate for decay, a lack 
in professional system management, that is, a lack of knowledge to manage 
these parameters, a lack in education, in formal training leads to decay 
within Physical Protection Systems”.  
 
Member three’s views are consistent with the writings of Garcia (2006, pp. 24-25) who 
states “systems engineering considers both business objectives and the technical needs 
of customers. This is an approach concerned with the integration of functional, technical 
and operational requirements, where integration includes physical, electrical, customer 
needs, technical performance, safety, reliability, procedures, personnel, training, testing 
and life cycle of the systems solution”. Congruous with Garcia’s (2001, pp. 24-25) 
writings, panel two, member three stated:  
“there is no reason why the system cannot be kept at its commissioned level 
of effectiveness. That is, at the original detection capabilities, both physical 
and technology can be maintained at that level over the cycle of the system. 
It can be maintained to ensure over the systems life cycle, that it performs at 
the desired capabilities “commissioned level performance”.  
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Such a standpoint was supported by Howlet (1995, pp. 219-220) who states “no system, 
however well designed, can be completely reliable without proper maintenance. If left 
without attention (proper maintenance), it will become unserviceable, that is, not work. 
The operator may not be aware of it, but the system will now perform as intended”. 
Congruous with Garcia’s (2006) writings and according to member three, the avoidance 
of decay requires professional management of the system.  Panel two member three 
further states, “I have come across systems in Asia where there is absolutely no decay. 
That is, there is no procedural decay, and the technological and physical aspects of the 
system are professionally managed in-line with the systems commissioning security 
management plan”. This experience suggests a cultural aspect to security decay.  
 
Nevertheless Underwood (1984, p. xi) wrote, decay should be avoided and countered 
where possible, most of all, it must be expected. In relation to countering decay panel 
two member one, responded “decay is reversible, however it comes down to leadership 
and management support, and of course the necessary resources, stating “you need the 
will to turn decay around”. This view was supported by member three, who considered 
security decay to be a phenomenon which could be both reversed and avoided, stating: 
 “as soon as decay has been recognised, through professional management 
of the problem, “decay” can be overcome”. “Decay is a quantifiable 
factor; decay must be managed so it does not fall below the inbuilt 
redundancy level”.  
These views are compatible with the writings of Byeon’s (1999, p. 287) who explains 
that open frame systems are able to circumvent the effects of the second law of 
thermodynamics (entropy law) through their feedback processes (management and 
maintenance).  
 
In responding to sub-question two, all panel one members reported real world examples 
of how they have experienced decay or degradation within PPS. For example, panel one 
member one provided a substantial list of examples where he has observed decay 
manifestation within PPS. member one states:  
“poor maintenance of the environment in which PPS components are 
deployed leads to decay, based on the interrelated aspects of PPS elements. 
That is, weeds or feral growth in detection zones triggers high nuisance 
alarm rates, or poor electronic system maintenance having the same effect”.  
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As Howlet (1995, p. 220) writes, without proper maintenance the system will not work, 
where he states “ideally maintenance should be considered at the design stage, and that 
maintenance costs are very closely tied to the original design specifications of the 
system. Furthermore, member one responded that a lack of ongoing operator training, or 
operator training through handed down experience rather than through formal training 
processes ultimately leads to decay in the system as a “whole”. In addition, panel one 
member two provided similar views, stating: 
 “I have noticed that as staff competencies fluctuate, this fluctuation alters 
individual key performance indicators, where decay occurs in relation to the 
reduction in competencies and capabilities of the people components”.  
 
Member two’s experience was supported by member three who responded similarly 
with one of panel member one’s examples, stating “staffs’ lack of 
familiarization/awareness with procedural security during system checks leads to decay 
within the system. Such procedural decay results in technical decay; as it is not known 
if systems are truly working around its designed parameters”.  The human aspect of 
security decay was considered by Underwood (1984, p. 250) who states “it is important 
that the security operation is subject to the same management-by-objectives as the other 
management functions in an organisation”. In addition, all panel two participants 
reported real world examples of how they have experienced decay or degradation within 
PPS. For example, panel two member three, stated:  
“I conducted a security audit of an old system; when I do an audit I look at 
management, physical and technological aspects. The system I was auditing 
had clearly suffered decay because no-body wrote down in the first place 
what the system was meant to achieve (no measures of performance). I 
found that a lack in education and awareness in how the system was meant 
to operate lead to decay”.  
 
An example based support towards the phenomenon of security decay was also 
provided by member two. Member two stated “decay is often why I as a consultant is 
called in, in the first place, to review security after an incident. In our experience we 
find that security decay occurs in non systems arranged approaches to security, where 
isolated security measures are failing”. Member two states “during a security audit I 
found that whilst staff believed they were protected by a duress system, the system had 
been disconnected for two years”. Uniform with research panel one, a consensus was 
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achieved that decay embodies all aspects, constituents and elements within PPS. 
Research panel two reported that all aspects of PPS decay, where such decay occurs 
when performance falls below the system’s preset parameters. In addition, panel two 
member two responded “after a security event, often the security improvements become 
excessive”. This view was supported by Underwood (1984, p. 249) who writes, “the 
immediate reaction is often to increase the security measures established, but in fact this 
is not usually necessary and all that may be required is the re-establishment of the 
intended level of protection”.  
9.3.2 Research sub-question two deductions 
In response to sub-question two the evidence indicates that a consensus was reached 
within the study, where both research panels one and two supported the argument that 
security systems “do suffer from decay”. The research sample’s outcome is congruous 
with the pilot panel’s finding. Accordant with the pilot panel’s outcome, the evidence 
suggests that such decay relates to a failure to maintain security “systems” at their 
commissioned operating levels of effectiveness, diminishing their ability to deliver the 
required output goal (risk reduction).    
 
9.4 Research sub-question three 
Research question three directly related to the premises of Coole and Brooks (2009), 
and focused on the heterogeneous aspects of the Physical Protection “System” (PPS), in 
response to writings of Lovey and Manohar (2007, p. 99) and Styer (2000, p. 1).  Lovey 
and Manohar (2007, p. 99) and Styer (2000, p. 1) stated that “all physical systems, if left 
to themselves, tend to maximise their entropy, true to the laws of thermodynamics”. 
Accordant with the writings of Lovey and Manohar (2007, p. 99) and Styer (2000, p. 1) 
sub-question three asks “Do security experts support that security decay lies within the 
systems elements, constituents and their interrelationship”?  
 
9.4.1 Research sub-question three Interpretation 
The study asked panel members that in considering the argument that security controls 
decay, how did they think this occurs within a system approach to security? Too this 
question panel one member one stated: 
“decay within a PPS occurs within its individual elements, and propagates 
through the system. Decay occurs at the base level over time. This decay at 
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elemental level occurs through many causes, and the effect can result in 
major system breakdown”.  
Panel one member two responded similarly, stating “decay occurs at the element level, 
the efficacy of the system decays as small changes occur, changes start small, however, 
spread when not detected and managed”, where according to member two, procedural 
decay starts initially, stating “procedural decay occurs when staff no longer maintains 
their initial personnel based key performance indicators, where this initial decay 
propagates throughout the remainder of the system”. Panel one’s viewpoints are 
compatible with Section 4.4 (Tables 4.1 and 4.2) which indicate how changes in a 
Physical Protection System’s (PPS) microstates have a direct effect on its macro-state 
output measure. 
 
Panel one’s thoughts relating to security decay from a systems approach were also 
reported by research panel two. For example, panel two member three, stated “decay 
occurs in each, or all aspects of the triangle (Figure 8.1), where based on what a system 
is, and how the system operates, decay occurs in-line with what underpins them”. 
During Delphi method round two all research panel two participants responded that they 
support research panel one’s articulation of how decay occurs within a systems 
approach to security.  
 
A consensus was reached within research panel two congruous with research panel one 
that within a systems approach to security, decay starts in one aspect of the system; 
however, this can be manifest simultaneously across several constituents. Then based on 
the systems interrelationships, decay propagates throughout the remainder of the 
system. Such propagation ultimately affects the system’s response element and its 
deterrence aspects as well. For example, panel two member one stated “something 
serious would have a knock-on effect”, where member two states, “small changes can 
lead to large security implications, much like a chain. A chain is only as good as its 
weakest link or point. When the weakest point breaks, the result can be large”. Both 
research panel’s views relating to security decay from a systems approach conform with 
the early works of Isacc Newton who stated “the extension, hardness, impenetrability, 
mobility and inertia of every object, depends on, the extension, hardness, 
impenetrability, mobility and inertia of its component parts (The Open University, 
1976, p. 68).  
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Within the context of PPS, Newton’s views are supported in the writings of Garcia 
(2006, p. 29) who states “system effectiveness can become degraded through the 
reduction in effectiveness of individual components”. As Koniceck and Little (1997, p. 
184) state “when a single part of a security system fails, such failure can cause 
degradation within the total system”. Uniform with this view, panel one member three 
stated “the selection of components is made based from their individual key 
performance indicators, such as probability of detection, nuisance alarm rate etc, then 
we combine them together into a designed “whole” . 
 
A consensus was reached within the research panel one that decay occurs within a PPS, 
within individual constituents and its effects propagate through the system from this 
point. For example, panel one member one stated:  
“a system is a combination of elemental inputs, the system is very much 
dependant on the correct operation of the effectiveness of each of these 
elements in performing their function and supporting functions of other 
elements”.  
 
The panel’s responses are uniform to the literature stemming from Bertalanffy (1950; 
1968) and Konicek & Little, 1997; Mosely and Coleman, 2000; Garcia 2006; Broder, 
2006; Waldman, 2007). Furthermore, in providing his examples of decay manifestation 
within a PPS, panel one member one stated: 
“each of the above may have only minor degradation, or degradation that is 
not significant in its own sphere, the accumulated impact however, 
presented significant risk. In this instance it was clear that the input 
changes or performance degradation with each element had the potential to 
result in large change or performance degradation without evaluation in 
consideration of the total PPS”.   
 
Such a consensus was also reached by research panel two. For example, panel two 
member three stated, “each system is a system of systems. Each system has to be 
integrated into other systems, where each must play its part, underpinned by mission 
critical infrastructure”. Research panel two supported the views of research panel one, 
who reported that the systems approach to security embodies the Physical Protection 
System (PPS) broken down, into its component parts, which relies on the other 
components within the system, where if one component within the system is broken or 
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removed, this changes the whole system. Once again, this view is uniform to Koniceck 
and Little’s (1997, p. 184) who stated “when a single part of a security system fails, 
such failure can cause degradation within the total system”.  
 
The combined panels thoughts, feelings and experiences towards security decay are 
accordant with Section 4.3.2 (Chapter 4) which discusses the effects of entropic decay 
on PPS. Section 4.3.2 purports the original decay within a PPS expands to the 
boundaries of that specific subsystem component, resulting in a failure within this 
specific part of the system. Based on the system interrelationships between the Defence 
in Depth elements, results in the system becoming disordered, ultimately causing this 
point disturbance propagating through the remainder of the defence in depth system. In 
considering this aspect of security decay, all panel members supported the application 
of the “Butterfly” metaphor to PPS, which has been used to articulate such interrelated 
aspects of specific systems. For example, according to panel one member two, “system 
training has a macro-level output through the system. However, over time the training 
levels set at the system’s commissioning are allowed to decline, then the level of staff 
competency declines, affecting the remainder of the system”. This view was also 
reported by panel one member one, and panel two member three.  
9.4.2 Research sub-question three deductions 
Based on the available literature, it is argued that the evidence indicates both research 
panels support the argument that security decay lies within the systems elements, 
constituents and their interrelationships. That is, based on panel member’s responses, all 
panel members’ support that decay occurs at the constituent level, manifests, then 
expands to incorporate and affect specific sub-system key performance indicators. Then 
expands to the specific Defence in Depth element for which it is located. Such decay 
then propagates throughout the remainder of the Defence in Depth system from that 
point, ultimately affecting the systems macro-state key performance indicator (Pi) based 
on the systems interrelations, consistent with the writings of Bertalanffy (1950; 1968). 
 
9.5 Research question Interpretation 
Results of the study indicates that both research panels, and the pilot panel’s views 
relating to the implementation of effective security controls are congruous with the 
measures discussed in the study’s security benchmark (Chapters 2, 3 and 4). Accordant 
with the underpinning principles of General Systems Theory (GST) all study panels 
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understand the systems purpose, its functions and its architecture, and comprehend the 
various interrelations, organisation and orderly aspects which achieve the systems 
output goal. Furthermore, all panels support and understand how, based on the systems 
interrelating aspects, small changes in one area of a system are associated with changes 
throughout the remainder of the system, and how these changes directly affect the 
various sub-systems and “whole” systems macro-state (key performance indicators).  
 
In addition, a consensus was reached across the study’s participant sample with the pilot 
panel, and research panels one and two supporting the study’s security decay 
benchmark premise (Chapter 4) that physical security systems (Physical Protection 
Systems) “do suffer from decay”. The panels supported that such decay relates to a 
failure to maintain security “systems” at their commissioned operating levels of 
effectiveness” and to deliver their required output goal (risk reduction).  
 
Furthermore, all panels supported the argument that security decay lies within the 
systems elements, constituents and their interrelationships. That is, based on participants 
responses, all panel members support that decay occurs at the constituent level, 
manifests, then expands to incorporate and affect specific sub-system key performance 
indicators, then expands to the specific Defence in Depth element for which it is 
located, propagating throughout the remainder of the Defence in Depth system from that 
point. Such decay propagation ultimately affects the systems macro-state key 
performance indicator (Pi) based on the systems interrelations, true to the writings of 
Bertalanffy (1950; 1968).  
 
In responding to the study’s research question it is argued that the available evidence 
from the study indicates that the participant sample (N=9) collectively supported the 
view that security decay can be represented as “the gradual degradation of the 
microscopic quantities (constituents), and, or, the gradual degradation in the relationship 
between the microscopic and macroscopic quantities within a security system”.  
 
9.6 Security decay preliminary item bank 
Consistent with the writings of Loewanthal (2001, p. 3) (Section) Table 9.1 presents the 
security expert’s pool of variables and factors (item bank) associated with the concept 
of security decay. This item bank is underpinned by the expert panel’s thoughts, 
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feelings and experience with degradation within Physical Protections Systems (PPS). 
Table 9.1 highlights participant’s real world experiences and explanations relating to 
security decay.   
Table 9.1 Security decay preliminary item bank 
 
PPS Components Decay Categories 
Condition Phenomenon Consequence 
Technical Poor detection system 
maintenance 
 
Triggers increased 
nuisance alarm rates 
 
 
Staff ignore alarm, or, 
do not assess alarm 
causes properly 
reducing probability of 
accurate assessment 
KPI. 
 
 
Incorrect  technical 
maintenance 
Causes high nuisance 
alarm rates. 
 
 
Staff become 
complacent, resulting in 
accurate assessment as a 
KPI diminishes. 
 
 
Degradation of lighting 
system 
Light lamp failure 
affects the performance 
of CCTV systems. 
Diminished ability to 
assess (discriminate) 
alarm sources. 
 
 
People  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lack of professional 
management of the 
security function, as a 
system. 
 
System decays across 
all aspects of the 
management triangle, 
technological, physical 
and procedural. 
 
Eventually a security 
related event will occur 
due to a diminished risk 
reduction program. 
 
Poor, or lack of system 
testing, or, breaches of 
system testing 
procedures. 
 
 
Accurate state of system 
efficacy not established. 
 
 
Potential sub-system 
vulnerability 
manifestation. 
 
Poor formal training for 
new staff, where 
training occurs through 
handed down processes. 
 
Incorrect procedures or 
bad habits passed on to 
new staff. 
 
Cultural decay 
established within the 
human aspect of the 
system. 
 
 
Lack of qualified staff 
continuation training. 
 
Decay in response 
requirements for non-
routine events. 
 
Decay in efficiency and 
efficacy of staff 
responses. 
 
People changing the 
built environment to 
suit personal 
requirements. 
 
 
Changes various system 
inputs, discordant with 
their design 
specifications. 
 
 
Can trigger small 
changes in various sub-
system KPI’s which are 
not understood until a 
security event. 
 
 
Fluctuations in staff 
competencies 
Alters specific sub-
system KPI’s for where 
competency reduction is 
Staff may not react in 
an efficient and 
effective manner, based 
222 
 
related to. 
 
on system design 
requirements. 
 
Poor physical attribute 
(lighting and air 
conditioning) within 
CCR. 
 
Provide inappropriate 
output conditions. 
 
Poor staff concentration 
and focus, degrading 
operator effectiveness 
within CCR. 
 
Standard operating 
procedures being 
modified without 
reference to holistic 
system requirements (to 
address minor elemental 
issues).  
 
Degrades the 
performance of the 
operating system as a 
“whole”. 
 
System may not 
perform accordant with 
design specifications. 
 
 
Poor communication 
structures between 
Central Control Room 
(CCR) staff and 
security management 
and operational staff. 
Degradation in efficacy 
across “whole” system. 
System may not 
perform efficiently 
against defined threat, 
accordant with  
designed specifications. 
 
Physical 
 
Lack of maintenance of 
PPS environments 
(weeds and feral 
growth). 
 
 
 
Triggers increased 
nuisance alarm rates 
 
 
 
Staff ignore alarm, or, 
do not assess alarm 
causes properly 
reducing probability of 
accurate assessment 
KPI. 
 
Deterioration of delay 
physical elements. 
 
Barrier effectiveness 
based on 
commissioning 
measures degrades 
against defined threat. 
 
This changes the delay 
time along an 
adversary’s path, 
altering the system’s 
commissioning Pi. 
 
 
Physical components 
designed without 
considering physical 
environment impact. 
Leads to premature 
physical decay. 
Physical components 
may not perform as 
designed when put 
under defined threat 
stress. 
 
 
(Adjusted from Gillham, 2000, p. 68). 
 
 
9.7 Conclusion 
This chapter presented phase four of the study, the deductive analysis of security 
expert’s thoughts, feelings and experience with decaying security systems drawing on 
the outcomes of phase one, the conceptual review of literature as security (Chapters 2, 3 
and 4) system decay benchmarks. Phases two (Pilot study) and three (Research panels 
one and two) provided the interview data for this deductive analysis. The study’s 
research question was responded to by drawing on the deductive analysis of the three 
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research sub-questions. Research sub-question one asked: Do security experts support 
the systems approach to implementing effective security controls? Section 9.2 presented 
evidence that security experts do support the systems approach to implementing 
effective security controls. Research sub-question two asks: Do security experts support 
the argument that security systems can and do suffer from decay. Section 9.3 presented 
evidence that security experts do support the argument that security systems can and do 
suffer from decay. Research sub-question three asks: Do security experts support that 
security decay lies within the systems elements, constituents and their interrelationship? 
Section 9.4 presented evidence that security experts do support that security decay lies 
within the systems elements, constituents and their interrelationship. 
 
Based on the sum of security experts responses to the research sub-questions, it is 
argued that it can be interpreted that the study participants do support that security 
decay can be represented by “the gradual degradation of the microscopic quantities 
(constituents), and, or, the gradual degradation in the relationship between the 
microscopic and macroscopic quantities within a security system”. These results will be 
taken forward to Chapter 10 where the study’s conclusions can be drawn, providing 
study findings, limitations and recommendations.  
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CHAPTER 10 
 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
10.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the study’s conclusion, methodological limitations and 
recommendations. Section 10.1 provides a summary of the study’s research enquiry and 
presents how the research data generated from this enquiry relates to previous works 
focusing on security decay theory. Section 10.2 provides a management philosophy and 
methodology (Figure 10.1) towards maintaining Physical Protection Systems (PPS) at 
their commissioned levels of effectiveness. In addition, this section presents a summary 
of how security decay directly relates to the degradation within a security “system” 
based on its designed purpose in relation to its defined threat (Figure 10.2). 
Furthermore, Section 10.2 presents the study’s formal research findings. Limitations of 
the study are presented and discussed (Section 10.3), and recommendations for future 
investigations are made (Section 10. 4). Section 10.5 summarises this research enquiry 
providing the study’s conclusion.   
 
10.1 Summary of the study 
As previously stated, to date there is a dearth of dedicated published literature 
underpinned by academic research pertaining to security decay. In considering such an 
academic void Koffka (1963, p. 4) explains that in contemporary times, knowledge is 
regarded as an aim in its own right, stating “find facts, and again find facts; when you 
are sure of your facts, try and build theories...But your facts are more important”. The 
current knowledge and theory relating to security decay stems from the previous works 
of Underwood’s (1984) writings in his book “The Security of Buildings”, or McClure’s 
(1997) thesis “Security Decay: The erosion of effective security”, which is a dedicated 
published research works towards discussing the phenomenon of security decay. 
McClure (1997, p. 71) stated “security decay theory is a long way from extending 
beyond being an abstract model”, where security decay theory is primarily concerned 
with the influence apathy has on security and how management react to risk 
materialization when decay is evident. However, McClure (1997, p. 71) recommended 
the pursuit of a more functional model of security decay.   
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In pursuing McClure’s (1997, p. 71) recommendation, Hamlyn (1969, p. 16) states 
“explanations in science are and can be divided into two kinds, those which make 
reference to laws, and those which make reference to theories”. In considering 
Hamlyn’s (1969, p. 16) views, this study approached the investigation into security 
decay by drawing on both theory and laws. That is, the theory of Defence in Depth 
which achieves a functional security system, and General Systems Theory (GST) which 
provides a scientific frame for considering systems of all types, regardless of their 
purpose and components. In combining these theories, this research then drew on the 
laws of thermodynamics (Entropy law) to explain the natural decay occurring in 
systems of all types, regardless of make-up. This approach was considered necessary 
given the variety of different sciences which make a Physical Protection System (PPS) 
possible, where the one science which binds all various sciences to achieve the systems 
output goal is systems science (Bertalanffy, 1950; 1968).  
 
In investigating the concept of security decay from a systems approach, contrary to 
McClure’s (1997) works, this study argues apathy is not the salient factor driving decay. 
The study indicated that for Physical Protection Systems (PPS) apathy can actually be a 
product state, manifested in the poor management of PPS. For example, panel one 
member three, stated “all technology decays, as technology decays it constantly false 
alarms, then staff ignore them, where ultimately they lose confidence in the system and 
their work decays”. Such a view was also reported by Howlet (1995, p. 222) who stated:  
“from the time of taking a system into use it will start to deteriorate. No 
system, however well designed, can be completely reliable without proper 
maintenance. If left without attention it will become unserviceable...A poorly 
maintained security system will have many unexplained alarms, leading to 
the guard force losing confidence in the system and eventually ignoring a 
true alarm as just another false alarm.  However, the operator may not be 
aware of it, but the system will not perform as intended” (Howlet, 1995, p. 
220).  
 
Howlet’s (1995, p. 220) viewpoint was supported through consensus across this study. 
The study identified that decaying work practices, manifested in technology decay (high 
nuisance alarm rates), can lead to a state of apathy. Such an account indicates that 
apathy can be a product state of decay, manifested in a specific constituent within the 
system, propagating to directly affect the human aspects rather than the salient driving 
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factor. Consistent with this view, panel two member three stated, “a lack of professional 
management underpinned by poor knowledge and awareness of how the system was 
designed to work (manage the risks) leads to decay”. According to member three, “if 
you manage the triangle (Figure 10.1), you manage decay”. A common theme emerged 
across the study from both the textual literature (Chapters 2, 3 and 4) and the panel 
interview data (Chapters: 6, 7 and 8), that as a result of the heterogeneous nature of a 
PPS, decay in one specific area (point disturbance) due to the interrelationships, 
propagates throughout the remainder of the PPS, ultimately changing the performance 
(Macro-state) of the system as a “whole”.  
 
Figure 10.1 Security system management diagram.  
 
Based on the available literature, the study proposes that for PPS to maintain their 
commissioned measures they must be managed as a “system”, in-line with its original, 
or reviewed, design parameters, or as stated by Underwood (1984, p. 250) “managed by 
objectives”. For example, Figure 10.1 graphically indicates a pyramid analogy of how 
the system starts with a top down approach, where based on a defined threat (systems 
purpose) the systems objectives and parameters are established, where accordant to 
Figure 8.1 (Campbell Triangle) the operational deliverables are implemented and 
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managed to ensure the system maintains its commissioned measures of performance or 
key performance indicators over time. However, if the system is allowed to decay, the 
effects of this decay propagate back up the pyramid, in a bottom up approach. Such 
propagation diminishes the risk reduction efforts increasing organisational risk exposure 
(see Equation 28). That is, it is argued security decay transcends all levels of systems 
management. 
 
In addition, the study asserts that security decay is about the degradation within a 
security “system” based on its designed purpose in relation to its defined threat. For 
example, Howlet (1995, pp. 219-220) stated “without proper maintenance the system 
will not work”, where the operator may not be aware of it, but the system will not 
perform as intended. This view was articulated by panel one member one who stated 
“decay may not be a major failure of this system, but more incremental decrease in 
performance that occurs over time”. Based on the evidence, the study recognises that 
whilst a system may have a measure of decay, it is most probably still at a level where it 
would be effective against lower level, or lesser threats. As panel two, member three 
stated “security role is to manage the threats that pose a risk to either: institutional, 
commercial and industrial organisation to mitigate the risks”.  
 
It is argued decay in just one of the Defence in Depth elements may for some 
adversaries provide the necessary vulnerability, facilitating their opportunity to execute 
an attack and breach the layers of security. This opportunity is based on the defined 
threat’s capabilities in relation to the other Defence in Depth elements within the 
system. The findings from this study suggest that a system may still be effective against 
a large percentage of a population, but not its defined threat, where the system is 
vulnerable to attack only by these higher level threat agents for which it was intended to 
defeat (Figure 10.2). This view was explained by Garcia (2001, p. 245) who argued that 
the adversary factor is strongly interrelated with the effectiveness measure of PPS, 
where the designer must understand the facilities operations and threat. 
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Figure 10.2 The effects of decay based on a normal distribution of attack capabilities. 
 
For example, Figure 10.2 presents the argument that a system’s defined threat is based 
on the combined capabilities of a threat agent/group across all Defence in Depth 
elements (see Section 3.4.1). It is therefore suggested that such capabilities would be 
held by a very small percentage of people within the general population. However, for a 
small targeted percentage of the population the system’s vulnerability increases as the 
holes get bigger in the appropriate elements. Therefore the opportunity for success for 
this population sample increases. This aspect of system degradation is shown in Figure 
4.2 (Section 4.5), where based on the principle equifinality (see Figure 2.5) in open 
systems the steady state reached is independent of initial conditions and determined by 
the systems parameters. Consistent with the principle of equifinality the system, based 
on alterations to these parameters, alters its original steady state, arriving at a new, 
lesser steady state condition. However, this new condition presents the intuitive 
perception it is still functioning at its commissioning state (see Section 4.5, Figure 4.2).  
10.2 Research findings 
McClure (1997, p. 1) wrote, “There is a complex interrelationship between technology, 
people and management processes within a security function”. Consistent with 
McClure’s (1997) viewpoint, the available literature indicates that within a systems 
approach to security, it is the interrelations which tie the system together towards 
achieving an output goal, rather than a collection of side-by-side or juxtafication of 
controls. Coole and Brooks (2009, p. 22) highlighted such a complex relationship within 
a PPS. They argued that an orderly relationship exists where the space and time 
distribution of the Defence in Depth elements creates a comprehensive state of order in 
relation to a Physical Protection System’s (PPS) macro level of effectiveness. 
Consistent with this view the study presented the argument that as a result of managers 
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not understanding how the physical, technological and procedural aspects combine 
through management principles and processes within preset parameters to achieve and 
maintain the systems output goal, they decay. The available literature indicates that in 
order to maintain PPS at their commissioned levels of effectiveness during their life 
cycle, they need to be managed in accordance with their commissioned designed 
specifications. It is argued that the most appropriate means to manage decay within PPS 
is through the use of a performance indicator frame work, which enables full 
management of the heterogeneous nature as a “system”.  
 
Combining the summative aspect of a Defence in Depth system with the textual 
benchmark and the interview data, the evidence indicates that the study supported the 
proposition that security decay can be represented as: The gradual degradation of the 
microscopic quantities (constituents), or the gradual degradation in the relationship 
between the microscopic and macroscopic quantities within a security system. It is 
argued that such a definition provides rigor and genuine conceptual substance that can 
be integrated into Physical Protection Systems performance measures and appeal to 
both security academics and practitioners alike. Furthermore, the acceptance of entropic 
decay theory means that the laws, theories and principles of systems theory associated 
with maintaining PPS at their commissioned levels of effectiveness can be applied to 
the security function management processes. In addition, such an approach may also be 
applied to personnel and information frameworks to cover the entire security 
management system (see Figure 2.1). 
 
The study defined the effects natural entropy has on a PPS, where such degradation 
reduces a PPS’s effectiveness; however given the ubiquitous usage of entropy, limited 
understanding and definitional ambiguity, the study argues that consistent with 
Underwood’s (1984) and McClure’s (1997) writings, the term security decay become 
adopted to represent the effects and measure of degradation within PPS. Nevertheless, 
in considering such an outcome, the study argues that in contrast to Underwood’s 
(1984) writings and the findings of McClure (1997) security decay theory is primarily 
concerned with managing the natural entropic processes/pressures occurring against 
commissioned levels of effectiveness across all elements within PPS. In some cases 
these processes are allowed to manifest due to a lack of professional management of the 
security function as a “system”.  
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10.3 Study limitations 
This section highlights the methodological limitations within the study. These 
limitations include a lack of published security benchmarking within the security 
domain. In addition, this section explains the limitations within the study due the small 
sample size. Furthermore, the study highlighted a potential cultural aspect to security 
decay; however, due to limitations in time this aspect was not pursued. Finally, the 
study’s conceptual review of literature considered security decay to be an aspect 
predominately considered during the monitor and review stage of the risk management 
cycle, after the system was commissioned. However, the research indicated that decay 
should be considered well before this stage, at the design stage of a security project.  
10.3.1 Benchmarking 
Due to a lack in formal Physical Protection Systems (PPS) benchmarking, this research 
conceptually reviewed the literature (Chapters 2, 3 and 4). Whilst the principles of this 
benchmark had been peer reviewed prior to this study through the works of Coole and 
Brooks (2009), the conceptual review as a benchmark had not been double blind peer 
reviewed. This restricted peer review provides limitations within this study’s deductive 
analysis.  
10.3.2 Research Sample 
The research panel participants formed a purposive sample (N=9), providing a relatively 
small research sample. In addition, whilst panel members were selected based on their 
meeting certain criterion, this sample was chosen based on geographical location and 
willingness to participate. Some security experts declined to participate, limiting the 
security domain specializations represented within this study. In addition, another 
limitation within the sample is the multidimensional nature and many practicing 
domains of security. 
10.3.3 Cultural theory  
Research panel two, member one, explained that security decay is like risk, you can 
accept some decay, mitigate some decay and avoid some decay. Consistent with this 
approach, according to member three panel two, he has come across some security 
functions in South East Asia which are so professionally managed that there is 
absolutely no decay That is, there is no procedural decay and the physical and 
technological parameters are managed in accordance with the systems designed 
specifications. This suggests, like risk, security decay has a degree of cultural aspect, 
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which could be organisational or geographical. This aspect of decay theory was not 
investigated during this study. 
10.3.4 Security decay and risk management  
Section 3.6 presents Figure 3.3 the security risk management cycle. At the start of the 
study, decay was considered to be an aspect which was predominately considered 
during the monitor and review stage of the risk management cycle, after the system was 
commissioned. However, the research indicated that decay should be considered well 
before this stage, at the design stage of a security project. Such an approach considers 
decay as a risk and treated as such. The aim would be to design and commission a 
system where decay has been considered and where possible, the system designed to 
minimize or mitigate decay before the system is commissioned. The study’s conceptual 
review of literature benchmark did not consider this aspect of decay. Therefore this 
aspect of decay theory was not explored in depth.   
10.4 Recommendations 
In combining the findings from the study in conjunction with the conceptual review of 
literature as a benchmark (Chapters 2, 3 and 4), a number of recommendations have 
been made. These recommendations aim to further develop the knowledge and 
understanding of entropic security decay so that McClure’s (1997, p. 71) 
recommendation, of pursuing security decay theory beyond an abstract model can be 
achieved.  
10.4.1 Recommendation one: further research into Physical Protection 
Systems complex interrelations 
The study’s findings support McClure’s (1997) view that there exists a complex 
interrelationship between technology, people and management processes within a 
security function. It is recommended that academia pursue further research into this 
complex interrelationship. The benefits would be the establishment of suitable security 
benchmarks facilitating more robust security research in the future. 
 
10.4.2 Recommendation two: development of operational performance 
measures 
It is recommended that academia pursue the development of performance measures or 
key performance indicators at the operational level, which would combine to achieve 
the tactical level measures presented in the EASI model. These measures would 
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facilitate the ongoing performance management of the operational deliverables that 
combine to achieve the tactical measures across the system. Such a management 
framework would assist security management develop further as a professional 
management domain. 
10.4.3 Recommendation three: the teaching of systems theory for security 
It is recommended that academia consider how security studies and security 
management is taught. This study indicates that a true systems based approach to 
achieving effective security is required. Therefore, security needs to be managed as a 
system to ensure that the natural entropic processes/pressures occurring against Physical 
Protection Systems are avoided or countered through management principles and 
processes. A significant amount of time is spent within management theory discussing 
open systems theory. As such, it is recommended that in teaching the management of 
the security function, that the academic focus towards systems science be adopted into 
security studies syllabus.      
10.4.4 Recommendation four: security decay at the design stage 
The research sample, as a consensus, considered that security decay needs to be 
considered at the design stage of a security project. The security body of literature has 
focused significantly into designing the environment to reduce crime, referred to as 
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED). This study recommends 
applying such a philosophy to research how PPS can be designed to reduce/minimize 
decay over the systems life cycle.  
10.4.5 Recommendation five: security decay and cultural theory 
It is recommended that cultural theory be employed to investigate the cultural aspects 
leading to the manifestation of decay, or its avoidance within security systems 
management.  
10.4.6 Recommendation six: the adoption of security decay into the body of 
knowledge 
It is also recommended that the characteristics of security decay i.e. Table 6.1 (Section 
6.6) and Table 9.1 (Section 9.6) be further defined, and that security decay theory 
become adopted into the security domain’s body of knowledge. The adoption of 
security decay theory would enable security managers to draw on this body of 
knowledge when developing business cases for the ongoing maintenance and review of 
their respective organisational security functions. 
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10.4.8 Recommendation seven: the pursuit of a systems approach. 
This research indicates that a true systems approach to implementing effective security 
controls is required to achieve a state of effective security. However, much of the 
security literature dissects security reviews and security auditing into discrete domain 
specific categories, including Crime Prevention through Environmental Design 
(CPTED) reviews, physical security audits, security lighting audits, etc. This study 
suggests that in order to maintain PPS at their commissioned levels of effectiveness 
during their life cycle, they need to be managed in accordance with their commissioned 
designed specifications as a “system”. Therefore consistent with recommendation two, 
it is proposed that security auditing tools and methodologies be developed to audit the 
security function as a “system” rather than seeing security control components standing 
in a side-by-side relationship or Silo thinking. This focus was emphasised by 
Bertalanffy (1968, p. 18) who considered the systems approach to be one of 
organisation where phenomena are not observable by respective parts in isolation.  
 
It is argued that a systems focus would highlight the quantitative aspect of security 
which leads to two different security states. These two states include security by denial 
and security by apprehension. For a denial state the system is commissioned to deny a 
defined threat access to a protected asset, where through the employment of 
mathematics the sensitivity settings within a PPS can be adjusted to ensure such an 
objective is achieved. In contrast, security by apprehension is a state where the system 
is commissioned to increase the level of difficulty associated with achieving a 
successful attack. However, the cost benefit analysis does not justify the level of 
Defence in Depth to resist high level attacks, where the system hinders the attack and 
facilitates the collection of evidence towards apprehending the offender/s at a later time. 
Such separation of two different security objectives provides a means of qualitatively 
articulating the effects of decay on a commissioned PPS, where the system can move 
from a denial state to one of apprehension.  
10.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the study’s research conclusion (Section 10. 1) summarising the 
available literature relating to the concept of security decay towards presenting this 
study’s research finding (Section 10.2).  The study investigated the concept of security 
decay from a systems approach to implementing effective security controls. This 
investigation was framed within an open systems approach, drawing on the 
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underpinnings of General Systems Theory (GST). GST facilitated the examination of 
how individual security components are tied together to achieve a predetermined output 
goal. It was argued that this predetermined output goal is the systems purpose, which is 
achieved through the implementation of various layers of controls. These layers include 
the use of technological, physical and procedural aspects combined in an orderly 
relationship, which are interrelated and commissioned as a “whole” against a desired 
benchmark. This benchmark is designed to counter the threats that pose a risk to various 
organisations towards achieving the amount of desired risk reduction.  
 
To account for the concept of decay within an open systems frame the study drew on the 
concept of entropy. Entropy as a concept is derived from a metric, defined as a measure 
of disorder in a system and a process characterised with: decay, running down, and 
becoming disordered. For a system it is argued that as its entropy level increases its 
output or working capabilities decrease. As such, entropy provided the scientific frame 
for considering security decay within a Physical Protection System (PPS). The study 
argued that if PPS are left to themselves, that is, not provided with the appropriate 
feedback open systems require too circumvent the effects of the second law (entropy 
law) of thermodynamics, they become closed. Closed systems eventually reach a state 
where they are no longer capable of delivering the required risk control they were 
commissioned to achieve.  
 
The study recognised and highlighted the complexity of entropic decay theory and the 
professional management required to ensure that Physical Protection Systems (PPS) 
maintain their commissioned levels of performance over the course of their life cycle. 
This complexity is based on the vast number of domain specializations which draw on a 
variety of science disciplines to achieve the PPS’s output goal. The evidence indicates 
that security decay can be seen as either technological, physical, or procedural in its 
manifestation. Based on what a system is, such decay can under certain conditions 
propagate to affect other sub-systems within the system and ultimately the system’s 
macro-state output. The findings of the study suggest that for systems to maintain their 
commissioned levels of effectiveness over their life cycle they must be professionally 
managed. It is argued that such professional management requires a specific focus, 
where the technological aspects of the system are managed in accordance with their 
designed parameters. In addition, the physical aspects of the PPS needs to managed in 
accordance with their structural underpinnings, and the human functions and procedural 
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aspects must be managed by those principles and processes underpinning management 
theory.  
 
The evidence indicates that these three aspects are the structural categories towards 
countering entropic decay within PPS. Consistent with this view it is argued that the 
systems objectives must be clearly defined and underpinned by key performance 
indicators which directly contribute to the systems output goal. This study purports that 
such a management philosophy will facilitate an efficacy based approach to the 
professional management of PPS. That is, facilitating the professional management by 
objectives.  
 
The study also highlighted the problems associated security’s lack in consensus 
definition. In addition, the dearth of knowledge and lack of dedicated published 
literature underpinned by academic research pertaining to security decay. In-light of this 
knowledge gap, this chapter presented a number of study limitations (Section 10.3), 
highlighting the complexity in conducting robust academic research within the security 
domain. Furthermore, this chapter presented a number of recommendations (Section 
10.4) to both expand the knowledge relating to security decay and expand the 
robustness of security research for future knowledge categorisation development.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE LETTER 
 
 
 
The Theory of Entropic Security Decay 
Thank you for considering participating in our research study pertaining to the concept 
of security decay. This research project is being undertaken as part of the requirements 
of a Master of Science degree at Edith Cowan University. Your insights will be 
extremely helpful in evaluating the existence of this phenomenon within the security 
domain.  
 
Aim: To develop the concept, define the term and establish a framework for measuring 
entropic decay within a security system. 
 
Benefits: This research will develop an understanding of how the characteristics that 
may make an organisation prone to entropic decay can be identified, and measured. 
Once these characteristics are understood, this will enable the use of small funding to 
stimulate and maintain the effectiveness of various security risk mitigation strategies. 
This information can assist managers when conducting formal risk assessments to 
ensure their risk reduction strategies take into account the decaying aspect of 
implemented security controls. 
 
The theory of entropic security decay 
The theory of defence in depth aims to link layered security elements into a system 
incorporating; people, technology, barriers and procedures to ensure a holistic and 
functional security system. This system aims to deliver effective risk based decisions, 
enhanced operational effectiveness, and reductions in overall risks and costs for a 
facility. However, it has been argued that security controls degrade over time reducing 
the effectiveness level of risk treatment. This argument was first considered by 
Underwood (1984) who referred to this as decaying security, stating “Security decay” is 
the most serious threat to a security system, and that such decay must be “expected”, 
“avoided”, and “countered”. 
 
The theory of entropic decay considers that security controls are implemented within a 
systems approach towards reducing security related risks, and that in line with the 
premises of systems theory the elements of defence in depth (detect, delay and 
response) must be employed and successfully achieved within their sequential order and 
that over time all systems are prone to entropic decay, including security systems.   
This study requires your assistance to explore the application of security controls within 
a systems frame. Specifically, we seek your experience with the argument that in line 
with the principles of systems theory, all systems includes security systems degrade 
over time, leading to decay, and that this decay does/is manifested within the system. 
Results from this study will be integrated into the conceptual literature review framing 
the theory of entropic security decay for interpretation and analysis towards drawing 
conclusions relating to the research questions. In addition, each participant within the 
study will receive a critique of the findings as they occur. This will provide you with the 
most up-to-date discourse relating to the concept of security decay. 
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Guidelines: This research enquiry is employing a Delphic poll methodology. The 
purpose of a Delphic Poll is to gather a consensus of expert opinions relating to a 
specific topic under investigation using several rounds of interviews or questionnaires to 
facilitate the identification, evaluation, and clarification of research problems and 
establish positions towards identifying solutions, by drawing on the current knowledge 
of participating experts. You have been nominated by your peers as a security expert.  
This Delphic study will be undertaken utilizing Interviews as they are a systematic 
means of discussing with people an area under investigation towards collecting data and 
constructing knowledge in research. The use of interviews in research considers that 
knowledge is something generated between people, often through conversation. 
Interviews enable research participants in a study to discuss their interpretations of the 
world in which they live, and to express how they regard issues under investigation 
from their personal experience. As sch the core aspect of your role within this study will 
consist of providing experience-based knowledge when answering interview questions.  
 
Risks and Discomforts 
There are no foreseeable risks or discomforts associated with your participation in this 
study. However, you will be required to participate in two rounds of interviews, with an 
information feedback process between these rounds.  
 
Confidentiality 
Information obtained from this study which could identify you will be kept private to 
the extent allowed by law. However, information which may identify you will be shared 
with research supervisory staff from Edith Cowan University where necessary. 
 
Results 
The results of this study will be published as a thesis and made available through 
various library catalogues. In addition, it is anticipated that the results of this study will 
be reported in conference proceedings and relevant journal publications. The reporting 
of results will not include any information that may identify individual participants. 
This study incorporates a Delphic Poll, as such results will be disseminated to 
participants during the course of the research phases, and final results will be reported to 
all participants once conclusions have been drawn at the completion of the research 
phase. 
 
Refusal or withdrawal without penalty 
Your taking part in this study is your choice. There is no penalty if you decide not to be 
in the study. In addition, you are free to withdraw from this research study at any time. 
In addition, you may be removed from this study without your consent if Edith Cowan 
University chooses to end the study. 
If you have any questions, concerns, or complaints about this research or a research- 
related enquiry, please contact this research’s supervisor Dr Dave Brooks; 
d.brooks@ecu.edu.au or telephone:  08 63045788, or 
Student Researcher; Michael Coole: 0415874595 or email, mcoole@our.ecu.edu.au 
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INFORMED CONSENT 
Thank you for choosing to participate in this research study. Your signature 
below indicates that you agree to participate in this study. If you agree to participate in 
this study you will receive a copy of this signed document. 
 
I______________________________________ agree to participate in this research 
study (the theory of entropic security decay). I have had the aims of the study explained 
to me, its research methodology and my commitment requirements. In-line with the 
requirements of informed consent, I provide my informed consent. 
 
 
Signature___________________________ Date____/____/____. 
 
This document was Witnessed by Michael  
Coole_________________________Date___/___/____. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
PILOT STUDY SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Category Questions Responses                          
Date:    ___/___/___ 
                                            
Panel No._________ 
                                            
Round No.________ 
Systems approach to 
security. 
 
Prompts and Probes: 
a) Would you elaborate 
on that? 
b) How did that come 
about? 
c) That’s helpful I’d 
appreciate it if you 
could give more 
detail. 
d) Some say,..do you 
agree? 
e) What you’re saying 
now is very 
important, and I want 
to make sure that I 
get it down exactly 
the way you mean it, 
please explain some 
more.  
 
 a) Can you please tell me from your experience what the role of security is within an organisations 
• Do you see it as a risk reduction role? 
b) Can you tell me how you apply the body of knowledge including theories and principles of 
security, specifically DiD 
• Do you support a systems approach? 
Can you please explain to me your understanding of a system 
• Do you consider the relationships between the micro state and the macro state? 
• What do you think this involves? 
c) According to the principles of systems theory small changes within a specific part can lead to a 
large change at the output of the systems 
• Do you agree with this premise? 
d) Systems theory is concerned with those key performance indicators that are directly related to 
the whole systems key performance indicator. 
• Within your understanding of a systems approach, can you tell me what you believe the 
key performance indicators are within a PPS  
• Based on your experience, do you believe the key performance indicators of the systems 
are related to the systems effectiveness? 
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Security Decay 
This study is specifically focused 
towards establishing an 
understanding of the concept of 
security decay. 
 
Prompts and Probes: 
a) Would you elaborate 
on that? 
b) How did that come 
about? 
c) That’s helpful I’d 
appreciate it if you 
could give more 
detail. 
d) Some say,..do you 
agree? 
e) What you’re saying 
now is very 
important, and I want 
to make sure that I 
get it down exactly 
the way you mean it, 
please explain some 
more.  
 
a) Based on your experience do you believe that security systems decay; 
b) What is your understanding of security decay; 
c) Can you tell me about a time when you experienced security controls degrading; 
d) In considering the argument that security controls decay, how do you think this occurs within a 
systems approach to security; 
e) The theory of entropic security decay argues that the concept of decay within a PPS occurs 
within the individual constituents, within the PPS, and its effects propagate through the system 
from this point. Based on your experience, do you support this premise; 
a) Systems theory, and specifically an effect referred to as the butterfly effect suggests small 
input changes within a system can result in large changes at the macro output. Do you feel this 
applies to a PPS; Can you give me an example where you have come across this; 
b)  Based on your experience,  what do you consider the effects of decay are; 
c) Once decay has set in, do you think its effects, both at the point of manifestation, and 
throughout the remainder of the system are reversible; 
d) Do you think decay can be avoided; 
f) Do you believe the concept of decay has a place in the risk management formula? 
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Biographical data 
Participant No. 
Panel No. 
 
 
What is your current security employment context and role? 
 
 
Can you please tell me what type of security advice you 
supply in this role? 
 
How long have you been in this role?  
 
Can you please tell me what formal qualifications you hold 
for this role? 
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APPENDIX C 
FINAL SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Category Questions Responses                    
Date:    ___/___/___ 
                                      
Panel No._________ 
                                      
Round No.________ 
Systems approach to 
security. 
 
Prompts and Probes: 
f) Would you elaborate 
on that? 
g) How did that come 
about? 
h) That’s helpful I’d 
appreciate it if you 
could give more 
detail. 
i) Some say, do you 
agree? 
j) What you’re saying 
now is very 
important, and I want 
to make sure that I 
get it down exactly 
the way you mean it, 
please explain some 
more.  
 
 
 
 
 1) Can you please tell me from your experience what the role of security is within an organisation? 
 
2) Do you see it as a risk reduction role? 
 
3) Can you tell me how you apply the body of knowledge including security methodologies and 
concepts? Do you use DID? (If not stated). 
 
4) Can you please explain to me your understanding of a system? Do you consider the relationships 
between the components and the goal of the system?  
 
5) Do you support a systems approach towards security? Yes/No. 
 
6) What do you think the systems approach towards security involves? 
  
According to the principles of systems theory small changes within a specific component can lead to a 
large change at the output of the systems 
7) Do you agree with this premise? Yes/No Can you explain why?  
 
Systems theory is concerned with those key performance indicators that are directly related to the whole 
systems key performance indicator. 
 
8)Within your understanding of a systems approach, can you tell me what you believe the key 
performance indicators are within a PPS  
 
9) Based on your experience, do you believe the key performance indicators of the systems are related 
to the systems effectiveness? Can you explain how? 
 
10) Based on your experience do you believe that security systems decay; 
 
11) What is your understanding of security decay; 
12) Can you tell me about a time when you experienced security controls degrading, what occurred? 
 
Security Decay 
This study is specifically focused 
towards establishing an 
understanding of the concept of 
security decay. 
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Prompts and Probes: 
f) Would you elaborate 
on that? 
g) How did that come 
about? 
h) That’s helpful I’d 
appreciate it if you 
could give more 
detail. 
i) Some say, do you 
agree? 
j) What you’re saying 
now is very 
important, and I want 
to make sure that I 
get it down exactly 
the way you mean it, 
please explain some 
more.  
 
13) In considering the argument that security controls decay, how do you think this occurs within a 
systems approach to security; 
 
The concept of security decay argues that decay within a PPS occurs within the individual constituents, 
within the PPS, and its effects propagate through the system from this point.   
14) Based on your experience, do you support this premise Yes/No, why, why not? 
 
Systems theory, and specifically an effect referred to as the butterfly effect suggests small input changes 
within a system can result in large changes at its macro output. 
15) Do you feel this applies to a PPS? Yes/No. Can you give me an example where you have come 
across this? 
16) Based on your experience, what do you consider the effects of decay are? 
 
17) Once decay has set in, do you think its effects, both at the point of manifestation and throughout the 
remainder of the system are reversible? Yes/No. How do you think so? Or, why don’t you think so? 
 
18) Do you think decay can be avoided? Yes/No. How do you think the effects of decay within a 
security system can be avoided? Or, why don’t you think the effects of decay within a security system 
can be avoided? 
 
19) Do you believe the concept of decay has a place in the risk management process? Yes/No.  If so, 
where in the process? If not, why not? 
 
20) Based on your experience, is there any facet of security decay which you can add to the research 
enquiry? This may include factors associated with either the cause of decay or impacts from it. 
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APPENDIX D 
RESEARCH PANEL ONE: PHASE THREE EXPERT INTERVIEW AND 
FEEDBACK TRANSCRIPT 
 
The following transcript was taken from panel one member two’s feedback (Round two 
participant interview) transcript from questions 1-10 to demonstrate a typical interview . 
Interview transcript 
 
Question 1: Can you please tell me from your experience what the role of security is 
within an organisation? 
You answered: Security’s role is the protection of assets, including: physical 
information and personnel in order for the organization to function to achieve its 
business objectives. Security should be integrated with the organization to assist it in 
achieving its objectives.   
Participant 1; Re: Security depends on context and relates primarily to the safety of 
people, not Occupational Safety and Health, but the safety of people from human 
adversaries. It also encompasses asset protection, secure containment and incident 
management.   
Participant 3; Re: For me, in principle, the role is around maintaining custody and 
containment of all prisoners within the justice system. This is achieved through the 
provision of physical, procedural, dynamic security measures in a balanced and holistic 
approach. 
 Feedback: Both yourself and panel member number one (1) stated that security’s role 
is the protection of assets. However, panel member number three (3) stated that 
security’s role encompasses and is achieved through the provision of physical, 
procedural, dynamic (intelligence) measures in a balanced and holistic approach. 
Qu: Do you agree with panel member number three’s (3) statement?  
Res: These are functions towards achieving the objective, that is, this is how a state of 
security is achieved.  
Furthermore, the pilot study panel concluded that security at the tactical level of 
management relates to the holistic implementation of procedural, physical and 
electronic measures which aims to protect an organisation’s assets which includes 
people, information and physical property through their ability to deter, detect, delay 
and respond against organisation specific threats. 
Qu: Do you agree with the pilot panel’s conclusions? 
Res: Yes. 
Question 2: Do you see security roles as a reduction role? 
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You answered: Yes, because its role is to mitigate known or perceived threats to an 
organization. 
Participant 1; Re: Yes, everything is risk based. Without knowledge of risk there is no 
baseline. 
Participant 3; Re: Most definitely, it is about reducing risk all the time, not just within 
the justice system, but across the wider community. 
Feedback: All panel members responded yes to this question, that security is a risk 
reduction role. As such, it is interpreted that a consensus exists amongst the panel 
members that security is a risk reduction role. 
Qu: Do you support this interpretation?  
Res: Yes I do. 
In addition, the pilot panel reported that security is a risk reduction role at the strategic 
level of management. 
Qu: Do you agree with the pilot panel? 
Res: Yes, of course. 
Furthermore, the pilot panel as a consensus agreed that security also has a deterrent role 
within an organisation towards preventing security related incidents. 
Qu: Do you support the pilot panel’s views in relation to this aspect of security’s role 
within an organisation? 
Res: Yes, it is one of its functions. 
Question 3: Can you tell me how you apply the body of knowledge including security 
methodologies and concepts. Do you use defence in depth? 
You answered: I combine all aspects of defence in depth, Crime Prevention Through 
Environmental Design (CPTED) and risk management to achieve security objectives. 
These are, and need to be interrelated. To achieve defence in depth, in-line with a 
security context requires all aspects of security. For example, security intelligence 
(SYNT) aligns with risk management to ascertain how defence in depth will be 
achieved. For example, CPTED detection or a technology based detection component. 
This takes into account zoning at a facility, where different levels of risk reduction are 
required within each zone (Hierarchical system) of defence in depth, where defence in 
depth achieves a level of access control.  
Participant 1; Re: It depends on the security context. Defence in depth is an absolute 
underpinned by security risk management. That is, you need to understand the client’s 
needs and their risks. It needs to be very functional. 
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Participant 3; Re: I definitely adopt the principles of defence in depth, also crime 
prevention through environmental control (CPTED) within physical security. I utilize 
CCTV as alarm verification/discrimination. For me It incorporates a balanced approach 
of physical, procedural, dynamic (Intelligence) and risk management.   
Feedback: For this question, all panel members responded that they employ defence in 
depth interrelated with risk management to establish a level of security based on risk. 
As such, it is interpreted that al panel members agree that the consistent body of 
knowledge employed to security an organisation’s assets is defence in depth and risk 
management. 
Qu: Do you agree with this interpretation?  
Res: Yes. 
In addition, panel member number two (2) stated that he employs a hierarchical system 
of defence in depth, where defence in depth achieves a level of access control, within 
zones to achieve a desired level of risk reduction. 
Qu; Do you support panel member number two’s (2) approach? 
Res: Yes. 
In addition, panel member number one (1) stated that when employing the security body 
of knowledge it needs to be very functional. That is, applied from a functional approach. 
Qu: Do you agree with panel member number one’s (1) views relating to the 
employment of security’s body of knowledge? 
Res: Yes. 
Question 4: Can you please explain your understanding of a system? Do you consider 
the relationship between the components and the goal of the system? 
You answered: For a system, you tie in a group of elements and constituents which 
maintain a role towards an overall outcome. All aspects are interrelated, it depends on 
how they are interrelated, and yes I certainly consider the interrelationships. 
Participant 1; Re: The systems approach is a holistic approach, “seen as a whole”. It 
requires structure with good interactions between components (highly interrelated) 
interface between components. “It’s a top down process”. A systems approach considers 
strong interrelationships between interrelationships at the design stage with operator 
interface. That is, the components must help achieve the objective of the system. 
Participant 3; Re: For me systems are the components and linking’s between them, the 
physical components and procedures are linked to achieve a goal, which for me the goal 
is to reduce risk. 
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Feedback: For this question both yourself and panel member number one (1) focused 
on linking in individual components and their various interrelationships to achieve an 
overall goal or objective. Specifically, panel member number one (1) stated that a 
system a system is a top down process which requires structure incorporating 
components with good interactions between them, and all being highly interrelated to 
achieve the objectives of the system. However, the system should be seen as a “whole”. 
Qu: Do you agree with panel member number one’s (1) views? 
Res: Yes. 
Furthermore, panel member number three (3) stated the systems approach links in the 
physical components and human procedures to achieve the systems goal, which in the 
security context is the reduction of risk. 
Qu: Do you agree with panel member number three’s (3) views? 
Res: I do in a security context, but a systems goal may not be to reduce risk. As such, I 
think this is an oversimplification.  
In addition, the pilot panel reported through consensus that the systems approach to 
security relates to how risks can be reduced through a holistic approach, interrelating the 
separate components which combine together to achieve an overall goal. 
Qu: Do you support the pilot panel’s consensus? 
Res: Yes. 
Question 5:  Do you support a systems approach towards security? 
You answered: Yes for sure. 
Participant 1; Re: Yes, as long as the systems are properly designed tools for the 
management of security risks (systems are sets of tools). 
Participant 3; Re: Yes, definitely. 
Feedback: For this question all panel members responded yes, that they support a 
systems approach towards security. It is therefore interpreted that a consensus was 
reached with this question. Such a consensus was also reached by the pilot panel. 
Qu: Do you agree with this interpretation? 
Res: Yes. 
Question 6: Too the question: What do you think the systems approach towards 
security involves? 
You answered: The same as it does with any organization. The Physical Protection 
System (PPS) broken down into its component parts relies on the other components 
within the system. If one component within the system is broken, or removed, this 
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changes the whole system. For example, defence in depth relies on all its elements to be 
interrelated and at their measure of effectiveness. 
Participant 1; Re: The systems approach to security is a holistic approach that 
recognizes the main contributions to the security solution. Be it, management processes, 
procedures, technology, people and physical security, the built environment and 
planning. It is how each of these elements are implemented, recognizing the importance 
of each other and how the interactions compliment and influence each other. Each 
element is configured or implemented to support each other to form a holistic security 
system approach, and recognizes the Swiss Cheese choice approach.  
Participant 3; Re: The systems approach means to have sound security practices in 
place before an event occurs. This applies the dynamic approach (Intelligence) to 
security. The systems approach adopts the principles of security, and has them in place 
before an event, to reduce the risks associated with a security context. The systems 
approach starts before a security project commences. The majority of risks should be 
mitigated before, at the planning stage. 
Feedback: To this question panel member number one (1) focused on the idea that the 
systems approach is a holistic approach that recognises the main contributions to the 
security solution, be they management processes, procedures, technology, physical 
barriers, built environment and people, and how each of these components are 
implemented to compliment and support each other. 
Panel member number one specifically draws on the Swiss cheese analogy presented in 
Standards Australia (HB 167: 2006, p. 59), where many security controls will exist in a 
“layered” or defence in depth structure, where under normal circumstances the holes in 
each layer are covered up by subsequent layers of controls. 
Qu: Do you agree with panel member number one’s (1) views?  
Res: Yes. 
In addition, panel member number three (3) stated that he views the systems approach 
as being sound security practices in place before an event occurs, that is, adopting the 
principles of security to reduce risks associated with a security context at the start of a 
security project. 
Qu: Do you agree with panel member number three’s (3) views? 
Res: I don’t agree as I don’t think he really has answered the question. Looking at it 
from management theory, the systems approach is about putting in place a combination 
of strategies to achieve a set goal. That is, systems theory should be applied to the 
security function.  
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Furthermore, the pilot panel reported through consensus that the systems approach to 
security relates to how risks can be reduced through a holistic approach, interrelating the 
separate components which combine together to achieve an overall goal. 
Qu: Do you agree with the pilot panel’s consensus relating to the systems approach? 
Res: Yes, this makes what panel member number three (3) seem clearer. 
 
Question 7: According to the principles of systems theory, small changes within a 
specific component can lead to a large change at the output of the systems. Do you 
agree with this premise, can you explain why? 
You answered: Yes, it comes down to a cause and effect. By one small element 
changing, results in a larger-more-macro change. This stimulates a chain reaction 
through the system.  
Participant 1; Re: I agree with this comment. 
 Due to the reliance on each element, the systems based approach must regularly be 
reviewed or weaknesses are created. These small changes can have a domino effect on 
each of the other elements that combines to the systems based structure. The changes 
may be small, but if not considered in a holistic manner or without a clear 
understanding of why an element was implemented or structured in the first place you 
can change the basic premise of why and how it supported other elements within the 
system. Using the Swiss cheese analysis you can actually move the “hole” so that it now 
aligns with another hole. Do this with several or many small changes and you can create 
a weakness that is substantial, yet difficult to recognize or identify. 
A clear understanding of the system is needed. This understanding needs to be 
underpinned by security risk management, integrated through security management 
plans, assessed and reviewed regularly with understanding of the holistic approach. For 
example, time changes in procedures, staff, complacency and a lack of training or 
understanding of initial concepts are enemies of the systems based approach.    
Participant 3; Re: Yes I do. For me, one of the reasons our system breaks down is that 
we are unable to intervene, based on the intelligence due to pressures (political) on the 
system. Small systems changes can have a significant impact at a much higher level and 
can change the strategic direction of an agency.  
 
Feedback: Too this question both panel members’ number one and three agreed. In 
addition, panel member number one’s (1) views were in-line with your own, and states 
“due to the reliance on each element small changes in a system can have a domino 
262 
 
effect on each of the other element that combines to the systems based structure”. The 
changes may be small, but if not considered within a holistic manner or without clear 
understanding of why an element was implemented or structured in the first place, you 
can change the basic premise of why and how it supported other elements within the 
system.  
Panel member number one (1) draws on the Swiss cheese analogy from Standard 
Australia (HB 167: 2006, p. 59) where under normal conditions the holes in each 
security layer are covered up by subsequent layers of controls. However, small changes 
in the system results in the holes aligning with another hole, where if you do this with 
several or small changes you can create a weakness that is substantial, yet difficult to 
recognise or identify. 
Qu: Do you agree with panel member number one’s (1) views? 
Res: Yes, each hole gets bigger as decay sets in, eventually aligning the holes. 
In addition, panel member number three (3) stated that he agrees as small system 
changes can have a significant impact at a much higher level, and can change the 
strategic direction of an agency. 
Qu: Do you agree with panel member number three’s (3) views in relation to this 
specific principle of systems theory? 
Res: I am not sure. 
 
Question 8: Within your understanding of a system, can you tell me what you believe 
the key performance indicators are within a PPS? 
You answered: The key performance indicators give you a measure, where you set 
goals in an organization to ensure you are achieving what the system is designed for, it 
is a monitoring process. As such, the elements of the PPS become the key performance 
indicators. They start off with a probability of detection, then a probability of 
transmitting an alarm actuation, followed by a measure of accurate assessment of the 
alarm cause, then a probability of communicating that alarm source to the appropriate 
response component of the system. Then, the delay time and response time based on 
their mean average become the following system measures. 
 
Participant 1; Re: Key performance indicators are those items that you can use to 
monitor the effectiveness of the ongoing performance of each element of a system. If 
key performance indicators are not being met this could strongly suggest that a specific 
element is not delivering the full capacity or the outcomes for which it was specifically 
designed. 
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If an element is not delivering required performance full capacity or outcomes it may 
therefore not be supporting other elements within the total system in the manner for 
which it was intended to, designed and implemented. 
These shortfalls in elemental performance is very likely to have an impact on the whole 
of the systems performance and therefore if “whole of system KPI’s” are correctly 
identified, structured and monitored these will be directly influenced by elemental 
KPI’s. 
The KPi’s include: 
Management/Procedures 
Log in out systems each shift, recorded training frequency, recorded proficiency 
assessment, recorded regular performance diagnosis. Annual-Bi-annual audits of staff 
training levels, of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP’s), of response procedures. In 
addition, minutes of team meetings, minutes of management meetings and activities 
altered from annual, bi-annual audits.  
Planning/Built environment 
Frequency of physical inspections, frequency of maintenance (gardening type), 
frequency of maintenance (structure type), annual, bi-annual audit, action on annual, bi-
annual audit. Inspection of Central Control Room (CCR) and physical environment. 
Inspection of perimeter zones (erosion, debris, materials) and actions, results of 
inspections. 
Technology 
System false alarm rates, nuisance alarm rates, maintenance records, service breakdown 
records, system down time records, repair period records, record of maintainer training 
records, records of maintainers agent accreditation, records of maintainer’s site 
induction training, records of length of time to rectify “sign off” fault, independent audit 
of routine maintenance, records of daily tests and results, regular audit of compo entry 
integration testing. 
Participant 3; Re: From a prisons perspective, the key performance indicators relate to 
the core elements of defence in depth, they start at deterrence where reducing 
opportunity provides a level of deterrence, then a capability of detection, within a 
context, the verification (assessment) of an alarm event, the delay aspects, where all of 
this is measured against the response capability. In addition, aside from key elements 
other key performance indicators include: fit for purpose (environment) reliability, 
robustness, and technical support. These aspects relate to probability of detection, 
nuisance alarm and false alarm rates.  
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Feedback: Too this question, panel member number three (3) followed a similar view 
to yours, proving what is considered tactical level key performance indicators within the 
system, as the systems key performance indicators. 
Qu: Do you agree with this view relating towards the level of key performance 
indicators? 
This view was also supported by the pilot panel study. However, panel member number 
one (1) provided a much more detailed account of the system key performance 
indicators, some of which were also reported by panel member number three (3). It is 
considered therefore that the key performance indicators reported by panel member 
number one (1) are operational level key performance indicators. 
Qu: Do you support this interpretation? 
Res: Yes, I mean ultimately it is a broad question. As such, a hierarchical level of key 
performance indicators needs to be articulated. The system needs to be designed and 
key performance indicators established through a top down approach, however, audited 
utilizing a Bottom up approach where the operational key performance indicators 
directly relate to the tactical key performance indicators which ultimately relate to the 
systems strategic objective.   
Question 9: Based on your experience, do you believe the key performance indicators 
of the systems are related to the systems effectiveness? Can you explain how? 
You answered: Yes. This is your means to ensure the elements are achieving your 
design goals. To ensure you can measure for any problems at its earliest opportunity. 
Key performance indicator reduction at the micro-level reduces key performance 
indicators at the macro level. The overall key performance indicator provides a strategic 
level of monitoring effectiveness. 
Participant 1; Re: Yes, KPi’s are and should be related to system effectiveness. If you 
refer back to my answer to question 7, I believe that KPi’s are a measure of whether an 
element and therefore a system is delivering the outcomes and functionality for which it 
was designed. This directly determines or impacts on the elements effectiveness as a 
single element performing its required function and effectiveness is supporting other 
elements in its functions within the total system. Again, the Swiss cheese effect. If one 
or more elements of a system are not performing in the manner intended, they do not 
support system security and would therefore directly impact on KPI’s. 
Participant 3; Re: I do believe the systems performance indicators are related to the 
systems overall key performance indicators. We look at the selection of components 
from their individual key performance indicators, such as probability of detection, 
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nuisance alarm rate, false alarm rate etc, then combine them together into a designed 
whole.  
Feedback: Too this question all panel members reported that they do believe the key 
performance indicators of the system are related to the systems effectiveness, based on 
the argument that key performance indicator reduction at the micro-level reduces key 
performance indicators at the macro level, where according to panel member number 
one, if one or more elements of a system are not performing in the manner intended, 
they do not support system security and would therefore directly impact on it. 
Such a consensus was also reported by the pilot study. 
Qu: Do you support that a consensus to this question exists? 
Res: Yes. 
Question 10: Based on your experience, do you believe that security systems decay? 
You answered: Yes they do decay.   
Participant 1; Re: Yes I do believe that security systems can and do experience decay. 
Participant 3; Re: Oh yes. 
Feedback: Too this question all panel members reported yes. Therefore it is interpreted 
that a consensus exists amongst the panel that security systems do suffer from decay. 
In addition, a consensus was also reported by the pilot study congruent with this panel’s 
consensus. 
Qu: Do you support such an interpretation? 
Res: Yes I do. 
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APPENDIX E 
RESEARCH PANEL TWO: PHASE THREE EXPERT INTERVIEW AND 
FEEDBACK TRANSCRIPT 
 
The following transcript was taken from panel two, member three’s feedback (Round 
two participant interview) transcript from question 10 -20 to demonstrate a typical 
interview. 
 
Interview transcript 
 
Question 10: Too the question: Based on your experience, do you believe that security 
systems decay? 
You answered: I believe security systems categorically decay. There is however, not a 
reason in the world why you can’t keep the system working properly; however, to 
achieve this, over time maintenance costs will increase. 
Participant 1; Re: Yes they do if they are not maintained. 
Participant 2; Re: Yes of course. 
Feedback: Too this question, all panel members responded yes, providing a consensus 
amongst the panel supporting the argument security systems decay. Furthermore, a 
consensus supporting the argument that security systems decay was also achieved by 
research panel one and the pilot panel. As such, it is interpreted that a consensus 
achieved across the research panel that security systems decay. 
Qu: Do you support this interpretation?] 
ANSW: Yes. 
Question 11: Too the question: What is your understanding of security decay? 
You answered: People install systems that do not understand what underpins them. We 
do design in parameters to facilitate for decay. For example, Figure 3 Shows how decay 
is considered in engineering aspects.  
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Figure 3: panel member three’s lighting degradation diagram 
However, the lack of knowledge and management of these parameters leads to security 
decay. 
That is, a number of factors lead to decay:  
• Lack of professional management is a significant factor, 
• Lack of continuity in educating management on how the system works, 
• Lack of formal training, where training is handed down rather than through 
formal processes, 
• Physical aspects decay through lack of maintenance, 
• Technology does get old and decays. 
This once again refers back to the Campbell triangle (Figure 7.1), where decay occurs in 
all three aspects: management, technology and physical engineering.   
There is however, no reason in the world why you can’t keep the system working 
properly. That is, if you manage the engineering aspects of decay, there is no reason that 
you shouldn’t be able to avoid decay. 
Participant 1; Re: The degradation of security systems, processes and hardware 
(security) arrangements, and personnel procedures. 
Participant 2; Re: The decline in the efficacy (effectiveness), and efficiency of the 
security function, and correlating increase in risk. Also the inappropriate response to 
security events which causes a new or updated security function which has no impact in 
altering or managing the risk, decay leads to adhoc security.   
Feedback: To this question, panel member two (2) responded that security decay 
relates to the decline in the efficacy (effectiveness) of the security solution, and its 
correlating increase in risk. Panel member one (1) responded that degradation of the 
security systems, processes and hardware arrangement and personnel procedures is what 
he consider to be security decay. In considering these views, panel member one (1), 
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research panel one (1) stated, “Security system decay is the degradation in the 
performance of an element of the security solution. Both as a single element performing 
a specific function, and its role in supporting other elements in their function within the 
total system. This may not be a major failure of the system, but mere incremental 
decrease in performance that occurs over time. This decay may however occur 
incrementally and continue over an extended period to the point it has a significant 
impact on performance and effectiveness. Furthermore, this may be compounded further 
where this decay occurs over many or all of the elements within a system. 
 Qu: Do you agree with this view relating to security decay?  
ANSW: Yes. 
In considering panel member one’s (research panel one) views, you stated that systems 
are designed with parameters to facilitate for decay. Figure ? shows an engineering 
aspect of such inbuilt tolerance. That is, decay occurs when performance falls below 
these engineered parameters. However, a lack of knowledge and poor management of 
these parameters leads to security decay 
QU: Do support this representation of your views? 
ANSW: Yes that’s right. Build in the quality that will maintain the system over time. 
Question 12: Too the question: Can you tell me about a time when you experienced 
security controls degrading, what occurred? 
You answered: I cannot name specific areas or organisations. An audit (security audit) 
I did was on an old system. However, I had the privilege of speaking directly to the 
people who set it. When I do an audit I look at: 
• Management 
• Physical 
• Technical. 
The system I was auditing had clearly suffered decay because no-body wrote down in 
the first place what the system was meant to achieve (no measures of performance). I 
found that a lack of education and awareness in how the system is meant to operate. To 
overcome such systemic decay, the systems purpose and aspects needs to be written 
down, as a document. What occurs is that changes based on wants are implemented; 
however these changes are made to satisfy people, not to maintain the security plan. The 
system needs a defined security plan otherwise changes occur which lead to decay. 
Participant 1; Re: Yes in people’s apathy, for us, day one we give them an induction 
awareness lecture, then they walk out and forget it immediately. Then security processes 
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decay over time when nothing happens. For example, people do not report security 
incidents, even though they have been told and trained to report them. This failure 
breaks down the knowledge of what is going on in the field. 
Participant 2; Re: Often why I as a consultant is called in, in the first place is to review 
security after an incident. In our experience we find that security decay occurs in non 
systems arranged approaches to security, where isolated security measures are failing. 
For example, I conducted a cash handling audit for local government. During the audit I 
found that whilst staff believed they were protected by a duress alarm system, the 
system had been disconnected for two years. In addition, the built environment 
maintenance had decreased due to leasing issues. However, the operational environment 
had changed, where cash movements had increased dramatically. I was called in as a 
robbery in the area occurred, where in response to that robbery the security 
improvements were excessive after the fact. 
Feedback: To this question all panel members provided practical examples, 
highlighting they have experienced security decay. In-line with this panels self report of 
experiencing security decay, both the pilot panel and research panel one also provided 
practical examples of where they have experienced security decay. For example, 
research panel one provided the following examples: 
Participant 1; Re: There are many practical examples of where elemental and or, 
systems decay/degrading. Examples include: 
1. Lack of maintenance in the perimeter zones (weeds and other feral growth) 
causing an increase in nuisance alarm rates, causing lack of confidence and 
increasing operator’s complacency, Lack in electronic system maintenance, 
having the same cause and effect as above. 
2. Poor or total lack of daily testing procedures being implemented, resulting in a 
failure to identify systems not working. Training occurring for new staff by 
handed down experience rather than from training processes, meaning incorrect 
procedures or bad habits being passed down.  
3. A lack of ongoing training to reinforce correct processes and procedures, having 
the same cause and effect as above.  
4. Changes to the perimeter built environment or changes to adjacent areas without 
considering the perimeter detection and surveillance systems. 
5. Changes to the Central Control Room (CCR) physical environment without 
consideration of operational efficiency or operational performance.   
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6. Changes to electronic systems, set up in CCR, i.e. CCTV/SMS etc to suit 
personal preference without reference to initial design considerations and 
integrated response requirements. 
7. Physical deterioration of physical elements, which are not maintained, reducing 
the effectiveness of the element as a barrier, or in whatever function it performs. 
There are many others 
Participant 2; I have noticed that as staff competencies fluctuate, this fluctuation alters 
individual key performance indicators where decay occurs in relation to the reduction in 
competencies and capabilities of the people components. That is, most agencies work at 
the lowest common denominator where system key performance indicators are based on 
the lowest standard, this includes training, of competency to achieve that aspect of the 
system. System key performance indicators increase with competency increase, and of 
course decrease as those competencies decrease. 
Participant 3; Re: Yes, a situation involving staff’s lack of familiarization/awareness 
with procedural security, during perimeter alarm checks. A system we put in introduced 
a microphonic alarm in a cowling, where the decay relates to improper testing around its 
designed requirement. Often staff do not test systems properly, in-line with their 
procedures resulting in technical decay as we do not know if the system is working 
based on its design configuration. Also camera alarm presets, staff when testing 
perimeter systems do not test all aspects such as alarm preset positions and field of view 
objectives for cameras. 
Also, environmental impact on physical structure, for example, on a high security fence 
the plinth was not designed to move water, therefore water sat at the base of the fence, 
and due to the high salt content in that area physical decay of the barrier occurred. Such 
physical decay needs to be considered at the design stage of a security project.   
As such, it is interpreted that security decay as a phenomenon has been directly 
experienced by all research sample members. 
Qu: Do you support this interpretation. 
ANSW: Yes. 
 
Question 13: Too the question: In considering the argument that security controls 
decay, how do you think this occurs within a systems approach towards security? 
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You answered: Once again the Campbell triangle (Figure ?), decay occurs in each, or 
all aspects of the triangle, then based on what a system is, and how the system operates, 
decay occurs in-line with what underpins the system. 
Participant 1; Re: Based on what we have talked about, normally a benign security 
environment leads to a reduction in the security program, that is small changes. These 
changes eventually leave the system vulnerable so when something does happen 
everybody’s guard is down. 
Participant 2; Re: A breakdown in monitoring and reviewing, as well as 
accountability, against external pressures, finance, people over time. Systems require 
efficiencies, but security events can lead to spending cuts within the system which can 
lead to a large change within the system. 
Feedback: To this question, you responded, once again the Campbell triangle (Figure 
?), decay occurs in each, or all aspects of the triangle, then based on what a system is, 
and how the system operates, decay occurs in-line with what underpins the system. In-
line with your views, panel member one (1) research panel one (1) stated, “I believe that 
security decay within a PPS occurs within its individual elements, them propagates 
through the system. Decay occurs at the base elemental level over time”. In-line with 
this approach, panel member three (3), research panel one (1) stated, “Any aspect of 
decay affects the rest of the system”. For example, multiple false alarms can propagate 
through the rest of the system, when complacency sets in, alarm inputs are not 
discriminated or reported, ultimately affecting the response aspect of the system. 
Qu: Do you support this approach to how security decay occurs within a systems 
approach? 
ANSW: Yes, it can be an outcome. 
Furthermore, panel member three (3), research panel one (1), and the pilot panel 
reported that security decay can affect the systems deterrence aspect as well. 
Qu: Do agree with this view?   
ANSW: Yes it can, that’s a fact. 
 
Question 14: Too the question: The concept of security decay argues that decay within 
a PPS occurs within individual constituents, within the PPS, and its effects propagate 
through the system from this point. Based on your experience, do you support this 
premise and why/why not? 
You answered: Yes, decay can occur in all three elements based again on the Campbell 
triangle. 
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Participant 1; Re: Yes. Something serious would have a knock on effect elsewhere. 
Participant 2; Re: Yes. Small changes can lead to large security implications, much 
like a chain. A chain is only as good as its weakest link or point. When that weakest 
point breaks the result can be larger.  
Feedback: To this question, all panel members responded yes, based on and in-line 
with their earlier responses. In considering the panel’s consensus responses to this 
question, research panel one supported through consensus the summary that a system is 
a combination of various inputs, where each of these inputs has a function in performing 
a specific function and supporting functions of others (interrelationships) therefore 
small changes across many/all elements can have a major impact on the system at the 
macro level.  
Qu: Do you agree with this summary and support that a consensus exists within the 
research sample that, based on the above reasoning, decay within a PPS occurs within 
individual constituents, within the PPS, and its effects propagate through the system 
from this point. 
ANSW: Yes. 
Question 15: Too the question: Systems theory and specifically an effect referred to as 
the butterfly effect suggests small input changes within a system can result in large 
changes at its macro output. Do you feel this applies to a PPS? Can you give me an 
example where you have come across this? 
You answered: Yes. However, every time you do a security system, there are 2 x 
mission critical analysis. 
1. Establishes the context required, analyses the system for single point failure. 
This analysis considers built in redundancy to stop single point failure. 
2. Apply the tools, to look for the single point factor, which leads to the butterfly 
effect, to overcome it. That is, compatibility of design, where the key is inbuilt 
redundancy. Once again, Figure ? Shows how inbuilt redundancy works, decay 
occurs when the effectiveness falls below this inbuilt redundancy.  
If these aspects of system design do not occur, yes you will have the Butterfly effect.  
Participant 1; Re: Yes it does. For us, during drug and alchohol testing for mine sites. 
If the system is not in place, or effective, this deficiency can lead to a security or safety 
related incident. 
Participant 2; Re: Yes, as discussed above, one small change leads to larger chain 
reactions. 
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Feedback: Too this question, all panel members responded yes. However, panel 
member three (3) highlights the point that inbuilt redundancy to stop single point failure 
is/should be built in, where decay occurs when the effectiveness falls below this inbuilt 
redundancy, and states “if these aspects (Figure ) of system design do not occur, or are 
not maintained, yes you will have the “Butterfly” effect. In considering panel member 
three’s (3) views, panel member two (2), research panel one (1) provides the following 
supporting statement: Yes I agree with this metaphor being applied to PPS. The 
example I can give relates to procedural decay. I have observed that for systems an 
initial level of training is introduced, at a specific level. This training has a macro-level 
output throughout the system. Over time, when this level of training is declined, that 
level of competency is declined, affecting the remainder of the security system.  
As such, it is interpreted that, certain conditions considered in-line with panel member 
three (3), research panel two (2), that a consensus exists across the research sample that 
the “Butterfly” metaphor does apply to a PPS. 
Qu: Do you support this interpretation? 
ANSW: Yes. 
Question 16: Too the question: Based on your experience what do you consider the 
effects of decay are? 
You answered: The effects are that if the system decays, it is directly proportional to 
the loss of risk management.  
Participant 1; Re: A more apathetic work force, degradation may affect assets, 
personnel and the service delivery of your product. 
Participant 2; Re: Invariably it will lead to a security related incident, a degree of loss, 
then in response excessive spending, and potentially re-justification of the system itself. 
Feedback: To this question, a common theme is that security risks increase as a direct 
result of decay within a security system. Research panel one (1) supported through 
consensus that decay occurs at the component/constituent level, then degrades key 
performance indicators, reducing sub-system key performance indicators. Such decay 
ultimately affects the risk reduction aspects of the system, bearing a strategic impact on 
the organisation. 
Qu: Do you support such a view towards the effects of security decay? 
ANSW: Yes. 
Question 17: Too the question: Once decay has set in, do you think its effects, both at 
the point of manifestation and throughout the remainder of the system are reversible. 
How do you think so, or why don’ you think so? 
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You answered: Yes, absolutely. Because as soon as decay has been recognised 
(independent audit is usually required), through professional management of the 
problem the decay can be overcome.  
Participant 1; Re: Yes, but it does come down to leadership and management support 
and of course the necessary resources. You need the will to turn decay around. 
Participant 2; Re: Yes they are reversible. Whether that happens comes down to 
management structure, through maintenance review, awareness recognition, and 
preventative maintenance.   
Feedback: To this question, all panel members responded yes, providing a consensus 
within the panel that decay, both at its point of manifestation and throughout the 
remainder of the system are reversible. Such a consensus was also achieved by the pilot 
panel. However, research panel one (1) argued that it depends on what the decay is 
related to. Research panel one (1) agreed that procedural decay could be reversed and 
prevented through management, that is, ongoing monitoring and reviewing of the 
people component of the system. However, physical and technical decay can only be 
controlled/delayed through processes. Research panel one (1) agreed that all physical 
and technology components have a life cycle, where eventually they will decay beyond 
a repairable state. However, with proper maintenance, decay can be slowed and 
managed. 
Qu: Do you agree with these additional aspects relating to security decay from a 
systems perspective? 
ANSW: All points are right to a point. From an engineer’s perspective, technology has 
a finite life 8-10 years, however this is usually pushed to 12, it does vary from system to 
system. There is no reason why the system cannot be kept at the original detection 
capabilities, however these costs associated with this will rise each year. If you budget 
for about 10% of the systems costs a year it would balance out across the systems life 
cycle. With proper maintenance there is no reason why the system cannot maintain its 
design specification capabilities over its life cycle.  
My philosophy is that decay is a quantifiable factor, decay must be managed so it does 
not fall below the inbuilt redundancy level. 
Furthermore, panel member two (2), research panel one (1) stated, “decay can only be 
countered if it is understood”. 
Qu: Do you agree with this panel member’s view? 
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ANSW: Yes, once again you need to professionally manage the system in-line with the 
triangle, to do this you must understand how it works, if you don’t understand how it 
works how do you manage decay? 
Question 18: Too the question: Do you think decay can be avoided. How do you think 
the effects of decay within a security system can be avoided, or why don’t you think the 
effects of decay within a security system can be avoided. 
You answered: Absolutely, and unequivocally. It can be done (avoided) through 
professional management which looks after the technology, physical aspects and 
operational aspects. If you manage the triangle you manage the system, avoid decay, 
that is, avoid the movement below the level of inbuilt redundancy. 
Participant 1; Re: Yes, possibly. It comes down to management’s will and capacity. 
Decay is a political concern rather than a technical aspect. 
Participant 2; Re: Yes it can be avoided, through the proper management, the 
monitoring and review of the systems key performance indicators, as the key 
performance indicators tell you what is going on and wrong. In addition, through a 
system driven by clear policy. 
Feedback: To this question, all panel members responded that decay can be avoided, 
where panel member three (3) stated through professional management, focusing on 
technology, physical and operational (procedural) aspects. According to panel member 
three (3), if you manage the triangle, you manage the system, and avoid decay, that is, 
you avoid the movement below the level of inbuilt redundancy. In-line with panel 
member three’s (3) views, panel member two (2) states, “proper management, 
monitoring and reviewing the systems key performance indicators enables decay to be 
avoided, the key performance indicators tell you what is going on and wrong.  
However, research panel one (1) argued that procedural decay can be avoided, however, 
technical and physical decay can only be managed, and its effects delayed through 
proper monitored maintenance. 
QU: Do you agree with this additional information?  
ANSW: Not true, as stated, both physical and technical aspects of the system can be 
maintained at their commissioned level over time, that is over the cycle of the system. It 
can be maintained to ensure over the systems life cycle that it performs at the designed 
capabilities, for example the designed detection capabilities “Commissioned level 
performance” .  
As such, at this point, it is interpreted that a consensus exists within the panel that decay 
can be avoided through professional management, which focuses on the aspects of panel 
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member three’s (3) triangle, where by focusing on the systems performance measures 
(KPI’s) enables the professional management of the triangle, towards avoiding decay. 
Qu: Do you support this summary and interpretation that a consensus in relation to 
these aspects of security decay.   
ANSW: Yes, but I still don’t like the key performance indicator terminology as you 
could end up with a tick in the box approach, the system requires professional 
knowledge to manage the system to avoid decay. What worries me is the idea that we 
can develop a tick box solution where it is considered that the sheets provide the 
expertise not the people, especially since over time the impression will be anybody can 
manage the system using the tick box approach, and this just isn’t true.   
Question 19: Too the question: Do you believe the concept of decay has a place in the 
risk management process. If so where in the process, if not why not? 
You answered: Yes it does have a valid place, you would have to assess for decay. You 
need to able to take the security objective measures to management, to show them how 
we don’t have enough money to manage the system. The only place decay has, is that if 
you don’t manage it properly. 
Participant 1; Re: Yes, I think in the ISO 31000, the context section, decay is a risk.  
Participant 2; Re: Yes, in establishing the context. Security decay is a context, 
recognising it as a risk. Also, in the evaluation process. 
Feedback: To this question, all panel members responded yes. In addition, a theme 
developed where the majority of the research sample see that decay needs to be 
considered as a security risk. A consensus was reached by research panel one (1) that 
security decay should be considered as a “system”, considered at the design stage, 
considered against its consequences, with a view to countering it where practicable as a 
risk treatment, towards designing out decay, then continually assessed for in the monitor 
and review stage.   
Qu: Do you support this summary and finding? 
ANSW: Yes. 
Question 20: Too the question: Based on your experience, is there any facet of security 
decay which you can add to the research enquiry. This may include factors associated 
with either the cause of decay or impacts from it? 
You answered: Decay is caused because of a lack of professional management, 
security management. That is: 
• Lack of education 
• Lack of system awareness 
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• Employing the wrong people to manage it, for example ex police or ex military 
people who don’t understand the technical aspects of security, what they are 
actually managing. This goes back to the quantifiable performance measures of 
the system.  
Participant 1; Re: Security decay as a concern will be constantly driven by 
organizational culture, then the resources prioritization, coupled with the threat 
landscape. 
Participant 2; Re: Security decay is common in various forms. 
Feedback: Too this question panel members from research panel one (1) provided the 
following responses: 
Participant 3; Re: Security decay will always be managed against the level of recurrent 
funding available. 
Feedback: Too this question, panel member number three stated that security decay 
will always be managed against the level of recurrent funding available. 
Qu: Do you agree with this point? 
ANSW: No necessarily, it comes down to professional management. 
Res: When you put your capital submission forward you must, at a strategic level, 
indentify whether the system you are putting in is achievable, and you can maintain the 
system you are putting in. This recurrent funding submission is required at the design 
stage.   
Qu: Do agree with panel member three’s responses? 
ANSW: Absolutely. 
